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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For about 30 years the adequacy of education finance has been litigated in state 
courts across the United States.  Ironically these suits have been filed, pursued, and 
decided without a firm consensus in the educational or political communities about what 
adequacy means.  Instead, judges have rendered opinions about the amount and 
distribution of money in the state’s education system based on sentences or phrases in 
state constitutions (Banks, 1991; Thro, 1993, 1994).  What guides jurists from cryptic 
constitutional phrases to adequacy rulings? 
Academic theories about adequacy probably have not guided judicial decision-
making.  Verstegen explains that, “unlike the notion of equity, the conceptualization and 
measurement of adequacy in education has received a paucity of attention” (1998, p. 52), 
while Ladd and Hansen say “that adequacy as an equity concept still requires much 
development and must be used with an awareness of this fact” (1999, p. 132).   
The four primary methods the courts use for determining adequacy are practical 
rather than theoretical.  They attempt to provide courts with the cost of an adequate 
education.  The statistical approaches used by Duncombe and Yinger as well as 
Reschovsky and Imazeki (2001; 2003) use existing data about school inputs and outputs 
to determine the amount of resources needed to produce a level of student achievement.  
Augenblick’s (1997) method looks at the resource levels used in “successful” districts 
and projects those resources onto other districts, assuming that if one district can be 
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successful with a level of resources, then all could be successful with that level of 
resources.  Haveman’s (2004) model is similar; however it is more sophisticated in 
comparing district characteristics.  The Professional Judgment approach pioneered by 
Chambers and Parrish and used by Guthrie and Rothstein (1999) removes the black box 
of statistics and simply tallies the best educated opinions of knowledgeable experts to 
determine the cost of an adequate education.  Finally some studies indicate some 
commercial packaged educational systems are effective.  New Jersey’s high court 
accepted those costs as proof that the state was spending enough to provide an adequate 
education (Goertz & Edwards, 1999; Ladd & Hansen, 1999; Ritter & Lauver, 2003).  
While courts have considered these practical approaches to funding adequacy, 
researchers have had mixed success explaining judges’ rulings in education finance cases.  
Potential influences include case facts and legal rules, the judges’ personalities or 
political views, other governmental branches, the economy or social trends, or 
institutional features such as selection method of judges and term length (Lundberg, 
2000, p. 1101; Swenson, 2000).  State per capita income and political culture were 
significant predictors of judicial behavior, but constitutional language and case facts, 
court partisanship and institutional features were not significant (Lundberg, 2000; 
Swenson, 2000; van Geel, 1982).  Thro (1993) thought the strength of a state 
constitution’s education clause should predict court rulings on the constitutionality of 
education funding systems; however research indicates education clauses do not explain 
judges’ rulings (Banks, 1991; Dayton, Dupre, & Kiracofe, 2004; Lundberg, 2000, p. 
1115; Swenson, 2000).  Dayton et al. thought the economy’s condition influenced 
judicial orders (2005); however, Smith interviewed judges who “all said they took into 
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consideration the political and economic repercussions their decisions might have,” but 
“they all also agreed that such considerations had very little or no influence on their 
decisions” (1994, p. 222, 224).  Enrich noticed that courts turned “to a variety of sources 
– constitutional history, expert opinion and testimony, dictionary definitions, the thinking 
of other courts” to justify their decisions, “but it remains unclear how any of these can 
truly ground the crucial step from generic constitutional language to specific substantive 
criteria.”  Enrich declares, “Ultimately, these courts have simply, and boldly, taken it 
upon themselves to define the contours of educational adequacy” (1995, p. 175).   
One under-explored possibility is whether judicial beliefs affect adequacy rulings.  
Danelski asserts the “concept of values is central to the explanation of judicial decision-
making” (1966, p. 722).  Pritchett (1941) pioneered research into judicial attitudes and 
their effect on judicial decision making.  Segal and Spaeth (2002) added economic 
models and rational choice models to the list of techniques used to study judicial rulings.  
Schubert put behavioral research into judicial decisions “under four major categories: 
group interaction, courts as small groups, the political socialization of judges and the 
social psychology of judicial attitudes” (1963, p. 433).  Based on his analysis of the U. S. 
Supreme Court from 1943 to 1944, Schubert says “the inference seems warranted that the 
attitudes of the justices toward issues of civil liberties and economic liberalism probably 
have, together, dominated the disposition of most cases decided by the Supreme Court on 
the merits during at least the past two decades (1963, p. 433).  Tate attributed justices’ 
background characteristics to their eventual voting behavior on the court (1981; Tate & 
Handberg, 1991).  If there is no consensus about the theoretical or practical meaning of 
adequacy of educational financing, and if constitutional language does not predict judicial 
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behavior, and if judicial attitudes do sometimes explain judicial behavior, then might 
judicial attitudes explain adequacy remedies?  If value judgments are “inherent in 
alternative standards of equity as applied to school finance” (Berne & Stiefel, 1979, p. 
15) then do judicial values, beliefs or attitudes influence adequacy rulings?   
Scholars have created various scales to examine judicial beliefs, values and 
attitudes; however, none seemed appropriate for this study.  Danelski (1966) created 
value spaces according to the intensity, congruity and cognitive completeness of the 
judge’s ideas.  This described judicial beliefs in three dimensions.  It also required more 
information than was likely to be revealed in court dicta.  Schubert (1965) scaled judicial 
beliefs according to economic and political liberalism, Segal and Cover (1989) used a 
liberal-moderate-conservative scale, and Lundberg (2000) used judicial political party 
membership, but these all seemed too crude for education finance research, especially 
since politicians of all stripes call for better schools.  New York’s Judge Jones said, “It is 
not whether education is of primary rank in our hierarchy of societal values; all recognize 
that it is” (Levittown School District v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982), p. 370).  Segal 
and Spaeth (2002) defined judicial values based on rulings across a variety of cases; 
however, this involved greater knowledge of judicial rulings than was reasonable for this 
study, and other research indicated that technique might not work at the state court level 
(Fair, 1967).  Berne and Stiefel offered important questions guiding value judgments in 
equity cases; however, they were inappropriate for this study.  Similarly, Guthrie (2004) 
suggested that all educational finance decisions revolve around questions of equity, 
efficiency and liberty; however, they required trade-offs that limited the value space 
between them. 
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What was needed were scales of the beliefs that would shape the development of 
an educational system.  Beliefs about resources were an obvious choice, starting with the 
minimalist ideas of Milton Friedman (1962) and ending in an ideal world where money is 
no object.  Children are the input, focus, and product of the education system; so judges’ 
beliefs about children’s entitlements seemed fundamental to designing an adequate 
education system.  Finally the purpose of schools in society seemed critical, since 
purpose should drive design.  As a result of this thinking, this study will examine judges’ 
beliefs about resources, school’s role in society, and children’s entitlements. 
More specifically, by analyzing high court orders this study hopes to find 
indications of judicial beliefs about education.  These beliefs will be scaled and compared 
to the resulting remedy to see if there is a correlation. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
The study uses scales of belief about education and a theoretical model of 
adequacy to examine the relationship between judicial beliefs and state high court 
adequacy remedies.  The underlying hypothesis is that high court orders contain implicit 
models of adequacy that reflect judicial beliefs about the availability of resources, 
school’s role in society, and student entitlements.  “Law not only reflects differences of 
political influence and economic interests; it also expresses beliefs in systematic and 
binding terms, thus framing the ways in which people can make claims on government” 
(Tyack, James, & Benavot, 1987, p. 4, emphasis added).  These beliefs affect the breadth 
and level of knowledge, and intended student recipients of educational resources. To test 
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these hypotheses, this paper measures and compares judicial beliefs and remedies as 
reflected in state high court rulings on the adequacy of education finance systems.   
For this paper, judicial beliefs about education include beliefs about resources, 
student entitlements and school’s role in society.  Judicial beliefs about the availability of 
resources are presumed to range from scarce to abundant.  Judicial beliefs about student 
entitlements are presumed to range from no entitlement to an entitlement to equal 
educational outcomes.  Judicial beliefs about school’s role in society are presumed to 
range from no role to that of social equalizer and leveler. 
Similarly judicial ideas about the adequacy of an education system involve the 
breadth of courses and the level of learning for a hypothetical student population.  The 
breadth of courses concerns the variety of subjects students should learn.  The level of 
learning concerns the extent to which students should learn the various subjects.  Finally 
all students will not learn all subjects with equal aplomb, so that a hypothetical student 
body can be described according to their educability, or the proficiency with which they 
can master the various subjects to the level of ability society expects.  Beliefs about 
resources, school’s role in society and student entitlements may interact with the three 
dimensions of an adequate education system in various ways. 
Judges who believe resources are scarce will be less likely to interfere with their 
use or to try to use them for the benefit of the less fortunate at the expense of those who 
have those resources already, while judges who believe that resources are plentiful will 
be more interested in using them to influence students’ lives and the future of society. 
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Hypothesis 1: Judges who believe resources are scarce will distribute resources 
equally to students of all educability, while judges who believe resources are plentiful 
will give more resources to the least educable students. 
Judges who believe students are entitled to whatever their families or 
circumstances provide are unlikely to interfere with the distribution of resources, while 
judges who believe students are entitled to a certain result after attending school will try 
to move resources to the least educable students. 
Hypothesis 2: Judges who believe students are entitled to what their families can 
provide or to equal resources from the state will allow inequities or provide money 
equally to all students, while judges who believe students are entitled to equal outcomes 
from education will focus resources on the least educable students. 
Judges who hold a minimalist view of the role of school in society will expect 
little from and pay little for education and will not expect the legislature to use schools to 
enhance the future prospects for all children, but judges who believe schools are 
implements of social policy will target educational resources at the least educable. 
Hypothesis 3: Judges who believe education is a parental responsibility or that 
schools must only enable students to read, write and count will distribute resources 
equally to all students or perhaps allow the wealthy the liberty to spend more, while 
judges who believe schools exist to enable students to pursue personal fulfillment or to 
reduce social inequity will target more resources on the least educable students. 
Judges who believe the state has limited resources and must chose wisely in 
dedicating them to various good purposes will be reluctant to expand the range of courses 
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or objectives for the school system, while judges who believe the state has plentiful 
resources will be more willing expand what schools enable children to do. 
Hypothesis 4: Judges who believe resources are scarce will demand a narrow 
breadth of knowledge, while judges who believe resources are plentiful will demand 
students get a broader range of knowledge. 
Judges who hold a narrower view of students’ entitlements will demand that the 
schools do less for them than judges who hold a broader view of students’ entitlements. 
Hypothesis 5: Judges who believe children are entitled to equal resources or what 
their parents can provide will call for a narrower breadth of knowledge, while judges who 
believe children are entitled to the maximum opportunity or equal outcomes will demand 
students learn a wider breadth of knowledge. 
Judges who believe schools are only one part of a child’s overall development 
will demand that schools do less for their students, while judges who believe schools are 
an instrument of social policy intended to enhance the future prospects for children will 
demand schools enable students to do a broader range of things. 
Hypothesis 6: Judges who believe education is a family responsibility or that 
schools must enable students only to read, write and count will require a narrower 
breadth of knowledge, while judges who believe schools must enable citizens to compete 
in the market or pursue personal fulfillment will demand a wider breadth of knowledge. 
Judges who believe resources are scarce will resist ordering a high level of 
student accomplishment, while judges who believe resources are bountiful or otherwise 
misused will demand resources be used to increase the levels of student learning. 
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Hypothesis 7: Judges who believe resources are scarce will call for lesser levels of 
accomplishment in students, while judges who believe resources are plentiful will call for 
higher levels of student accomplishment. 
Judges who believe students are entitled only to a minimum education will only 
demand schools develop a minimal level of skill in their students, while judges who 
believe students are entitled to the best that society can provide will demand students be 
educated to a higher level of accomplishment. 
Hypothesis 8: Judges who believe education is a family responsibility or that 
schools must enable students only to read, write and count will call for a lesser level of 
accomplishment in students, while judges who believe students deserve the maximum 
opportunity will claim students have a right to higher levels of accomplishment. 
Judges who see schools as merely enabling students to master the basics will 
demand schools bring students to a lesser level of learning, while judges who believe 
schools exist to provide all a student needs to succeed in life will demand schools equip 
students with higher levels of learning. 
Hypothesis 9: Judges who believe schools must only enable citizens to read, write 
and count will call for lower levels of student accomplishment, while judges who believe 
schools must enable citizens to compete in the market or pursue personal fulfillment will 
demand higher levels of student accomplishment. 
  
Definitions 
Adequacy – There is no single definition of adequacy accepted among scholars.  
Webster’s defines adequate as “1. equal to the requirement or occasion; sufficient; 
10 
suitable” and “2. barely satisfactory; acceptable but not remarkable” ("Webster's New 
Universal Unabridged Dictionary," 1983).  While defining adequate is easy, defining an 
adequate education is infinitely more difficult and much less sure.  The Rhode Island 
state high court opined “what constitutes an ‘equal, adequate, and meaningful’ 
[education] is not likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so 
earnestly debate the issues” (City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I., 1995)), 
and others assure us “no standard definition of adequacy exists” (First & DeLuca, 2003, 
p. 190) and the “meaning of adequacy is still unclear” (Ladd & Hansen, 1999, p. 132).  
Nevertheless, the education finance literature is replete with references to adequacy.  
Core defining characteristics of adequacy as discussed in the literature are in Chapter II.  
Parrish and Chambers defined adequacy as “the provision of learning services sufficient 
to meet a goal” (1982, p. 7).  Using that starting point, this paper defines adequacy as the 
provision of learning services sufficient to enable the top 95% of students to meet a 
criterion-referenced goal.   
Educability – Educability refers to the ease with which a learner can acquire 
knowledge, skills or attitudes (KSAs) valued by society.  Synonyms include trainability, 
aptitude or quickness.  Webster’s describes educability as “capacity for receiving 
education or of being instructed” ("Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary," 
1983).  A more educable child requires fewer resources to acquire the same KSAs.  All 
learners will not acquire all KSAs with the same ease.  A child could learn to play a tuba 
easily while she struggled to wield a paintbrush.  Another child could diagnose a 
mechanical problem in a car but have trouble reading the manual (Gardner, 1983).   
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Breadth of skills – Breadth refers to the range of KSAs schools try to impart to 
students.  Breadth refers to the extent to which schools attempt to make students jacks of 
all trades.  Ladd and Hansen call this the “adequacy of what” and refer to it as 
“qualitative adequacy” (1999, p. 104).  Traditionally this has included the “three R’s,” i.e. 
reading, writing and arithmetic; however, it could include the entire gamut of human 
capabilities; musical and artistic skills and appreciation, physical training, interpersonal 
skills, intrapersonal skills, vocational skills, etc.   
Ability Level – Ability level refers to the level of skill schools provide their 
students.  There are levels of ability or achievement in all KSAs.  Ladd and Hansen refer 
to this as “quantitative adequacy” or the question of “how much” (1999, p. 104).  Wise 
(1983) might consider this the goal of education.  
Educator Effort – Educator effort refers to the amount of resources needed to 
bring a learner to a defined ability level in a defined KSA, including teacher time and 
energy, administrative and support personnel, materials, buildings, transportation, school-
delivered social services, and the entire expenditure of resources that enable a child to 
learn.  Educator effort does not include effort expended by family, friends, clergy, Little 
League coaches, and the rest of the “village” that helps a child develop (Clinton, 1996). 
Beliefs, values and attitudes – These terms are used interchangeably to indicate 
underlying motives that shape judicial behavior.  Value is used in the sense of “acts, 
customs, institutions, etc. regarded in a particular, especially favorable way.”  Belief 
means “an opinion; expectation; judgment,” and attitude is “one’s disposition, opinion, 
etc.”  (Definitions from Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 1983).  
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High Court – Because the highest court in every state is not called the “Supreme” 
court, this paper uses the term high court to refer to each state’s highest court. 
 
Delimitations 
Although the model is rooted in the thinking of other scholars (Ladd & Hansen, 
1999; Wise, 1983), it is a new and untested idea.  This theory, like all theories, is a 
speculative explanation, tentatively held, waiting to be disproved or discarded.  It is 
offered with the understanding that, “All theories are provisional and partial, and 
particularly in the social sciences, they tend to be imperfectly articulated, imperfectly 
operationalized and imperfectly tested” (Willower, 1980, p. 1-2).    Consequently it might 
not represent theoretically what adequacy is all about.  Later scholars might devise better 
models of what “adequacy” really means.  Theories and models simplify, and thus distort, 
reality.  While this model might indicate something about reality, there is much about 
reality it cannot explain.  Segal and Spaeth say, “all models are false in that they 
purposefully exclude idiosyncratic and trivial factors that may marginally influence the 
behavior in question” (2002, p. 46).  In its defense, “even if the model has elements that 
appear unrealistic, as long as it is internally consistent (logically deduced from first 
premises) and useful, it is acceptable” (van Geel, 1982, p. 77). 
The model depends upon the assumption that increased levels of inputs will result 
in increased levels of student achievement.   “All plaintiffs in school finance litigation 
rely on the common assumption that the level of funding of a school district has a direct 
effect on the quality of the program provided and the education the children receive”  
(Underwood, 1989, p. 414).  Addonizio characterized the education production function 
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as “an elusive concept that remains controversial despite enormous research literature” 
(2003, p. 481).  Hanushek might be the best known and most outspoken critic of the 
assumption that increasing educational inputs will increase student performance.  He 
states bluntly, “Extensive scientific evidence indicates quite clearly that there is little if 
any relationship between the resources devoted to schools and their performance – at 
least as schools are currently organized” (Hanushek, 1994, p. 468).   
While there is debate about whether more money creates more educational 
opportunity, certainly some money is required to create some educational opportunity.   
In short, the scholarly retort to the argument that money does not matter 
when it comes to improving educational outcomes has made two solid 
points.  First, increased expenditures, targeted wisely, have in fact had a 
good effect in many school environments.  Second, much of the increased 
expenditures have gone to meet new school commitments such as special 
education, transportation, and the like – not to improving regular 
education. (DeMitchell & Fossey, 1997, p. 141)   
 
McUsic notes that leaning on a minimum standard of output interpretation of state 
constitution education provisions avoids the problem of if and how money results in 
educational opportunity (McUsic, 1991, p. 310).  Also, as long as courts behave as if the 
education production function were valid, then whether it is actually valid is less 
important to this study.  The Alabama court found “that the results of production function 
studies alone are in any case not an appropriate basis for concluding that additional 
funding for public schools is unnecessary or misguided” (Hunt, 1993, p. 140).  
It is also possible that the model does not capture what judges have tried to do in 
their adequacy rulings.  Judges might have different theoretical ideas about what 
adequacy means, so that what they are trying to do and what this model tries to show are 
too imperfectly matched (Grossman, 1962).  For example, Dworkin, “arguably this 
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generation’s preeminent legal theorist” (Segal & Spaeth, 2002, p. 49), distinguishes 
between arguments of policy and arguments of principle.  The model is a tool for 
rationally defining adequacy according to beliefs about social goals and social policy.  
Dworkin says “arguments of principle are arguments intended to establish an individual 
right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a collective goal” (1975, p. 
1067).  Further, Dworkin says “rights may be absolute” and “rights may also be less than 
absolute; one principle may have to yield to another” (1975, p. 1069).  If judicial 
decisions in adequacy are based purely on principle and rights without regard for social 
goals, then the model might not measure what judges are really doing or thinking.  If the 
rulings reflect a balancing of rights and social goals then the model might be more useful.   
Perhaps court decrees do not reflect the values and goals of their authors.  “Values 
and all the other postulated variables that connect stimuli and responses in some 
meaningful way are, of course, only theoretical constructs” (Danelski, 1966, p. 737).  
What may appear to be values to the reader may not exist at all.  Or, to the extent that the 
most carefully crafted writing may not say what we really mean, there might be some 
difference between what the decrees said and what the judges really believed.  “Much of 
the real decision making may occur off the record and out of public view, and publicly 
stated motivations may not always coincide with true motivations” (Dayton, 1996, p. 20).  
Judges may have felt constrained by precedent, political pressure, or other factors from 
expressing their visions of adequacy fully.  “The nature of the legal profession – its 
concern with precedent, its opaque language – often makes law a screen to obscure social 
change and to blur conflicts of values and interests” (Tyack, 1982, p. 3; Tyack et al., 
1987).  Judges may restrain their prescriptions to the legislature so that orders are “aimed 
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less at remedying the particular plaintiffs’ situation than at getting the legislature to do 
something about the general problem analyzed in the court’s initial declaration” (Brown, 
1994, p. 565).    Also, “reasons, motives, and the like surely influence action but not in 
ways that are easily isolated as discrete, measurable, determinate variables” (McCann, 
1996, p. 460). Last, the decrees may reflect the beliefs of an anonymous clerk and not the 
beliefs of the signatories (Brenner, 1990, p. 4; Ely, 1980; Schubert, 1963, p. 433).  
Finally, the author may not grasp what the courts were genuinely trying to do with 
their adequacy opinions.  “Given that individuals rarely understand their own decisions, it 
is immeasurably more difficult to fully understand the decisions of others” (Segal & 
Spaeth, 2002, p. 45), or as Dayton et al. explain, there are “at least three reasons for our 
conduct: What we tell ourselves; what we tell others; and the real reasons” (2005, p. 18). 
Opportunities to misunderstand and misconstrue abound. 
 
Analytic Techniques 
The fundamental analytic technique for this paper is document analysis.  The texts 
of the high court rulings will be analyzed (Patton, 2002), and the judges’ beliefs will be 
scaled (Danelski, 1966; Fair, 1967; Segal & Cover, 1989) regarding resources, student 
entitlements, and school’s role in society.  Simultaneously, the rulings will be examined 
to find the theoretical model of adequacy the judges are demanding, as described by the 
breadth, height and intended student recipients of educational resources.  The result will 
be a belief score and a three-dimensional theoretical picture of the adequacy remedy.   
Judicial beliefs will be measured along the scales in Tables 1-3. The three belief 
scores are then multiplied together to yield a overall belief score.  Judicial direction of  
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Table 1 
Beliefs about resources 
Level Description of belief about resources 
R1 The state lacks resources to spend on public education. 
R2 The state should minimize all expenses and expenditures, including 
spending on education (Friedman, 1962). 
R3 Because resources are limited, investment in schooling should balance  
available resources, return on investment, and other spending needs. 
R4 Resources are practically unlimited.  Lack of will and misappropriation 
causes shortages in school funding and student failure. 
 
 
Table 2 
Beliefs about school’s role in society 
Level Description of the role of school in society 
S1 Education is an individual/family responsibility. 
S2 School must enable citizens to read, write, count and participate in the 
political process. 
S3 Schools prepare workers for the economy, national defense, and etc. 
S4 School must enable citizens to pursue personal fulfillment. 
S5 Schools exist to reduce social inequity. 
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Table 3 
Beliefs about children’s entitlements 
Level Description of “entitlement” 
E1  Children deserve what their families and circumstances provide. 
E2 Children deserve a minimum opportunity. 
E3 Children deserve equal resources from the state. 
E4 Children deserve a generous opportunity. 
E5 Children deserve equal outcomes. 
 
 
resources toward the least educable will be classified as “P” (Progressive);equal 
distribution of resources will be classified “N” (Neutral), and direction of resources 
toward the most educable will be classified as “L” (Liberty). 
Similarly, adequacy remedies can be described using a three-dimensional model 
describing the breadth of courses, the level of achievement, and the targeted student 
populations.  The horizontal “X” axis describes the educator effort required to bring a 
theoretical student population to an equal level of learning based on their educability.  
The “Y” axis measures the level of learning demanded by the decree, and the “Z” axis 
measures the breadth of knowledge (classes, courses, subjects) ordered by the remedy.  
Measuring the approximate volume of educator effort aimed across the range of student 
educability results in a theoretical measure of resources ordered by the remedy.  Similarly 
the shape or bias of the curve may be characterized as “progressive” (P) if it directs more  
18 
 
Figure 1: Basic adequacy model 
 
resources toward the least educable, “neutral” (N) if it directs equal resources to all 
students, and favoring “liberty” (L) if it lets more resources to go to the most educable.  
Finally, statistical analysis may show the correlation between judicial beliefs and ordered 
remedies, hinting perhaps that judicial beliefs shape adequacy remedies. 
 
Data 
The data for this study are state high court rulings on the constitutionality of 
education systems from 1989 to 2003.  Thro (1990) described this period as the “third 
wave” of education finance litigation in which high courts leaned more on the state 
constitution’s education clause than on state or federal equal protection provisions (K. 
Alexander, 1991, p. 354). 
By gauging judicial attitudes about resources, student entitlement and school’s 
role in society, and by comparing that to the resulting adequacy remedy depicted in three 
dimensions, this paper hopes to reveal the link between judicial beliefs and the resulting 
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remedy.  Tufte said “the task of the designer is to give visual access to the subtle and the 
difficult – that is, the revelation of the complex” (1983, p. 191).  These belief scores and 
adequacy remedies can then be compared to determine if there is a link between the 
judges’ beliefs and the adequacy remedies they order.   By placing high court beliefs and 
rulings against a three-dimensional model of adequacy, this paper hopes to make explicit 
the implicit beliefs and adequacy models in the rulings. 
 
Significance of the Study 
This study investigates state high court decisions about the adequacy of education 
funding systems from 1989 to 2003.  Looking backward, Tyack said, “I am persuaded 
that study of the law and education can clarify questions that puzzle historians of 
education as well as elucidating the legal system” (1982, p. 4).  Looking forward, 
McCann said, “nearly all struggles in modern society will take place to a large extent on 
legally constituted terrain” (1996, p. 480).  By examining court decisions with the 
theoretical model, this study hopes to illuminate the beliefs that shape the adequacy 
rulings, and the implications for education and society.   
This study is significant because it uses a model specifically designed to describe 
adequacy in theory.  Because little theoretical work has been done on adequacy, this 
model makes explicit assumptions and ideas that may lie below the surface of the 
dialogue on adequacy (Wise, 1983).  By describing the high court adequacy decisions 
with the theoretical model this study may be project on the cave wall an image of the 
judges’ “ideal” adequacy remedy (Plato, trans. 1942).  By providing a theoretical 
template of adequacy, it may be able to systematically describe how high court adequacy 
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decisions vary, and by scaling judicial beliefs it may help explain why the adequacy 
remedies vary.   
By putting the facets of adequacy in a single model this study may help us 
visualize what we want students to achieve, as well as some sense of the cost.  If the 
potential costs of a model are clear, then policymakers can decide rationally what to 
exclude while still providing for an adequate education.  Wise notes “Policymakers 
would prefer to have a rational or scientific basis for [decisions about adequacy],” 
because a “judgment about adequacy is a judgment about what a student needs,” a 
concept which “has meaning only when a standard of reference also is defined” (1983, p. 
305).  This model combines a hypothetical student body with defined state goals. By 
making these assumptions tangible, this model may facilitate discussion within the 
scholarly, policy and legal communities about what adequacy really means. 
After examining these beliefs and models society can ask if we share the courts’ 
beliefs and if these are the adequacy remedies we would choose.  If the courts’ intentions  
are plain, perhaps a better dialogue may be opened about what we expect for our children 
and how we expect the educational system to fulfill those expectations.  Informed public 
debate about spending on education and the purposes of education in shaping society’s 
future could reassert the people’s liberty to define and fund education for their children. 
The results should contribute to the educational research literature by furthering 
the theoretical discussion about adequacy, and by analyzing judicial beliefs and high 
court adequacy rulings against a common template.  This study may contribute to the 
political science literature by exploring the ways judicial attitudes shape court decisions. 
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The results should encourage discussions about society’s vision of the future, goals for its 
children, concepts of justice and the roles of the courts and schools in meeting those ends. 
 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter 1 presented an introduction and overview of the study with relevant 
definitions.  Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on adequacy and legal theory.  
Chapter 3 describes the theoretical model and the methodology used to analyze the court 
cases.  Chapter 4 presents the results of the study, while Chapter 5 contains the summary, 
conclusions, and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The Courts and Educational Adequacy 
Since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown), “dispossessed 
groups have challenged through legislation and the courts what they perceived as an 
unequal and unjust system of public schools” (Tyack, 1982, p. 7).  Equity lawsuits, and 
the adequacy lawsuits upon which this study focuses, are part of that on-going challenge.  
Many authors give credit to Arthur Wise as the intellectual father of equity litigation 
(1967), although Coons, Clune and Sugarman were influential as well (1970).  The 
battleground over equity shifted from the federal courts to the state courts with the near 
simultaneous decisions of San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
and Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 372, (NJ, 1973).  Equity cases had mixed success in the 
state courts (Thro, 1990).  Philosophically and practically, equity and adequacy 
arguments are related, but each has different virtues.  Equity arguments tend “to take and 
hold the moral high ground in policy debates” (DeMitchell & Fossey, 1997, p. 135; 
Enrich, 1995).  In reference to the Washakie County v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (1980)  
decision in Wyoming, Verstegen and Whitney commented, “the court implicitly held that 
equity and adequacy could not be severed” (1997, p. 336).  Adequacy suits spring from 
the same fountain as desegregation and equity litigation. 
Many authors credit the Kentucky Supreme Court’s Rose v. the Council for Better 
Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (1991) decision  with beginning the push in education 
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finance reform from equity to adequacy (Adequacy and Education Finance, 2004; K. 
Alexander, 1991; Minorini & Sugarman, 1999; Ritter & Lauver, 2003; Roellke, Green, & 
Zielewski, 2004; Thro, 1990; Verstegen, 1994, 1998).  It is intuitive that a state would 
provide an adequate education for its children, and Guthrie and Rothstein explained that 
early education finance researchers “had ‘adequate’ as an assumed condition” (1999, p. 
211).  Nevertheless, the definition of an adequate education, how much that costs, and 
how that should be paid are subjects of debate. 
Courts that ruled against state education finance systems often tasked the 
legislatures to change the finance systems, and the legislatures often turned to education 
specialists to devise an adequate education financing system.  In New York the highest 
court appointed a panel which “recommended a staggering $14 billion in additional 
operating funds over four years (a 45% increase) and an extra $9.2 billion over five years 
to build new schools and fix the “glaring inadequacy” of the district’s aging facilities 
(Kingsbury, 2005, p. 35).  This review will outline education adequacy decisions from 
various states as discussed in the literature, and then discuss some of the expert’s  
definitions and plans for providing adequate financing. 
Educational adequacy today is primarily the end product of the evolution of legal 
thinking rather than educational thinking.  Authors describe the gradual change in legal 
doctrines from separate but equal, through integration and equity to adequacy. 
The doctrine of separate but equal was established by Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896), so that litigation until the 1950s aimed to “show that the segregated 
schooling provided for blacks was inferior to what was provided for whites.”  (Minorini 
& Sugarman, 1999, p. 176).  Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) changed 
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that emphasis when the court declared: “in the field of public education ‘separate but 
equal’ has no place.  Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”  
Brown (1954) and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 sparked an extended battle over 
integration that was partially successful, especially in the Southeastern United States.  
The battle for integration ultimately ended in frustration (Orfield & Eaton, 1996).  
Decisions such as Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) limited the geographic reach 
of Brown (1954) by allowing predominantly white suburbs to retain autonomy from 
minority inner cities, and Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 111 S.Ct 630 (1991), that limited the 
temporal reach of Brown, since the court was unwilling to “condemn a school district, 
once governed by a board which intentionally discriminated, to judicial tutelage for the 
indefinite future” (Dowell, 1991).  
Even before the integration battle ended, the “intellectual arguments for the 
school finance reform litigation movement were laid out in Arthur Wise’s Rich Schools, 
Poor Schools (Wise, 1967) and Private Wealth and Public Education (Coons et al., 1970; 
Rebell, 2001; Ward, 1998, p. 12).  Wise noted that while “it had long been recognized 
that there were disturbing inequities in public school finance, the suggestion that the issue 
might be justiciable was novel” (Wise, xi).  Roellke, Green and Zielewski (2004) also 
credit Wise with initiating the “first wave” of school finance litigation, which focused on 
the federal Constitution’s equal protection clause. 
The problem “was that the existing school finance systems in most states clearly 
favored those communities that had more property tax wealth per pupil to finance their 
schools” (Minorini & Sugarman, 1999, p. 181).  Lawyers such as Wise and Sugarman 
noted that the U. S. Supreme Court had “already expressed concern about wealth 
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discrimination” (Minorini & Sugarman, 1999, p. 181) in the right to vote, divorce, get 
welfare, or mount a criminal appeal, so the Supreme Court might include education as a 
fundamental right deserving protection from wealth discrimination under the 14th 
amendment (First & DeLuca, 2003; Ladd & Hansen, 1999; McMillan, 1998; Minorini & 
Sugarman, 1999).  While this approach failed at the federal level when the Supreme 
Court rejected the status of education as a fundamental right under the U.S. constitution 
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Rebell & 
Metzler, 2002; "Rodriguez," 1973), equity cases were successful in the state courts based 
on state constitutional provisions for education and equal protection.  Authors consider 
the turn to state courts the “second wave” of school finance litigation, initiated by the 
Serrano (1976) case in California and the Robinson (1973) case in New Jersey, and 
distinguished by the switch from the federal to state constitutional emphasis (Ladd & 
Hansen, 1999; McMillan, 1998; Moran, 1999; Rebell, 2001; Verstegen, 1994, 1998).   
Minorini and Sugarman (1999) explain that equity was ultimately unsatisfactory 
to many advocates for five reasons.  First, because some, principally urban, communities 
were saddled with high costs and large numbers of special needs students, equity was not 
enough.  Also, some urban districts had more than average funding, and they might lose 
out because of equity, which was difficult to define anyhow (Hanushek, 1994; Roellke et 
al., 2004).  Second, some advocates began to think curbing spending in rich districts to 
match that of poorer districts was difficult and fruitless.  Wealthier districts in California 
found alternative ways to fund their schools in the wake of Serrano(1976) (Downes, 
1992).  Adequacy might provoke less political resistance from wealthier taxpayers, since 
it “offers the possibility of increasing the size of the pie for all” (Rebell, 2001, p. 231).  
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Third, California’s property tax revolt made some advocates wonder if more might be at 
stake than equity by denying local communities the ability to raise money for their 
schools.  Fourth, the publication of A Nation at Risk (1983) focused attention on 
improving the performance of the lowest students rather than equalizing performance 
overall (First & DeLuca, 2003).  And finally, decisions like Board of Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell (1991) and Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) indicated the federal courts 
were limiting their intervention in schools on the basis of segregation, (Minorini & 
Sugarman, 1999), while other decisions indicated the courts were willing to accept local 
control and variation in education quality (Roellke et al., 2004).   
Authors mention other reasons for the shift to adequacy.  Odden cites “the goals 
and demands of standards-based reform” (Odden, 2001, p. 85), as do Moran (1999) and 
Rebell (2001), while Verstegen credits “the requirements of the knowledge society and 
global economy” (1998, p. 51; Verstegen & Whitney, 1997, p. 330).  Roellke et al. 
mention numerous legal points beyond those mentioned above that made equity difficult 
to litigate (2004).  Ladd and Hansen mention adequacy as a potential cure for two 
theoretical weaknesses of equity; that is, equality of what kind of opportunity, and 
opportunity to which level of achievement (1999).  Arguably the battle for inter-district 
equity in many states, like Florida, Rhode Island and Kentucky, has been won (Haselton 
& Keedy, 2002; Herrington & Weider, 2001; Mathis & Fleming, 2002; Picus, 2004); 
however, there may be potential for intra-district equity to improve student performance 
(Hill & McAdams, 2002; Roza & Hill, 2003) since educational reform efforts 
“increasingly focus on the school (rather than the district) as the basic unit in the 
education production process” (Ladd & Hansen, 1999, p. 99; Odden, 2000).  Ironically, 
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the larger financing discrepancies that exist between states are not judiciable through the 
courts.  The final irony is the suggestion that “in many ways the adequacy movement is a 
strategic retreat to the ‘separate but equal’ standard of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 
influenced partly by disillusionment with school desegregation and the rise of ethnic 
pride and multiculturalism” (Clune, 1994a; Orfield & Eaton, 1996, p. 366). 
 
Adequacy Litigation 
Adequacy became the alternative to equity in the effort to reform schools through 
the courts.  “What is most distinctive about the adequacy approach is that, unlike the 
traditional school finance cases, it does not rest on the norm of equal treatment.” “It is 
rather about spending what is needed” (Minorini & Sugarman, 1999, p. 188).  Thus 
adequacy can be construed as a switch from the strategy used since Brown (1954) which 
called for equal treatment, to some unclear standard of sufficiency.  With adequacy, 
unequal treatment is no longer offensive; in fact, it may be required.  However, as a 
practical matter equity and adequacy remain closely linked. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruling in Robinson was the first to refer to an 
adequacy standard: that of preparing students to become “citizens and competitors in the 
labor market” (Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) (Robinson I)).  
Later Washington’s Supreme Court declared the state constitution’s education clause 
meant that education should “equip our children as citizens and as potential competitors 
in today’s market as well as in the marketplace of ideas” (Seattle School District v. State, 
585 P.2d 71 (1978)).  Roellke et al. distinguish these cases as “second wave” because 
“second wave courts were not prescriptive in their mandates” (2004, p. 107).  That 
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changed somewhat when West Virginia’s Supreme Court listed seven elements of a 
thorough and efficient education (Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979)), allowing a 
lower court to order the legislature and Department of Education to translate the seven 
elements of a thorough and efficient education into a “Master Plan for Education”  (First 
& DeLuca, 2003; Minorini & Sugarman, 1999).  Rebell refers to these “early” adequacy 
cases as “initial attempts” (2001, p. 234). 
Although its remedy was similar to that ordered by the West Virginia court, 
scholars credit Kentucky’s Supreme Court with explicitly establishing “educational 
adequacy as a distinct theory in school finance litigation” in the “seminal” Rose decision 
(Ladd & Hansen, 1999; McMillan, 1998; Minorini & Sugarman, 1999; Rebell, 2001; 
Roellke et al., 2004; Verstegen, 1994, 1998).  The seven prescriptive capabilities 
requiring “sufficient” education cited in Rose and “based on the  Cardinal Principles of 
Secondary Education published by the Commission on Reorganization of Secondary 
Schools of the NEA in 1918” (First & DeLuca, 2003, p. 205) set a precedent for courts in 
New Hampshire, Alabama, North Carolina and Massachusetts (Minorini & Sugarman, 
1999).  Roellke et al. note that starting in Kentucky, “third-wave courts have taken 
thorough and efficient claims to a new level and have mandated rather specific reform 
initiatives” (2004, p. 107).   
Kentucky might also deserve credit for initiating the move toward adequacy 
because educational change has been clearer and stronger as a result of the Kentucky 
Supreme Court’s order than it has in response to some other state high courts’ orders.  
McMillan considers Rose “as aspirational for adequacy theory proponents” because the 
“Kentucky state education clause does not even mention adequacy but only ‘efficiency’” 
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(1998, p. 1876).  Schrag gives much of the credit for the success of Rose to the legal and 
political influence of Edward Prichard and Bert T. Combs (2002).  Minorini and 
Sugarman say Kentucky was “politically primed to respond quickly and positively” 
(1999, p. 200), a sentiment echoed by Ladd and Hansen (1999).  The court’s action in 
striking down the entire educational system spurred Kentucky’s political, business, union, 
and cultural factions to come together to create a new system, the Kentucky Education 
Reform Act (KERA), and its financial counterpart,  Support Education Excellence in 
Kentucky (SEEK) (Schrag, 2002).  In a similar vein, Rebell credits the seminal role of 
Kentucky in determining educational adequacy because “The Rose decision can, in 
essence, be viewed as the starting point in what has become a significant dialogue among 
the public, the courts, and the legislature on standards-based reform” (2001, p. 235; Fiss, 
1979).  Ward sees in litigation like Rose “a useful tool in the struggle for legislative 
attention and in the attempt to communicate to the electorate the need for equitable and 
adequate educational opportunities for all children” (Ward, 1998, p. 13).  Fiss suspects 
“that the relationship between the branches in the constitutional domain … is a more 
pluralistic or dialectical relationship” (Fiss, 1979, p. 15), so that courts not “have the only 
word or even the last word, but that they be allowed to speak and to do so with some 
authority” (p. 16, emphasis in original).  Finally, Enrich views the Rose decision as a 
“goad” or “backstop,” and part of an on-going process in which the courts engage “the 
legislative branch in a constructive collaboration” (1995, p. 177-178). 
Subsequent adequacy cases have provided variations on the themes established in 
Kentucky.  New Hampshire’s Claremont case explained “A constitutionally adequate 
public education is not a static concept removed from the demands of an evolving 
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world,” and that it is intended to prepare students for life in the 21st century.  The court 
affirmed different levels of funding between schools and districts, also established by the 
SEEK formula (Claremont School District v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183, 635 A.2d 1375 
(1993)).  Subsequent rulings have confirmed the dynamic nature of adequacy.  New 
Jersey’s high court said “what was adequate in the past is inadequate today” and the 
Wyoming high court claimed, “The definition of a proper education is not static and 
necessarily will change with the times.” Vermont, Massachusetts and others have made 
similar assertions (All cited in Verstegen, 1998). 
Alabama’s courts ordered sweeping change in the educational system; however, 
the legislature did not pass the bill before the governor balked at following the court’s 
direction.  Although Rebell claims “The emphasis on adequacy has involved the courts in 
a significant dialogue with state legislatures and state education departments,” but that 
dialogue broke down in Alabama (Enrich, 1995; Rebell, 2001, p. 218; Scheingold, 1974).  
McMillan might use Alabama to explain the limits of the legitimacy of the courts to 
effect change, noting that in the long run “political branches, media, and others must 
determine what they can do or what is legitimate” (McMillan, 1998, p. 1889; Rosenberg, 
1991).  Reed’s analysis drew similar conclusions about the efficacy of court-ordered 
school reform in Texas and New Jersey, concluding, “the success or failure of courts’ 
efforts to improve the equity of school funding in primary and secondary education 
depends ultimately on the capacity of the legislature to withstand this heated political 
opposition” (1996). 
In Roosevelt Elementary School District Number 66 v. Bishop, 179 Ariz. 233, 877 
P.2d 806 (1994) (Roosevelt), the Arizona the court established adequacy as it applied to 
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school buildings (Roosevelt, 1994).  The importance of adequate facilities was echoed in 
Ohio (DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 (1997) (DeRolph I)), New 
Jersey (Abbott v. Burke, 149 N.J. 145, 693 A.2d 417 (1997) (Abbott IV)), Wyoming 
(Campbell County School District v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (1995) (Campbell)) and New 
York (Campaign for Fiscal Equity, INC. v. State, 295 A.D.2d 1, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130 
(2002) (CFE IV)), and it may even be applauded by Eric Hanushek (1994).  These cases 
involved numerous volleys between the court and the legislative and executive branches 
of government (Minorini & Sugarman, 1999). 
In New York the definition of adequacy changed.  In 1982 the Board of 
Education of Levittown v. Nyquist decision used “minimalist terms” to determine no 
“child in the state attended school in a district that did not provide an adequate education” 
(First & DeLuca, 2003, p. 13).   In 1995 New York’s highest court said the state must 
provide children “basic literacy, calculation, and verbal skills necessary to enable [them] 
to eventually function productively as civic participants” (Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 
INC. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995) (CFE I)), which 
was reinforced at the appellate level in 2002 (cited in N. A. Alexander, 2004).  But by 
2002 the state was expected to provide its students with a high school education (CFE 
IV), thus demonstrating the dynamic nature of adequacy (Minorini & Sugarman, 1999). 
Wyoming’s high court was both less specific and more directive.  It ordered, “The 
legislature must first design the best educational system by identifying the ‘proper’ 
educational package each Wyoming student is entitled to have,” then cost and fund that 
package before any other state obligation (Campbell I, 1995).  Thus in Wyoming an 
adequate education was the best that could be designed, and it was also the state’s 
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primary fiscal responsibility.  Wyoming rejected the ability of local districts to fund their 
schools beyond that provided by the state, since “historical analysis reveals local control 
is not a constitutionally recognized interest and cannot be the basis for disparity in equal 
educational opportunity” (Ladd & Hansen, 1999, p. 53; Minorini & Sugarman, 1999).  
This is contrary to Cubberley’s admonition that the state “not reduce all to this minimum” 
(Cubberley, 1905), but it confirms the Montana court’s observation that differential 
funding may “deny to poorer districts a significant level of local control, because they 
have fewer options due to fewer resources” (Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. 
State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989) (Helena)).  By reference, Texas also touted the 
primacy of education in the state’s funding priority list, since it was “constitutionally 
imposed” (Verstegen, 1994, p. 245). 
Like Wyoming, New Jersey’s high court has also demanded the best education for 
plaintiff school districts.  In a series of cases, New Jersey’s high court ordered the state to 
provide plaintiff districts with funding equal to that of the richest districts in the state, 
enough to buy the most expensive whole-school reform, “Success for All.”  Thus poor 
children in New Jersey were to be equipped to compete with their wealthier peers, 
including consideration of their educational needs in providing vertical equity (First & 
DeLuca, 2003).  The sentiment that all children should have what the richest children 
have was also expressed in Massachusetts and Ohio.  Verstegen concludes, “What was 
adequate was largely determined by the education resources and learner outcomes 
evident in the best or highest spending districts/states” (1998, p. 55).  This may be 
justified by the court’s observation in Montana that “wealthier school districts are not 
funding frills…” (Helena, 1989).   
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In contrast to Kentucky, where the court struck down the entire educational 
system, New Jersey’s “long and torturous” (Abbott V, 1998) education finance litigation 
provided judicial intervention for approximately 30 of the state’s 551 districts (Ritter & 
Lauver, 2003).  The initial litigation was Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson, 1973), which 
went through five iterations, and it was followed by Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I, 1983) 
which was on its ninth iteration (Abbott IX, 2002) at last count.  Goertz and Edwards 
characterize it as “a story of how an activist court and a group of committed and 
tenacious plaintiff attorneys rewrote education finance policy in New Jersey” (Goertz & 
Edwards, 1999, p. 5), but the results are not beyond critique. 
Much like other states, the initial Robinson filing claimed that funding disparities 
deprived students of their right to a thorough and efficient education as provided by the 
constitution, and the ruling for the plaintiffs resulted in new legislation, the Public School 
Education Act of 1975, which the court deemed “facially constitutional in its fifth 
decision” (Goertz & Edwards, 1999, p. 7).  A subsequent filing on behalf of students 
from Camden, East Orange, Irvington and Jersey City resulted in the education finance 
system being declared unconstitutional again in 1990 because the absolute level of 
education and the educational programs were lower in poor urban districts than in 
wealthy suburban districts (Goertz & Edwards, 1999).  The court concluded the plaintiff 
“Abbott” districts could not provide a thorough and efficient education, but it limited the 
remedy to 30 districts. 
The legislature responded with the Quality Education Act (QEA), which 
increased spending by $1800 per pupil but still left a $1300 gap between rich and poor 
districts.  The court rejected QEA, requiring substantial parity between rich and poor 
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districts “approximating 100 percent.”  The legislature took two years to craft its next 
plan, The Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act, which brought 
the plaintiffs back into court two weeks after it was signed.  The court looked to see if the 
law established substantive standards for a thorough and efficient education, if it 
provided adequate resources, and if it met the needs or disadvantaged urban students.  
While it met the first test, the court determined it did not provide adequate funding or 
meet urban students’ special needs (Goertz & Edwards, 1999).  Ultimately the court 
ordered “a whole school reform package with high educational standards, full-day 
kindergarten, preschool for 3 and 4-year old children, a class size of 15 children, and a 
100 percent state-funded facility upgrade program” (Ritter & Lauver, 2003, p. 575).    
In New Jersey “these court decisions have not resulted in an equitable school 
funding system statewide” (Lauver, Ritter, & Goertz, 2001, p. 283; Ritter & Lauver, 
2003).  While the “Abbott” districts have come close to parity with wealthier districts, 
other poor districts have been left further behind and middle-wealth districts have had to 
increase their tax burden only to fall below average in spending.  Both non-Abbott poor 
districts and middle-wealth districts sued (Ritter & Lauver, 2003). 
The extended volleys between the courts and the legislature also played out in 
Ohio, although less extensively than in New Jersey.  Concluding that “the foundation 
level reflects political and budgetary considerations at least as much as it reflects how 
much should be spent on K-12 public education,” (DeRolph I, 1997) Ohio’s Supreme 
Court declared the educational funding system unconstitutional.  The legislature hired 
John Augenblick “to develop a base funding model” (First & DeLuca, 2003, p. 6).  
Augenblick’s models essentially involved determining which districts were successfully 
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educating children, determining their level of funding and declaring that adequate.  His 
models went through various iterations between the legislature and the courts.  Ohio’s 
citizens considered proposals for changing the system and rejected them.  Finally the 
court declared the system constitutional in DeRolph III (2001) only to change its mind in 
DeRolph IV (2002) (First & DeLuca, 2003).  Scheingold predicted the lack of resolution 
experienced in New Jersey and Ohio when he said “the direct deployment of legal rights 
in the implementation of public policy will not work very well, given any significant 
opposition” (1974, p. 117). 
While Ohio’s government wrangled over adequacy, Vermont’s government 
responded with surprising quickness to an uncertain call for equity in Brigham v. State, 
166 Vt. 246, 692 A.2d 384 (1997) (Brigham).  Like Kentucky, Vermont’s legislature was 
spring-loaded to execute change in the education system after years of “legislative 
gridlock that had prevented change” (Assistant Attorney General Yudien cited in Rebell 
& Metzler, 2002, p. 174), and the court’s decision provided a trigger.  
Rebell and Metzler explain that litigators in the Brigham (1997) case wanted to 
avoid questions of adequacy because adequacy was difficult to define and Vermont had a 
weak education clause and a strong equal protection (Common Benefits) clause.  Based 
on Vermont’s history and constitution, the Court treated education as a fundamental right 
in which citizens were entitled to effectively equal shares.  Education had been a high 
political priority for years, and the newly-elected Democratic majority, using reform 
plans that had been refined for five years, acted on the Court’s unanimous decision 
(Rebell & Metzler, 2002). 
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The result was a statewide property tax with caps to protect households with 
incomes under $75,000.  Most residents paid less tax, and ten times as many districts had 
increased per pupil resources as had decreased per pupil income.  Unhappy wealthier 
districts and property owners fought the new “Act 60” fiercely, but to no avail (Rebell & 
Metzler, 2002).  Mathis and Fleming note Vermont has “arguably the most equitable 
school funding system in the nation” (2002, p. 1).  They also note improved test scores, 
with previously lower achieving students rising closer to their higher achieving peers, and 
“with the low-wealth towns registering the largest achievement gains” (Mathis & 
Fleming, 2002, p. 9).  An interesting twist is that opponents of the Act 60 redistribution 
scheme appropriated $160,000 for an adequacy study, hoping “that if an adequacy level 
could be defined and funded by the state, then all funds raised locally above this level 
would be retained locally and not subject to recapture” (Mathis & Fleming, 2002, p. 10).  
Vermont has also joined Wyoming and Montana in striking down local disparities 
in funding, stating “nowhere does the constitution state that the revenue for education 
must be raised locally, that the source of the revenue must be property taxes” (Brigham, 
1997).  Moran (1999) also credits Vermont with examining student performance results 
in considering its education finance system, and ironically, explains that states can use 
their standards to defend themselves in adequacy suits, claiming that the standards help 
ensure adequacy. 
 Several state courts included outcomes as part of their adequacy decisions.  
Texas’ high court indicated efficiency “mandates education results” (Edgewood 
Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (1989) (Edgewood I).  Tennessee’s 
court declared “The General Assembly shall maintain and support a system of free public 
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schools that provides at least the opportunity to acquire general knowledge, develop the 
powers of reasoning and judgment and generally prepare students intellectually for a 
mature life” (Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (1993) 
(McWherter)).  While the state maintained the differences in funding and teacher salaries 
do “not affect student performance,” the court noted that students in poorer districts had 
lower test scores and were less likely to be in accredited schools.  Consequently the court 
ordered equalization of funding and salaries.  Like Tennessee, North Dakota’s high court 
considered accreditation in its examination of adequacy, noting that students in accredited 
schools had higher test scores (Bismarck Public School District #1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 
247 (1994) (Bismark)).  Like Tennessee and North Dakota, Montana considered 
accreditation, but there accreditation standards were considered “a minimum upon which 
a quality education can be built” (Helena, 1989).   
While Clune indicated adequacy may be a retreat to Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 
some litigators are taking adequacy back to Brown (1954).  The Connecticut Supreme 
Court ruled the state had failed in its affirmative duty to provide an equal education to its 
students where some encountered de facto segregation (Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 678 
A.2d 1267 (Conn., 1996) (Sheff)).  Plaintiffs in Minnesota have tried a similar tactic 
(N.A.A.C.P., Minneapolis Branch v. Metropolitan Council, 125 F.3d 1171, C.A. 8, Minn 
(1997).  Indeed, McMillan sees a fourth wave of school reform litigation previewed in the 
Sheff decision, although he believes its scope and impact will be limited by the unique 
clauses from Connecticut’s constitution which supported the decision, as well as courts’ 
individual concerns about their legitimacy and competency (1998). 
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Adequacy suits have also failed in the courts.  The courts in Florida (Coalition for 
Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400 (1996) 
(Chiles)), Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (1995) (Sundlun)), 
and Illinois (Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill.2d a, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 
220 Ill.Dec. 166 (1996) (Edgar)) all deferred to the legislature to answer the question of 
how to fund an adequate education for students in their states.  The Illinois court said, 
“Solutions to problems of educational quality should emerge from a spirited dialogue 
between the people of the State and their elected representatives” (Edgar, 1996).  Not all 
courts agree on the extent of their legitimacy and competency in solving education 
finance questions (Ladd & Hansen, 1999; McMillan, 1998). 
Florida is an interesting case where adequacy seems to be coming in the back 
door.  In response to Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal., 1976) Florida’s legislature 
created a very flat education financing system that limited district discretionary funding 
to half a mil.  This system survived challenges that claimed it created too much variation 
in funding (Gindl v. Department of Education, 396 S. 2d. 1105 Fla., 1979) and that it 
allowed too little variation (Department of Education v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944 Fla., 
1993) as well as an adequacy challenge (Chiles, 1995).  While the judge in Ohio 
suggested that adequacy might be more successful if the citizens changed the 
constitution’s wording (cited by First & DeLuca, 2003), Florida’s constitution was 
changed to say: 
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State 
of Florida.  It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate 
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. 
Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, 
secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students 
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to obtain a high quality education … ("Florida Constitution," 1968, Article 
IX, 1998) 
    
Specific terms in this new constitutional language may enable the judiciary to 
intrude more deeply into educational finance questions, specifically “fundamental value,” 
“paramount duty” and two uses of the term “high quality.”  “[M]any believe the new 
constitutional language and the new standards for education may make Florida’s 
educational funding program more vulnerable to litigation” (Herrington & Weider, 2001, 
p. 518).  In fact Jon Mills, a member of the Constitutional Revision Commission, states, 
“By providing specific standards for adequacy, the Constitution Revision Commission 
has invited greater court supervision of the Legislature’s role in education funding and 
has guaranteed that future litigation will determine whether the state currently meets its 
duty to make ‘adequate provision’ for public education (Mills & McLendon, 2000, p. 
331).   Another adequacy case will test the court’s response to the new language.  While 
it is hard to imagine pro-education voters objecting to changing the constitution based on 
a surface reading of the new language, it is harder to imagine that voters, no matter how 
adequately educated, fully understood the legal and political ramifications of the nuanced 
legal phrases the new article contains.  It is reminiscent of signers of a “Compulsory 
Education” petition in Oregon in 1920 who did not realize they were supporting an act 
that would ban private schools (Tyack et al., 1987, p. 183).   
 
Definitions of Adequacy 
Within the definition of adequacy lay both the hope and threat of the adequacy 
movement.  Advocates hoping to expand resources for education want a broad and high 
definition of an adequate education, while defenders of individual liberty hope to define 
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adequate as satisfactory to some more narrowly defined goal.  This discrepancy has its 
roots in the economic and philosophic arguments about education as both a public and 
private good.  Cubberley’s statement, “The duty of the state is to secure for all as high a 
minimum of good instruction as is possible, but not to reduce all to this minimum” 
(Cubberley, 1905) (Addonizio, 2003; Clune, 1994b; First & DeLuca, 2003; Ward, 1987, 
1998; Wise, 1983) applies, as does Milton Friedman’s discussion of the liberty, 
neighborhood effects and paternalism behind state funded education (Friedman, 1962).  
However, the battle over adequacy has been fought mostly in the courts rather than in 
universities or legislatures, with decisions riding on judicial interpretations of 
constitutional education and equal protection clauses. 
Webster’s defines adequate as “1. equal to the requirement or occasion; sufficient; 
suitable” and “2. barely satisfactory; acceptable but not remarkable” ("Webster's New 
Universal Unabridged Dictionary," 1983).  As explained in Chapter I, the definition of 
adequacy is unclear and a universally accepted definition of adequacy is unlikely to be 
developed or discovered.  Nevertheless, the education finance literature is replete with 
references to adequacy, with many scholars quoting Cubberley as a starting point.  Some 
core defining characteristics of adequacy have evolved in the literature and the courts. 
In an early attempt to address the question of adequate financing of education, 
Chambers and Parrish said, “Adequate education refers to the provision of learning 
services sufficient to meet a goal” (1982, p. 7).  Minorini and Sugarman say “‘equity’ 
cases are about getting worse treatment than someone else” while adequacy cases “seem 
to be centrally about getting worse treatment than one is entitled to as determined by 
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reference to some absolute standard and not in comparison with others,” or a “high-
minimum quality education for all” (1999, p. 179).   
Arthur Wise, the seminal thinker in school finance litigation, had profound and 
troubling thoughts about adequacy.  “A judgment of adequacy is a judgment about what a 
student needs,” and because of the lack of measurements and standards, that judgment 
“inevitably must be made on irrational grounds.”  So the fundamental question of 
adequacy is “who decides what is essential or useful for whom” (Wise, 1983, p. 305).  To 
begin, “adequacy is the provision of that minimum educational opportunity necessary to 
(minimally) prepare students for adult roles” (Wise, 1983, p. 309).  While that is a 
definition of adequate outcome, determining adequate levels of funding is more 
problematic.  “Strictly speaking, total funds cannot be adequate (while inequity exists) 
unless one assumes that high-spending districts are wasting resources” (Wise, 1983, p. 
311), or if some students are unprepared for adult roles that “may imply that current 
funding levels are inadequate” (p. 313).  Finally Wise indicates adequacy is really old 
wine in new bottles in the sense that the “concept of adequacy – however defined – is 
really about the problems of the educationally disadvantaged” (p. 315). 
Ladd and Hansen trace the philosophical roots of an adequate education through 
Strike (1998) to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1993) and the concept of “primary goods” 
including “rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and self 
respect” (1999, p. 103).  From this they distill the concept of “qualitative adequacy,” 
essentially how broad a range of learning is adequate, and “quantitative adequacy,” or 
how much learning, learning to what ability level, is adequate (1999, p. 104).  In contrast 
to others (like Chambers and Parrish) Ladd and Hansen believe “adequacy is exclusively 
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focused on schoolchildren and does not embrace taxpayers as objects of concern” (p. 102, 
Berne & Stiefel, 1979).  While equity is more input-focused, adequacy is more output-
focused.  Citing Clune (1995) they believe adequacy as a concept applies especially to 
urban, poor districts and to high-poverty students.  Although the measurements are 
unclear, adequacy may be considered criterion-referenced, adequate to some standard, 
while equity concerns were norm-referenced, better or worse than peers (Ladd & Hansen, 
1999). 
Alexander finds definitions of adequacy vary depending on the thinker’s 
philosophy.  Thus “adequacy takes on a different face if grounded in progressive versus 
humanistic classical philosophies” so that “progressive definitions often lead to process-
oriented strategies, whereas the classical liberal definition often translates into skills-
based approaches” (N. A. Alexander, 2004, p. 83).  
Parrish and Chambers’ study The Issue of Adequacy in the Financing of Public 
Education (1982) is often cited as an early attempt to deal with the theoretical and 
practical problem of defining adequacy.  While they maintained “Adequate education 
refers to the provision of learning services sufficient to meet a goal,” they also included a 
caveat; “since there is no social consensus as to the specific outcomes that should result 
from public education and the technological relationships between educational resources 
and outcomes are not well understood, it is our contention that the issue of adequacy 
cannot be objectively resolved” (Chambers & Parrish, 1982, p. 7).  Guthrie and Rothstein 
also linked services or inputs and goals, saying adequacy “is a notion of sufficiency, a 
per-pupil resource amount sufficient to achieve some performance objective” (1999, p. 
214) requiring policy judgments which determine “(1) learning or performance levels to 
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be attained and (2) resource levels likely to permit schools to accomplish these learning 
purposes with students” (p. 215).   
Parrish and Chambers believed “adequate levels of provision cannot be 
objectively determined, but are subjective public policy allocation decisions” (Chambers 
& Parrish, 1982, p. 7).  Adequacy is inevitably the subjective result of society’s decisions 
about resource allocation, with the amount of money society decides to allocate to 
education as opposed to prescriptions for senior citizens or roads or parks being adequate.  
Carnoy agrees that “adequacy is rooted in a social consensus” (1983, p. 287).  Ward also 
says, “Important public issues in a democracy, such as the definition of adequacy, emerge 
from the public policy process” (Ward, 1991, p. 15), although his belief in the political 
process seems less sure when he says “elite groups will work very hard to protect their 
own privilege at the expense of the rest of society” (Ward, 1998, p. 19) and, “much of 
school finance policy today consists of struggles between those who want to guarantee 
each child access to an adequate education and those who want to perpetuate privilege in 
our society” (Ward, 1991, p. 14).  Chambers and Parrish’s “Resource-Cost Model” 
assumes state-specified educational services were the result of rational public decision-
making, and they use computer modeling to adjust for differences in resource costs and 
student needs between districts (1982, p. 65). 
Chambers and Parrish proposed a unique definition of adequacy tied to equity and 
society’s overall goals for the education system.  If society has established an educational 
system to reduce the disparities between the classes and increase the life chances of 
society’s poorest citizens, then it should have an education system adequate to that task.  
“Thus one standard for appraising the adequacy of public education is the degree of 
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equity inherent in the system.”  “A system of public schooling that is grossly inequitable 
so as to retard the movement toward equal educational opportunity may be regarded as 
inadequate in meeting this societal requirement” (Chambers & Parrish, 1982, p. 10).  
Carnoy and Ward echo this theme. 
Carnoy provided six means of reviewing adequacy (Carnoy, 1983).  
(1) “Adequacy as a purely educational goal,” in terms of the amount of schooling 
or knowledge children should have (p. 287). 
(2) “Adequacy as improved internal efficiency,” in the sense of are the schools 
adequate to the task of training young people by effectively using resources efficiently?  
An inadequate school would waste resources and fail to educate its charges even though 
it had enough to do the job (p. 288).  Furthermore, an adequate school would be adept at 
addressing the needs of its students, and efficient schools would add more knowledge to 
their students than less efficient schools.  Sanders’ work measuring pupil progress in 
Tennessee comes to mind (Sanders, 1998). 
(3) “Adequacy as internal efficiency equity” means judging the school in terms of 
equalizing outcomes.  An efficient school makes “as equal as possible the value added to 
knowledge for all students” or “adequacy is the equalization of absolute outcomes at the 
end of the schooling process (schooling as equalizer)” (p. 291).  Chambers and Parrish 
express a similar idea regarding society’s goals for its schooling system. 
(4) “Adequacy as external efficiency: Social functioning requirements.”  This 
notion of adequacy can be “measured by some minimum requirements to function 
adequately in modern society” - for example, being able to read and complete 
bureaucratic forms (p. 292). 
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(5) “Adequacy as external efficiency: The job market” would measure the kind of 
jobs students obtained following graduation (p. 293).  Kentucky high schools post this 
information on their web sites now, indicating how many students entered the military, 
got jobs, or entered higher education.   
(6) “Adequacy as external efficiency: Equity and equality considerations.”  
Carnoy’s final category assumes that the purpose of increasing adequacy in education is 
to have more equity in life-results among graduates.  In this sense a more adequate 
education system would produce less variation among its graduates.  An equitable system 
would ensure a higher rate of return for minority and poor students than Asian, white and 
richer students for their investment in education, so that over time the life chances 
between the groups became more similar (p. 294).   
Ward views adequacy by Carnoy’s notions of adequacy as measured by the job 
market and variation in life circumstances.  Ward notes the importance of symbolic 
analysts mentioned by Robert Reich, as well as the shift in wealth in the last decades of 
the twentieth-century from the poor to the rich documented by Kevin Phillips.  These two 
trends in the American economy lead Ward to conclude that an adequate education 
involves access to high quality instruction that provides all students the opportunity to be 
symbolic analysts (Ward, 1991), presumably slowing or reversing the trend toward 
greater disparity between rich and poor. 
Clune, a pioneer in the equity movement, has a simple definition for adequacy.  
“Program adequacy can be defined as (a) the cost of raising educational outcomes of poor 
children to the level of full functioning in society together with (b) the systems of 
finance, governance, organization, implementation, and educational practice needed to 
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guarantee that these high minimum outcomes actually occur” (1994a, p. 365).  Clune 
echoes Chambers and Parrish in stating, “Adequacy means adequate for some purpose, 
typically student achievement,” although he believes a “social consensus now seems to 
be developing around high minimum achievement as the common goal for educational 
adequacy” (1994b, p. 377).  That minimum of “educational adequacy will eventually be 
defined as every student (other than the 2% or so truly disabled) scoring at least at the 
proficient level on new tests including higher-order thinking,” and “as every student 
being qualified and certified for college entrance, for example, having taken the required 
courses and being able to pass a college entrance exam” (Clune, 1994b, p. 379).  Having 
said that, Clune claims “I have come to believe that the state-centered standards 
movement is a big mistake … the only standard for curriculum should be that it is high; 
otherwise, schools should have a wide range of options for curriculum choice” (p. 382, 
1994b).  Ultimately Clune offers Slavin’s “Success for All” as an example of adequacy, 
the same model used by the New Jersey court in Abbott.  Clune’s feelings about school 
autonomy are out of step with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s ruling which said, “No 
longer can the State operate on a ‘hands-off’ basis regarding how state money is spent in 
school districts and what the effect of that spending is.  Nor can the State continue to 
leave adequacy and equity considerations regarding school expenditures solely to local 
decision-making” (Lake View School District No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 91 
S.W.3d 472 (2002) (Lake View II)). 
Levin offered a thoughtful critique of Clune’s definitions of adequacy.  Among 
other things, he questioned the dedication to the “full functioning in society” standard 
because “What is shocking is how little we know about what types of educational 
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outcomes are necessary for workplace productivity” (H. M. Levin, 1994, p. 398).  In 
essence, Levin supports Clune’s basic ideas, but the courts are ordering legislatures to 
make changes when no one knows which changes will bring about which results.  While 
Clune distinguished equity from adequacy by noting that adequacy considers inputs and 
outcomes, rather than just inputs, Levin contends no one knows how to broadly link 
inputs and outputs, regardless of the name of the program.    
Hanushek criticizes the alleged link between inputs and outcomes most 
assertively.  “Continual infusion of funds has not produced higher aggregate 
achievement.”  “There is no consistent relationship between the resources applied to 
schools and student performance.”  “The evidence is very clear that the major 
determinants of instructional expenditure – class size, education of the teachers, and 
experience of the teachers – are not systematically related to student achievement” 
(Hanushek, 1994, p. 464).  Hanushek’s conception of adequacy is minimal.  “If a school 
district cannot provide safe and sanitary conditions, if it cannot provide adequate 
textbooks, and if it cannot provide qualified teachers for basic subjects, everyone would 
agree that the funding is inadequate” (1994, p. 466).  Juday takes Hanushek’s minimum 
one step further by asking questions involving numbers of textbooks per child, or 
children per teacher as important aspects of adequacy (cited in First & DeLuca, 2003).  
McUsic summarized, “Educators, social scientists, and courts have been unable to agree 
on the correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of education” 
(McUsic, 1991, p. 316). 
While Hanushek does not see a consistent correlation between educational inputs 
and student performance, Odden maintains there is a relationship and it can be made 
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more efficient.  Odden’s definition of adequacy is whether the state formula “provides 
adequate revenues per pupil for districts and schools to deploy educational strategies that 
are successful in educating students to high performance standards” (Odden, 2000, p. 
467).  Imbedded in Odden’s definition are three elements common to the discussions of 
adequacy: input (adequate revenues per pupil), process (educational strategies that are 
successful in educating students) and outputs (high performance standards).  Odden’s 
conception of adequacy involves costing out specific kinds of inputs and giving schools 
and teachers incentives to deploy those resources to improve student performance.  
Alexander also discussed three elements of adequacy: “(a) adequacy of educational 
inputs, (b) adequacy in school processes, and (c) adequacy of educational outputs” (2004, 
p. 81).  Verstegen also noted that judges have defined adequacy using input, process, or 
output criteria (1998).   
The traditional discussion of equity is tied to the adequacy of educational inputs, 
especially the notion of vertical equity.  Chambers and Parrish note the Serrano (1976) 
decision used a quantitative input measure of equity/adequacy: “It is the quality (or level) 
of the education in terms of expenditures relative to other districts in the state that is the 
relevant standard” (1982, p. 23).  Verstegen mentions New Jersey as an example of input 
adequacy, because the court directed “substantial equivalence approximating 100 
percent,” (Abbott III, 1994, p. 60) in funding between rich and poor districts, and “parity 
in per pupil expenditures” between rich and poor districts (Abbott IV, 1997, p. 60).  
Thomas and Davis list a “Resource Model” that they say “is referred to as an ‘input 
model’” (2001, p. 21); however, it sounds much like what Ladd and Hansen refer to as 
Professional Judgment (1999, p. 120). 
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Alexander divides inputs by quantity and quality.  Quantitative input adequacy 
looks at the quantity of inputs and “evaluates school finance systems based on relative 
distribution” with “an assumed linkage between resources and outputs” (N. A. Alexander, 
2004, pp. 86-87).  The National Council on Education Finance determines “adequacy as a 
two-step process,” beginning with a “rationally defensible base level of funding” and 
topped with “adjustments for different proportions of certain types of students” (NCES, 
2004, p. 2).  Quantitative input measures of adequacy are controversial, as noted above in 
the paragraph on Hanushek.  Ward says “some oppose school finance reform because 
they argue that spending more money on the education of children in low spending 
districts will not make any difference in the quality of their education.”   On the other 
hand, quality also matters.  Ward explains, “In his Texas research Ferguson found that 
better literacy skills among teachers, fewer larger classes, and more teachers with five or 
more years experience all were related to higher student test scores.  He concluded that 
skilled teachers are the most critical of all schooling inputs” (Ward, 1998, p. 14). 
Alexander puts the roots of study into adequacy of processes in sociology and 
works like Keeping Track (Oakes, 1985).  “There are certain assumed linkages between 
processes and student performance, where certain pedagogical and curriculum 
approaches are considered to be more beneficial for the academic performance of 
students” (p. 87), so “an important first step for adequacy reformers is to document trends 
in the curriculum choices and performance standards of students” (N. A. Alexander, 
2004, p. 91).  Alexander finds the root of process adequacy in Gowin by saying “an 
‘educative event’ can occur only if there are at least two partners in the process: the 
teacher who intervenes with meaningful materials and the learner who chooses to grasp 
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the meaning and learn them” (2004, p. 92).  While this paper assumes perfect efficiency, 
“a more detailed discussion on the adequacy of the process, which speaks to the capacity 
of institutions to meet the standards set” has been largely missing from the discussion of 
adequacy (N. A. Alexander, 2004, p. 97). 
Verstegen (1998) marks Montana and Wyoming as using a process definition of 
adequacy.  She quotes the Montana court in saying, “While this opinion discusses 
spending disparities so far as pupils are concerned, we do not suggest that financial 
considerations of that type are the sole elements of a quality education or of equal 
educational opportunity” (Helena, 1989).  Wyoming required the “best” educational 
system and the “proper” educational package for each student (Campbell, 1995). 
The bottom line for researchers, policy makers and society is educational inputs 
and outputs are very controversial.  Wise noted, “When the state assumes a duty, its 
citizens acquire a right,” but “at some point, the state may have to deal with the idea that 
teaching can be effective when students do not learn much.  The two phenomena may be 
irreconcilable” (Wise, 1983, p. 302).  Chambers and Parrish said, “It cannot be assumed 
with confidence that any prescribed set or level of resources will result in a mandated set 
of outcomes” (1982, p. 25).  Levin declared, “I cannot think of a single study that has 
defined and costed educational outcomes ….”   
An accurate costing requires that we know the specific resources that are 
required to provide a particular result.  Unfortunately we do not know with 
any degree of precision the impact of a specific set of resources on a 
specific set of students for a specific educational outcome. (1994, p. 399)  
  
Thomas and Davis list a “Desired Results Model” they claim is “often called the 
output model” (2001, p. 20).  However, it sounds more like the technique Augenblick 
51 
used to determine adequacy in Ohio that Ladd and Hansen call “Empirical Observation.” 
(1999, p. 118). 
Verstegen considers Kentucky and other states that defined pupil competencies as 
using output definitions of adequacy (1998).  Part of the problem with adequate outcomes 
is their measurement.  In reference to the Robinson and Pauley decisions, but also 
applicable to the Rose decision, Chambers and Parrish said, “A major problem with such 
output measures of adequacy in education is their measurement” (1982, p. 22).  While 
courts may declare the education clauses of their constitutions entitle students to 
preparation for a full and happy life, a full and happy life is more likely the result of life-
long learning and continual adaptation rather than the product of a definable amount or 
type of education.  Outcome measurement may be irrelevant if Alexander is right in 
saying “results neutrality will serve as the new standard by which plaintiffs take states to 
court” (p. 92), reflecting ideas discussed by Carnoy and Wise.  On the contrary, Rebell 
denies that judges have set an output definition of adequacy, maintaining instead that the 
courts have called for opportunity to learn rather than specific learning results (2001). 
Along with the theorists’ ideas, adequacy has been defined in the courts.  D. V. 
Thomas alleges the definition of adequate requires court interpretation: 
What constitutes an adequate education is a complex problem.  It requires 
judicial interpretation of the education clause in a state’s constitution and 
appropriate action by the legislature when mandated by the court’s 
decision. (Thomas & Davis, 2001, p. 7) 
 
Rebell’s review of court cases revealed four core constitutional concepts that 
define an adequate education, including 
(1) prepare students to be citizens and economic participants in a 
democratic society; (2) relate to contemporary, not archaic educational 
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needs; (3) be pegged to a “more than minimal” level; and (4) focus on 
opportunity, rather than outcome. (Rebell, 2001, p. 239) 
 
While Rebell sees opportunity rather than outcome as the focus of adequacy, 
writers like Wise claim “The failure to acquire the basic skills may be taken as prima 
facie evidence that the proper opportunity has not been provided” (Wise, 1983, p. 304).   
In conclusion, Ladd and Hansen (1999) said 
The meaning of adequacy is still unclear.  Major questions remain open: is 
it a wide, high standard or a narrow, low standard?  Does it focus attention 
and resources primarily on the disadvantaged or does it contribute to 
improving achievement for all students?  What will it mean to extend the 
concept of adequacy as an equity standard to federal, school, and student-
level policies?  How will the courts or legislators determine if funding is 
adequate? (p. 132)  
 
 
Implementing Adequacy 
Spurred by court rulings and unhindered by lack of definition, educators have 
implemented different types of adequacy plans.  Researchers have put these plans into 
four main categories, although exceptions are explained at the end of this section.  Ladd 
and Hansen list these adequacy models as based on statistical analysis, empirical 
observation, professional judgment, and whole-school designs (1999). 
 
Inference from outcomes by statistical analysis. 
Although this approach started as a technique for determining differing costs of 
educational services across a state, it evolved into an approach “so that a specific service 
level (defined, for example, in terms of the percentage of students achieving various 
educational goals) can be specified and the cost of providing that service estimated for 
the district with average characteristics” (Ladd & Hansen, 1999, p. 115).  “The 
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underlying philosophy of the advanced statistical model is that, with enough data about 
educational expenditures and student characteristics, statistical techniques should be able 
to isolate the effects of different types of inputs and arrive at a base cost of adequacy 
education” (NCES, 2004, p. 2).  The statistical result is a cost function.  “A cost function 
provides an estimate of the minimum amount of money necessary to achieve various 
educational performance goals given the characteristics of a school district and its student 
body, and the prices it must pay for inputs used to provide education” (Reschovsky & 
Imazeki, 2001, p. 379).  Two of the more well-known applications of this technique were 
done by Duncombe and Yinger in New York and by Reschovsky and Imazeki in 
Wisconsin and Texas (Reschovsky & Imazeki, 2001, 2003).   
Using this technique Reschovsky and Imazeki attempted to “determine the 
relationship between per-pupil education expenditures, student performance, and various 
characteristics of school districts and students” (2003, p. 2).  Their results indicate that 
small and large districts are more expensive than medium-sized districts, and the same is 
true of schools.  They found little difference in the expense of educating rural vs. non-
rural students, in contrast to Mathis (2003) and the Texas state legislature, which gave 
extra money to rural districts.  At the same time, education was properly funded through 
much of Wisconsin, although Milwaukee’s students performed poorly despite high 
funding levels (Reschovsky & Imazeki, 2001). 
Statistical analysis seems scientific and precise on the surface, “yet in reality, the 
precision implied by statistical modeling may be misleading because each of the 
definitions of data used in these equations, and rationales for their use, requires 
assumptions and judgments that are not necessarily more precise than those of 
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professionals operating without statistical models” (Guthrie & Rothstein, 1999, p. 222).  
Duncombe and Yinger’s costs for New York City varied between 7 and 262 percent 
above average, depending on the assumptions, while Rescovsky and Imazeki truncated 
their results in Wisconsin because Milwaukee was such an outlier (Guthrie & Rothstein, 
1999).  The “black box” nature of statistical analysis may also make the results harder for 
legislators to understand and accept.   
Statistical analysis is also called the “Econometric Model” (Thomas & Davis, 
2001), the “Advanced Statistical Approach” (NCES, 2004), “Statistical Modeling 
(Ensuring all children the opportunity for an adequate education: A costing out primer, 
2003) and “Economic Cost Function Approach” (Picus, 2003a).   
 
Inference from outcomes by empirical observation. 
This technique was developed by Augenblick, Alexander and Guthrie and later 
refined by John Augenblick in attempting to divine an adequate funding level for schools 
in Ohio following DeRolph.  The technique’s underlying assumption is that any district 
should be able to accomplish what some districts do accomplish (Augenblick, 1997).   In 
essence, researchers identified a set of districts with enough pupils performing at 
desirable levels, examined how much they were spending per pupil, and determined that 
all students should be so equipped or funded.  In practice, the criteria used were very 
controversial.  Augenblick initially eliminated the top and bottom 5 percent of these 
districts, then eliminated the top and bottom 10 percent, then returned to 5 percent.  The 
set of criteria for student performance, and whether they should be norm or criterion 
referenced was also controversial. 
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Ruggiero criticized Augenblick’s procedure in Ohio, claiming the successful 
districts “are not representative of the other school districts in the state” (Ruggiero, 
2001).  Haveman used Ruggiero’s technique to analyze Minnesota’s education finance 
system.  By comparing student test results in districts with similar characteristics 
(“benchmarking”), he concluded that Minnesota paid enough to provide its students an 
adequate education, although there were some distribution problems.  Furthermore, he 
was unable to find a benchmark for Minneapolis/St. Paul (Haveman, 2004). 
Cooper used a variation of the empirical observation technique in Illinois (Guthrie 
& Rothstein, 1999), and an “inverse variation of the model is proposed by the Council of 
Great City School Districts that bases the adequacy amount on the total per-pupil 
expenditures of the 10% highest achieving districts in the state” (Ensuring all children 
the opportunity for an adequate education: A costing out primer, 2003, p. 2).   
While the logic is compelling, critics maintain that this technique takes too little 
notice of the difficulties faced by some districts (Ladd & Hansen, 1999; NCES, 2004).  
The focus on cognitive results omits other desirable school outcomes, and it excluded 
schools which spent extreme amounts for administration and pupil support (Guthrie & 
Rothstein, 1999).  Finally, the approach assumes that variation in performance is 
correlated with variation in funding.  This technique may be less useful in states like 
Kentucky, Indiana, Florida and Rhode Island that have relatively little variation in 
expenditure between districts. 
The empirical observation technique is also called the “Desired Results Model” 
(Thomas & Davis, 2001), the “Successful Schools Approach,” “Method” (Ensuring all 
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children the opportunity for an adequate education: A costing out primer, 2003; NCES, 
2004), or “Model” (Griffith, 2001) and “Successful District Approach” (Picus, 2003a). 
Inference from Outcomes by Professional Judgment 
The Professional Judgment model for determining adequacy was “developed by 
Jay Chambers and Thomas Parrish in proposals they made for funding adequate 
education systems in Illinois in 1992 and in Alaska two years later” (Ladd & Hansen, 
1999, p. 121).  The technique involves consulting with various education practitioners to 
find out what needs to be provided to educate children to a certain level, and then to cost 
that across the state.  While Chambers and Parrish admonished their experts to “keep a 
balance between the resources they would like to see specified for each educational 
program and what they believed to be affordable” (Chambers and Parrish, 1994 quoted in 
Ladd & Hansen, 1999, p. 121), Guthrie et al. performed a similar study in Wyoming in 
response to the Campbell (1995) decision, but without a supposition of resource 
limitations.  Guthrie et al. also relied on experts as well as practitioners and used simpler 
mathematical methods to total the bill (Guthrie & Rothstein, 1999). 
As Guthrie and Rothstein explain, “We prefer the professional judgment 
approach, not because we believe it is more precise than statistical or inferential methods 
(it may not be more precise), but rather because its imprecision is more transparent” 
(1999, p. 231).  Like other methods, the professional judgment method is unreliable, and 
different groups of experts will produce different results. 
Thomas and Davis call the Professional Judgment model the “Resource Model.” 
In 2003 Picus et al. conducted a Professional Judgment Approach analysis to 
school finance for Kentucky.  Toward that end they engaged experts six school level 
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panels, two district level panels, and a state level panel “to produce a comprehensive set 
of school resources for each of elementary, middle, and high schools” (Picus, 2003a, p. 
15).  In a sense this combined the methods used by Chambers and Parrish and Guthrie, 
because it lacked the “affordable” restraint Chambers and Parrish employed, and it lacked 
the non-practitioner professional judgment Guthrie employed.  By determining the 
expense of the ingredients the professionals recommended, Picus et al. determined 
Kentucky would have to increase its education budget by $1.57 billion, from $3.956 
billion to $5.72 billion.  
 
Whole-school Design. 
Whole-school Design involves buying an “off the shelf” educational program, 
like “Success for All,” “Modern Red Schoolhouse,” and others, and incorporating it into 
the schools.  These methods have not been extensively scrutinized by researchers 
(Guthrie & Rothstein, 1999; Ladd & Hansen, 1999). 
The Whole-school Design approach might be changing.  The Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity lists “The Effective Strategies Method” or “Expert Judgment Approach,” which 
appears to rely on experts of some type to identify effective strategies and match them to 
schools, although they provide no citation.  Guthrie says “it may now or soon be possible 
to specify adequate resource levels based on a distillation of national empirical research 
about effective schools and judgments of professional researchers regarding effective 
practices” (Guthrie & Rothstein, 1999, p. 230), and Ladd & Hansen make an identical 
comment.  These comments sound like the “Effective Strategies Method” although that’s 
not certain since Guthrie and Ladd were referring to Whole-School Designs.  It is also not 
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clear how this technique differs from the Professional Judgment approach, described 
above and in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity literature (2003).   
Picus (2003a) lists “The Evidence Based Approach” or “State-of-the-Art 
Approach,” which sounds also like “The Effective Strategies Method” or “Expert 
Judgment Approach.”  This technique starts with experts who distill the best thinking 
involved in whole-school designs and other research into a list of requirements for 
adequate schools.  They can then determine the costs of these requirements and the 
subsequent price of an adequate school system. 
In 2003 Picus et al. conducted a State-of-the-Art Approach analysis for Kentucky.  
For a prototypical elementary school of 500 students they proposed a principal, 2.5 
instructional facilitators, 29 teachers with classes of 15 (K-3) or 25 students, 6 art, music 
and PE teachers, a tutor for each 20% of the student body on free lunch, plus professional 
development and computer funding.  All told their recommendations would entail raising 
Kentucky’s $3.9 billion dollar education budget by $740 million. 
Thomas and Davis also list a “Normative Data Model” for adequacy that uses 
either a national or representative sample of comparable state spending to determine 
“adequate” spending for the home state, although they caveat that this approach “is not 
applicable in the areas of facilities and transportation” (2001, p. 19).  They also list an 
“Education Priority Model,” in which “the state decides how much money the state can 
afford for education.  Then it places the burden on local districts to provide adequacy” 
(2001, p. 22).  These two models have elements of the Economic-Cost Model (Chambers 
& Parrish, 1982) discussed earlier, although Thomas and Davis’ book is distinctive both 
for its combativeness and lack of citations. 
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Summary of Adequacy Literature 
Regarding his 1994 overview of adequacy articles Clune wrote, “The single most 
important question to emerge from the articles is our lack of knowledge about the 
feasibility and methods of producing high minimum outcomes on a large scale among 
poor children” (1994, p. 367).  Nearly 10 years later Addonizio wrote regarding his 
research into educational adequacy in Michigan, “this approach to adequacy rests 
implicitly on the notion of an educational production function, an elusive concept that 
remains controversial despite enormous research literature” (p. 481).  Addonizio’s 
examined two high-performing, high-achieving districts; but the higher performing 
district had more low-income children and lower per-pupil expenditures.  He concluded, 
“The conceptual and technical challenges involved in defining and producing adequate 
educational outcomes are formidable” (Addonizio, 2003, p. 482).   
Despite the admitted lack of useful knowledge about adequacy, some advocates 
lash out at the legislatures for not providing more money.  First and DeLuca exclaim, 
“We have only the judiciary on which to depend to secure rationally and equitably the 
rights of all children to an adequate education” (First & DeLuca, 2003, p. 213), while 
Thomas and Davis agree “the vision of the justices far exceeds that of the legislators 
when it comes to defining an adequate education for all children” (2001, p. 16).  In the 
same volume D. V. Thomas says legislatures lack the courage to raise taxes to finance 
adequacy (p. 7).  In relation to the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in DeRolph, Sweetland 
says, “When judgment is served, however, reform can project divergence between the 
interests of the state and those of the populace” (2002, p. 817).  Sweetland is unclear how 
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to distinguish between the state and its populace; however, his observation is reminiscent 
of Glazer’s comments in Towards an Imperial Judiciary: 
And courts, through interpretation of the Constitution and the laws, now 
reach into the lives of the people, against the will of the people, deeper 
than they ever have in American history” (1975). 
 
Glazer’s comments are more applicable today than ever, since by dictating the education 
budget a judge dictates perhaps a third or more of the state budget.  Perhaps what 
Sweetland sees is a divergence of interest between the populace and its judges.  Chayes 
notes that in constitutional adjudication “courts may be called upon to act counter to the 
popular will as expressed in legislation” (1976, p. 1314). 
Monk and Theobald reported on the surprising degree of consensus among Ohio 
stakeholders regarding school finance, indicating that perhaps the state and its populace 
were not at odds.  Some of the goals were conflicting, but that necessitates dialogue to 
resolve those conflicts.  While educational advocates might be pleased with the success 
they have enjoyed in the courts to promote adequacy, the effort to provide the best 
possible education for all children is a continual democratic struggle, not an episodic 
fight.  That implies a continual, productive relationship between the citizens, the 
executive branch, the legislature, and educators.  Monk and Theobald make the following 
recommendation regarding Ohio, but it is nationally applicable:   
Moreover, it is in the area of where best to set the adequacy standards that 
disagreement appears to exist among Ohio policy makers and leaders of 
interest groups.  These agreements appear to be quite genuine and appear 
to give rise to the feeling of impasse in the policy making process.  The 
fact that we lack definitive and uncontroversial means of answering the 
fundamentally important question about where the adequacy target should 
be set makes compromise an advisable if not absolutely necessary solution 
(Monk & Theobald, 2001, p. 514). 
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This level of agreement is reminiscent of the situation in Harper v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107, 
Ala. (1993).  In Alabama, too, everyone agreed there was a problem.  While litigation 
certainly made the discussion over education more visible, it is open to question whether 
it made the discussion more productive.  If litigation is an invitation to dialogue 
(Scheingold, 1974, p. 36), it seems to give the litigators a megaphone with which to make 
their opinions heard, at the expense of others in the discussion. 
Sandler and Schoenbrod are particularly suspicious of the kind of “dialogue” 
advocates like Michael Rebell claim they are opening: 
Rebell calls his proposal [for the courts to bring students, parents, 
teachers, and administrators as well as representatives of civic, religious 
and business institutions together] “the community engagement dialogic 
model.”  Every state and city already has a model for giving everyone in 
the community a voice in a dialogue led by organizers.  These models are 
established by state constitutions and city charters, which put elected 
officials in charge of leading the dialogue.  Rebell’s proposal amounts to 
replacing these constitutions and charters with an amorphous process 
structured by plaintiffs’ attorneys and the rest of the controlling group.  
Rebell’s proposal makes manifest what was implicit all along in 
government by decree – rejection of democratically accountable 
government (2003, p. 152). 
 
 
Legal Theory 
In order to prepare to study the relationship between judicial beliefs and adequacy 
rulings, this portion of the literature review will examine the legal theory on state 
constitutions, judicial activism, and the rationale of judicial decisions. 
 
State constitutional criteria  
Ely declared “the most important datum bearing on what was intended is the 
constitutional language itself” (1980, p. 16).  It is intuitive that since adequacy decisions 
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in the third wave (Thro, 1990) of school finance reform are driven by state constitutional 
clauses, state constitutional educational clause wording is important in adequacy cases 
(Banks, 1991).  “State constitutional provisions on public schooling, for example, often 
deliberately express what their authors understand to be common beliefs”(p. 3), and they 
“provided one kind of idealized framework” (Tyack, 1982, p.11) for mobilization and 
action.  On the other hand 
In the past, reformers often sought to bring about educational change by 
rewriting state constitutions, to create in effect a new social compact 
concerning public schools.  Activist lawyers and judges in the post-Brown 
era sought instead to reconstruct the constitutional doctrine by which 
existing constitutions – both federal and state – were interpreted. (Tyack et 
al., 1987, p. 196) 
 
State supreme courts are actively engaging education finance, interpreting the “plain 
meaning” (Helena, 1989) of phrases in state constitutions to direct the state legislatures to 
significantly change education finance arrangements; however, “Under a Serrano II 
analysis, the text of the constitution itself is to be accorded ‘significant consideration’; 
this factor should not, however, be given determinative weight” (Serrano II cited in Thro, 
1989, p. 1675).     
In the wake of the U. S. Supreme Court’s Rodriguez decision, state high court 
interpretations of state constitutions became the dominant form of school finance reform 
litigation.  New Jersey’s highest court did this in Robinson v. Cahill (1973) mere days 
after the U. S. Supreme Court rendered Rodriguez, effectively closing the door to 
education finance reform through the federal courts..  Robinson initiated decades of 
litigation based on the court’s interpretation of the constitution’s education clause (see 
Appendix A).  Another pioneer was Kentucky’s Supreme Court, which declared the 
entire state educational system unconstitutional in “all its parts and parcels” in the Rose 
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decision (1989).  Section 183 of the Kentucky state constitution proclaims the state will 
“provide an efficient system of common schools throughout the Commonwealth.” (see 
Appendix B). 
A classification system for education clauses adopted by Thro (1989; 1993) and 
widely cited in the literature (Mills & McLendon, 2000) was developed independently by 
Grubb and Ratner (see Appendix B).  “Specific education provisions fall into one of four 
basic groups.”  “Provisions of the first group contain only general education language,” 
“provisions in the second group emphasize the quality of public education,” while the 
third group contains “a stronger and more specific education mandate” and the fourth 
group mandates “the strongest commitment to education” (Ratner, 1985, pp. 815-816).  
Essentially the first “weak” (Grubb, 1974, p. 66) group “merely mandates a system of 
free public schools” (Thro, 1993, p. 23), while the subsequent groups demand levels of 
quality.  The second group is characterized by terms such as “thorough and efficient,” 
(Grubb, 1974, p. 66) establishing “some minimum standard of quality” (Thro, 1993, p. 
23).  The third group often includes a “purposive preamble” and requires the legislature 
to “adopt all suitable means” (Grubb, 1974, p. 68), thus creating a higher standard than 
that for Category II.  Finally, the fourth group makes education “the paramount duty of 
the state” (Grubb, 1974, p. 69; Ratner, 1985, pp. 815-816), essentially making education 
“an important, if not the most important, duty of the state (Thro, 1993, p. 25).  In the 
context of adequacy cases, Dworkin’s comment that if “the plaintiff has a right against 
the defendant, then the defendant has a corresponding duty, and it is that duty, not some 
new duty created in court, that justifies the award against him” (1975, p. 1062) applies. 
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Certainly one can question these categorizations.  For example, while Wyoming’s 
constitution is classified as providing some provision for quality, the second level, the 
high court’s observation that the constitution mentioned a “right” to education, as well as 
four descriptive terms (complete, uniform, thorough, efficient) may have resulted in it 
being treated as if it were the highest level.  Similarly, Alabama’s constitution carries the 
lowest, weakest classification, although the amended language cited by Mills and 
McClendon that asserts education is not a right was struck down by the Alabama high 
court (ACE v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107, p. 147).  Consequently, the high court treated the 
term “liberal” in its constitution much as other states treated “thorough” and “efficient,” 
making its effect much like that of a Category II constitution.  In fact, the Alabama court 
borrowed adequacy standards from Kentucky, a Category II constitution state. 
Thro contends that “if, as is often the case, the historical analysis of the education 
clause and the examination of previous precedent and state statutes are inconclusive, then 
the language arguably becomes the decisive factor” (p. 22) in guiding court involvement, 
because “the language of the education clauses defines the duty of the state legislatures” 
(Banks, 1991; Thro, 1993, p. 23).  For example, with Category II states “the court must 
ask whether [the thorough and efficient] quality standard has been met” (Thro, 1993, p. 
28).  In Category III and IV states “the court should focus not on a specific level of 
quality but on the depth of the commitment to the public schools” (Thro, 1993, p. 29).  In 
the end litigants should be able to compare the quality of public education in their state 
with that in states with education clauses in their category and determine whether or not 
litigation will be successful.  Thro finds it disturbing that high court decisions vary 
because “decisions by courts that interpret identically worded or nearly identically 
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worded provisions but that reach radically different results may thereby undermine the 
legitimacy of the state courts in the minds of the lay public” (Thro, 1989, p. 1660).   
McUsic disagrees with Thro:  
Other states’ court opinions interpreting identical constitutional language 
provide no guidance as to what the clause means in a particular state.  
Although most state constitutional conventions did borrow language from 
other state constitutions, they seldom had any idea what the text meant in 
those other states. (McUsic, 1991, p. 308, footnote 3) 
 
In Brigham v. State (1997) Vermont’s high court agrees with McUsic, saying that 
“Although informative, all of these cases are of limited precedential value to this Court 
because each state’s constitutional evolution is unique and therefore incapable of 
providing a stock answer to the specific issue before us” (p. 391).   
McUsic offered an alternative scheme for classifying state constitution education 
provisions by analyzing their requirements for equality and minimum standards (1991).  
Regarding the provision for equality, four states’ constitutions meet the highest standard 
of specifying equality of education: Montana, Louisiana, New Mexico and North 
Carolina.  Lesser standards of equality according to McUsic, required state education 
systems to be uniform, efficient, or contained no equality standard.  Additionally, McUsic 
categorized state educational provisions according to their support for some standard of 
education.  By this measure, Illinois, Montana, Louisiana, and Washington filled the 
highest category with “constitutions specifying an explicit and significant standard” 
(McUsic, 1991, p. 334).  The second category for standards for education in state 
constitutions is “less explicit standards,” which includes many states requiring thorough 
and efficient systems.  Next are “constitutions setting lower standards” such as 
“encouraging, promoting, or cherishing” education or providing for “adequate or 
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sufficient education” (McUsic, 1991, p. 336).  The lowest constitutional standard for 
education provides for a “general” system or simply for the establishment and 
maintenance of a system of public schools.  
Kern Alexander offered one other alternative for classifying state constitutional 
support for education.  His three categories include those that “broadly affirm … the 
value of education,” those that require “the legislature to provide for a ‘system’ of public 
schools,’ and those that include “one or more adjectives to define the kind of system 
required … such as ‘general and uniform,’ ‘efficient,’ ‘thorough and efficient,’ 
‘adequate,’ ‘thorough,’ and ‘uniform’” (1991, p. 352-353). 
Advocates in Florida, discontent with the Florida high court’s refusal to intervene 
in school budgeting, changed the state constitution.  In 1998 the voters revised article IX 
of the Florida Constitution to make education a “fundamental value” and “paramount 
duty of the State to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing in 
the state” ("Florida Constitution," 1968, amended 1998).  “Attempts to modify the 
constitutional text, and so alter the playing field, have been rare” (Mills & McLendon, 
2000, p. 347).  Voters in Illinois and Nebraska rejected attempts to modify their 
constitutions. 
 
Judicial activism. 
Many education reformers have turned to the courts to attempt to change the 
public education system, “and the law has become a new force for social change in 
education as in society as a whole” (Tyack, 1982, p. 8).  Scholars of this phenomenon 
have wondered if, how, and how much the courts can change the education system; 
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however, Tyack asserts, “The dialectic between statutory and court law shaped the 
development of public schooling in profound ways” (Tyack, 1982, p. 9).  Other scholars 
have pondered the influences that cause jurists to rule one way or another.  While a “full 
theory of state constitutional jurisprudence is beyond the scope” (Thro, 1989, p. 1660) of 
this paper, some discussion of legal theory is fundamental to its investigation. 
Sunstein used four basic theories of judicial action - originalist (Bork, 1990), 
deference to the other branches (Thayer, 1893a), independent interpretive judgment 
(Dworkin, 1996), and protecting the political process (Ely, 1980) - to advocate a 
spectrum of possible judicial responses to cases.  The spectrum spans from 
reasonlessness/silence to maximalism.  Reasonlessness/silence are cases when the court 
does not rule or gives no reason for its ruling, while maximalism is a case when the court 
“establishes broad rules for the future” and “gives deep theoretical justifications for the 
outcomes” (Sunstein, 1996, p. 15).  The middle path Sunstein recommends is 
minimalism, in which the judges “avoid broad rules and abstract theories, and attempt to 
focus their attention only on what is necessary to decide particular cases” (p. 14).  
Reasons for choosing different responses include decision costs, error costs, and the 
intent to allow “democratic processes room to adapt to future developments” and “to 
produce mutually advantageous compromises” (p. 19).  The minimalist approach might 
be relevant to adequacy cases where the court lacks relevant information.  On the other 
hand, courts should avoid taking the minimalist course when delay may be harmful or 
people may be treated unequally.  “The case for minimalism is strongest when courts lack 
information that would justify a comprehensive ruling; when the need for planning is not 
especially insistent; when the decision cost of an incremental approach does not seem 
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high; and when minimalist judgments do not create a serious risk of unequal treatment” 
(Sunstein, 1996, p. 99).  “Sunstein’s deference is not designed to produce an optimal 
solution, but an effort to preserve the process by which society feels its way through an 
uncertain situation to an unknown outcome” (Rubin & Feeley, 2003, p. 625). 
Although it is strongly advocated (Bork, 1990) and widely accepted as an 
appropriate means of constitutional interpretation, scholars see serious obstacles to 
interpreting constitutions according to the original writers’ intentions (Ely, 1980; Segal & 
Spaeth, 2002; Shaman, 2001).  This problem is more acute for state constitutions than the 
national Constitution.  In addition to the problems of interpreting the Constitution, state 
constitutions are changed more often than the federal Constitution; often the language is 
carried from one version to the next without being changed, so that “it is not clear which 
set of framer’s intentions should guide the court” (Thro, 1989, p. 1659).  Should judges 
attend to the intent of the original writers or of the subsequent adopters?  Complicating 
the problem further is that often “state constitutional provisions were borrowed from the 
charters of other states” so “the intention of the framers may be nothing more than a 
decision to borrow” (Thro, 1989, p. 1659).  Judges may often update constitutional 
requirements to modern expectations.  Thro cites the New Jersey high court, which noted 
in Robinson that “today a system of public education which did not offer high school 
education would hardly be thorough and efficient” (Thro, 1989, p. 1659). 
In the late 19th century James Thayer moved slightly away from the framers’ 
intentions as guidance for judicial decisions.  Thayer found the roots of judicial review in 
the English Crown nullifying colonial legislative acts and was reluctant to allow judges 
too much leeway in striking down legislative acts (Thayer, 1893a).  Rather than assert a 
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judge’s opinion about principle in doubtful constitutional matters, Thayer maintained the 
court “can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not 
merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one – so clear that it is not open to 
rational question” (Thayer, 1893b, p. 144).  In fact, “the judicial function is merely that of 
fixing the outside border of reasonable legislative action, the boundary beyond which the 
taxing power, the power of eminent domain, police power, and legislative power in 
general, cannot go without violating the prohibitions of the constitution or crossing the 
line of its grants” (p. 148).  Thayer concludes that ultimately 
the safe and permanent road towards reform is that of impressing upon our 
people a far stronger sense than they have of the great range of possible 
harm and evil that our system leaves open, and must leave open, to the 
legislatures, and of the clear limits of judicial power; so that responsibility 
may be brought sharply home where it belongs.  Under no system can the 
power of the courts go far to save a people from ruin; our chief protection 
lies elsewhere. (Thayer, 1893b, p. 156) 
 
In contrast to Sunstein or Thayer’s restraint, Dworkin encourages heroic judges to 
act boldly when hard cases present a choice between “policy,” which “advances or 
protects some collective goal of the community as a whole,” and “principle,” which 
“respects or secures some individual or group right” (Dworkin, 1975, p. 1059).  In this 
contest “an argument of principle fixes on some interest alleged to be of such a character 
as to make irrelevant the fine discriminations of any argument of policy that might 
oppose it” (p. 1062), and “judges must make fresh judgments about the rights of the 
parties who come before them” (p. 1063).  The New Jersey Supreme Court used this idea 
in Robinson when it said, “Ultimately, a court must weigh the nature of the restraint or 
the denial [of a right] against the apparent public justification, and decide whether the 
State action is arbitrary” (cited in Thro, 1989, p. 1678).  Ultimately, “judicial decisions 
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must be taken to be justified by arguments of principle rather than arguments of policy” 
(p. 1093) and if the judge believes “quite apart from any argument of consistency, that a 
particular statute or decision was wrong because unfair, within the community’s own 
concept of fairness, then that belief is sufficient to distinguish that decision and make it 
vulnerable” (p. 1102).   
When a judge decides to overrule a law he need not be constrained by precedent.  
He “uses his own judgment to determine what legal rights the parties before him have, 
and when that judgment is made nothing remains to submit to either his own or the 
public’s convictions” (p. 1104).  Even though both judges and legislatures are constrained 
by the constitution, the judge may decide “that the community’s morality is inconsistent 
on [an] issue: its constitutional morality, which is the justification that must be given for 
its constitution as interpreted by its judges, condemns its discrete judgment” (p. 1104), 
and the judge may decide this because his “personal convictions have become the most 
reliable guide he has to institutional morality” (p. 1107).  In the end, principle, rights and 
community morality are “not some sum or combination or function of the competing 
claims of its members; it is rather” the judge’s “own sense of what the community’s 
morality provides” (Dworkin, 1996, p. 1107).  McUsic observed this same phenomenon 
when she noted, “moreover, state judges may ignore historical evidence, believing that 
the original intent or understanding of the clause is inappropriate in the context of modern 
conditions and values” (McUsic, 1991, p. 308, footnote 3).  Why is the judge’s opinion 
superior to that of the citizens’ and their elected leaders?  Dworkin says 
There is no reason to credit any other particular group with better facilities 
of moral argument; or, if there is, then it is the process of selecting judges, 
not the techniques of judging that they are asked to use, that must be 
changed (Dworkin, 1975, p. 1109). 
71 
 
Thayer would have cringed at Dworkin’s judge confidently asserting the primacy of his 
opinion in matters “of political conviction about which reasonable men disagree” 
(Dworkin, 1975, p. 1102), while Spaeth and Teger would have savaged the flimsy 
covering of “reasonable men disagree,” instead asserting “reasonable men always differ 
over questions that reach the Supreme Court …” (1990).   
While Dworkin saw assertive judges furthering rights and principles, Ely sees 
assertive judges ensuring the legislative process is representative of all constituencies, 
thus saving democracy from the tyranny of the majority (1980; Scheingold, 1974).  While 
Sunstein placed Ely further from the originalist position than Dworkin, Ely would place 
himself between the originalist and Dworkin’s Herculean judge.  He says “on my more 
expansive days, therefore, I am tempted to claim that the mode of review developed here 
represents the ultimate interpretivism” (Ely, 1980, p. 87).  To the extent that “politics is 
the art of preventing people from taking part in affairs that properly concern them” 
(Valery, 1943), Ely believes the courts’ role is to protect the process that enables people 
to participate and be represented, rather than to uphold any particular values. 
In a representative democracy value determinations are to be made by our 
elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we can vote 
them out of office.  Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving 
of trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change 
to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no 
one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an 
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of 
simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of 
interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other 
groups by a representative system. (Ely, 1980, p. 103) 
 
 It is in the second case that judges can exercise considerable discretion.  In any case 
where a minority (however defined) gets less than others through the political process, 
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the courts can intervene.  Their assertion would be that if the process had worked 
properly the result would have been different.  Scheingold says, “the Constitution 
provides principled legal standards for judging political action and thus can serve as a 
counterpoise to the incessant pulling and hauling among entrenched interests” (1974, p. 
25). Ely’s assumption is that a properly functioning representative democracy will 
represent the interests of all citizens equally.  The radical implications of this standard for 
judicial intervention are enormous.  Since one of the purposes of the political process is 
to decide who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1936), and the inevitable result of that 
process is that some will get more and some will get less.  Following this line of logic, 
“whichever group happens to lose the political struggle or fails to command the attention 
of the legislature or executive is – by that fact alone – a discrete and insular minority” 
(Fiss, 1979, p. 8) needing protection.  Scheingold predicted this problem: 
How is the judge to decide which minorities are to be favored by law?  
And if special treatment is justified, how much of it – and under what 
circumstances?  If judges are left to answer these questions in whichever 
way they choose their discretionary powers are increased enormously and 
so too are the opportunities for abuse of judicial authority. (1974, p. 56) 
 
Thus, the opportunities for the court to intervene in the legislative process are limited 
only by the calendar and the judges’ whim, not the theory.  Ely expands the court’s 
traditional role into that of political powerbroker (Scheingold, 1974).   
Ely’s theory applies to education finance and adequacy.  Considering a situation 
in which wealthier districts can spend at their liberty, Enrich said, “one practical result is 
that those with the option of living in such more-than-adequate districts – a group that is 
likely to include a disproportionate share of those who shape state law and policy – have 
little direct stake in the content of the standard of adequacy at the same time that they are 
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sure to bear a substantial part of its costs” (1995, p. 181).  Alexander said “possibly the 
most important conclusion that can be drawn from the Kentucky decision is that state 
legislatures in most circumstances are unlikely to provide equal educational opportunities 
without judicial intervention” (1991, p. 343), because of “the obvious restrictive 
influence of the affluent and insular factions living in the state’s wealthy school districts 
who shape educational policy to their own designs” (1991, p. 346).  Minton studied voter 
behavior in New Jersey with the assumption that legislators would be more responsive to 
their peers, upper- and upper-middle class voters.  “Political assessments of this kind 
cause legislators to constrain the range of policy options they deem feasible” for fear of 
voter backlash, which could have been up to four or five percent in some wealthier 
districts in New Jersey (Mintrom, 1993).  Swenson noted that inability or unwillingness 
to reform the educational system “usually occurs because the potential policy action is 
unpopular with the public and a serious consideration would jeopardize political careers” 
(2000, p. 1155).  In other words, policy-makers are responsive to their wealthy peers and 
neighbors and heedless of the longer-term implications of inadequately educating all 
students.  Ely would advocate judicial intervention to protect the interests of the voters 
and non-voters the policy-makers ignore. 
Using the courts to accomplish policy goals takes various forms.  Scheingold saw 
court assertions of rights as a political tool.  Essentially a court declaration of a right does 
not of itself change peoples’ lives, but litigation “provides access to the substantial 
political power of the courts” (Scheingold, 1974, p. 85).  
The politics of rights, in other words, points towards a conception of rights 
as political resources.  The further implication is that the value of rights 
resides less in the political power that backs them than in their close 
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association with social justice in the minds of Americans. (Scheingold, 
1974, p. 84) 
 
Court-declared rights are important symbols that provide leverage in the political process 
because we are a people of laws who respond to declarations of rights.  Litigants can take 
the declared right into the political process, and use it to influence the political process to 
provide them with more power and resources.   
Abram Chayes contrasted traditional notions of law with “public law litigation” in 
“The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,” (1976, p. 1284), “the most widely cited 
explanation and defense of court supervision of state and local governments” (Sandler & 
Schoenbrod, 2003, p. 114).  While traditional law involved individual parties resolving 
past disputes through single judgments, public law involves “sprawling and amorphous” 
parties resolving questions of public policy through “complex forms of on-going relief” 
(Chayes, 1976, p. 1284; Scheingold, 1974, p. 17).  The end result is that “relief is not a 
terminal, compensatory transfer, but an effort to devise a program to contain future 
consequences in a way that accommodates the range of interests involved” (Chayes, 
1976, p. 1295). 
Chayes saw public law litigation changing the nature of lawsuits by using the 
constitution to compel government action rather than restrain it (1976, p. 1295).  
Constitutional restraints separating powers between branches are also weakened.  Judges 
gather facts in a process that “begins to look like the traditional description of legislation” 
(1976, p. 1297).  Public law litigation “prolongs and deepens, rather than terminates, the 
court’s involvement with the dispute” (1976. p. 1298) until “the trial judge has passed 
beyond even the role of legislator and has become a policy planner and manager” 
(Chayes, 1976, p. 1302), functions traditionally associated with the executive branch.  
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Because “judges would often be better than elected officials at resolving policy disputes 
and would produce better outcomes,” “[the] good results justify arguably antidemocratic 
means” (Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003, p. 116). 
As judges intrude on roles traditionally filled by the executive and legislative 
branches, judges presides over an exclusive political and policy environment.  “In such a 
system, enforcement and application of law is necessarily implementation of regulatory 
policy.  Litigation inevitably becomes an explicitly political forum and the court a visible 
arm of the political process” (Chayes, 1976, p. 1304).  Chayes sees a political dialogue 
with the courts as full partners, since “judicial participation is not by way of sweeping 
and immutable statements of the law, but in the form of a continuous and rather tentative 
dialogue with other political elements” (1976, p. 1316; Notes, 1977; Scheingold, 1974).   
Brown says “what the cases represent is not so much a judicial resolution of a problem, 
but rather one step in an ongoing approach to a multi-dimensional social question” 
(Brown, 1994, p. 546) or “the development of a new form of public law litigation: the 
dialogic as opposed to the managerial model” (p. 566).  Scheingold, Rebell, Ward, 
Sandler and Schoenbrod also mentioned this dialogue.  Alternatively, Brown speculates, 
judges may be protecting themselves from a potentially hostile legislature (p. 554).   
With specific reference to education finance litigation, Justice Woodall relied 
extensively on Chayes to show that education finance litigation was public law litigation 
(James v. Alabama Coalition for Equity et al., 836 So.2d 813 (2002) (Woodall 
concurring).  The court dismissed the case and withdrew from the controversy. 
Owen Fiss furthered Chayes’ ideas about the nature of law and litigation, and 
Ely’s ideas about court protection of losers in the democratic process, so that the judges 
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become an integral and necessary part of modern government.  For Fiss, “adjudication is 
the social process by which judges give meaning to our public values,” and in contrast to 
the traditional adversarial court action pitting individual against individual, “the structural 
suit is one in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over values of constitutional 
dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to eliminate a threat to those values 
posed by the present institutional arrangements” (Fiss, 1979, p. 2).   Because a judge is 
independent, required to listen to litigants and engage in a dialogue in which he is 
accountable for his decisions, Fiss believes judges are able to give reasons for decisions 
that “transcend the personal, transient beliefs of the judge or the body politic as to what is 
right or just or what should be done” and transform “personal beliefs into values that are 
worthy of the status ‘constitutional’” (1979, p. 13).  Through structural litigation Fiss 
believes judges will find “a social condition that threatens important constitutional values 
and the organizational dynamic that creates and perpetuates that condition” (1979, p. 18).  
In the battle between the helpless citizens and the bureaucracy, the judge heroically 
identifies the Constitution’s true values and demands “nothing less than the 
reorganization of an ongoing institution, so as to remove the threat it poses to 
constitutional values.”  To maintain his independence, the judge will hire special masters 
to administer his orders and ensure compliance in a “long term supervisory relationship… 
between the judge and the institution” (1979, p. 28). 
Fiss imagines a world in which judicial giants slay the giants of bureaucracy and 
hierarchy (1979, p. 44).  This sentiment is reminiscent of Judge Skelly Wright, who said, 
“our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of 
Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy” 
77 
(1971, quoted in Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003, p. 19).  But the judge’s legitimacy 
depends upon dialogue and independence.  Fiss says dialogue is not threatened because 
of “the obligation of the judge to confront grievances he would otherwise prefer to 
ignore, to listen to the broadest possible range of persons and interests, to assume 
individual responsibility for the decision, and to justify the decision” (1979, p. 45).  
However, judges do avoid grievances they prefer to ignore (Brenner & Krol, 1990; 
Spaeth & Rathjen, 1990).  For example, the New Hampshire high court declined 
Claremont School District’s “invitation to determine whether the definition adopted [by 
the legislature] is facially unconstitutional” Claremont v. Governor (Motion for 
Extension of Deadlines), (143 N.H. at 159-160, 725 A2d 648 cited in Claremont III, p. 
748). Also court rules dictate that only certain persons are allowed to speak, judges are 
significantly less accountable for their decisions than their peers in the other branches, 
and it is highly questionable whether the justifications of their decisions are meaningful 
(discussed below).  Fiss himself concedes that the very process of and desire to make 
judges’ perceptions of public values efficacious “threatens the judge’s independence and 
the integrity of the judicial enterprise as a whole” (1979. p. 53).  Nevertheless Fiss 
maintains the judge “among all the agencies of government is in the best position to 
discover the true meaning of our constitutional values, but at the same time, he is deeply 
constrained, indeed sometimes even compromised, by his desire – his wholly admirable 
desire – to give that meaning a reality” (1979, p. 58).  Regarding education finance in 
light of Fiss’ ideas, Kentucky’s Rose (1989) decision “portended a more assertive role for 
the judiciary as the oracle of interpretation for state constitutional mandates and as a 
permanent overseer of legislative responsiveness” (K. Alexander, 1991, p. 344). 
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Gerald Rosenberg (1982) provided a useful dichotomy for describing the ability 
of courts to create the kind of structural reform Fiss wanted.  He presented two views of 
the court: the Constrained Court view and the Dynamic Court view.  Those who 
subscribe to the Constrained Court view believe that since the courts have power of 
neither the sword nor the purse they “can do little more than point out how actions have 
fallen short of constitutional or legislative requirements and hope that appropriate action 
is taken” (p. 3).  Believers in the Dynamic Court see the courts “as powerful, vigorous, 
and potent proponents of change” (p. 3).  Through his examination of civil rights, 
abortion and women’s rights, he determined that courts could be ineffective if they lacked 
political support or faced serious resistance from the legislative and executive branches of 
government; however, they were not constrained by lack of legal precedent.  Depending 
on certain conditions, Rosenberg sees some truth in both views of the court, but worries 
about the “implications of seeking significant social reform through the courts for 
political participation, mobilization and reform” (Rosenberg, 1991). 
Wirt, Mitchell and Marshall raise a different but relevant dichotomy.  They detect 
“two streams of influence from constituents’ values:” a broad reflection of widespread 
citizen concern they labeled “breadth stimulus,” and the narrow interests of organized 
groups they labeled “intensive stimulus” (1986, p. 11).  While the legislature’s 
effectiveness in responding to the breadth stimulus is debatable, and the legislature’s 
response to intensive stimulus is controversial, clearly the courts respond to the intensive 
stimulus of narrow interest groups at the expense of other, broader citizen concerns.  This 
has important implications for the shift in education policy-making power from the 
legislature to the courts, or from the people to special interest groups.  “Democracy by 
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decree, in the end, privileges those groups and interests that have the tight organizations 
and sophistication needed to get Congress to pass a federal statute that creates rights, and 
then to follow up with litigation leading to a decree enforcing that right” (Sandler & 
Schoenbrod, 2003, p. 158). 
Handler (1978) used a theoretical model to examine structural reform litigation.  
Like Ely and Fiss, he postulated that the modern bureaucratic state does not properly 
serve the interests of the less powerful.  Handler described modern governments along a 
continuum from pluralism to corporatism, with pluralism being an ideal type of 
democracy and corporatism being government run by special interests.  He wondered if 
social-reform groups could swing the balance of power equilibrium from corporatism 
toward pluralism through litigation and the courts.  Their ability to do this depended upon  
(a) the characteristics of social-reform groups; (b) the distribution of the 
benefits and costs of activity by social-reform groups; (c) the nature of the 
bureaucratic contingency confronting the social-reform group; (d) 
characteristics of judicial remedies; and (e) characteristics of the law 
reformers. (Handler, 1978, p. 5) 
 
Within this list, the distribution of costs and benefits was particularly important, because 
it drove the transformation of social-reform groups from being broad-based and non-
hierarchical to being leader-centered.  He conceived three results from structural reform 
litigation: direct results, the change of public policy; indirect results, leverage, legitimacy, 
and the opportunity to be heard; and an increase in pluralism (Handler, 1978, p. 37-39). 
Handler concludes that “social-reform groups find it difficult to obtain tangible 
results directly from law-reform activity” (p. 209), and it is “difficult to pin down, either 
theoretically or empirically, what precisely the indirect effects are” (1978, p. 222).  
Scheingold explains the lack of direct results by saying, “the fact remains that access to 
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the material benefits of politics has invariably been associated with a degree of 
mobilization and with effective organization” (1974, p. 208).  Most interesting is, in 
contrast to the theories of Chayes and Fiss, social-reform groups do not increase 
pluralism.  To the extent that they depend upon centralized funding, they tend to “evolve” 
(p. 225) into a “hierarchical group, supported by the state, and, to a large extent, 
explicitly or implicitly controlled by the state” (p. 229), so that ultimately “decision 
making will not have been democratized a great deal” (p. 231, Scheingold, 1974, p. 34).  
When all is said and done, structural reform litigation “will not disturb the basic political 
and economic organization of modern American society” (Handler, 1978, p. 233). 
One fundamental question that adequacy cases raise, and it is applicable in other 
cases against the government as well, is “whether public policy should be made by 
courts” (Rubin & Feeley, 2003, p. 619).  While this question was debatable to Chayes 
and Fiss, by 2003 Rubin and Feeley declare that “policy making is a standard and 
legitimate function of modern courts” (2003, p. 617).  Rubin and Feeley trace the 
development of legal philosophy through formalism, legal realism and legal process to 
new legal process.  While legal process claimed that the courts could address certain 
issues because they had special competence, it fell victim to critics who noted that judges 
were political actors, just like those in the other branches of government.  The new legal 
process school encouraged courts to make public policy “only when they possess some 
identifiable institutional advantage” (Rubin & Feeley, 2003, p. 625), which could be 
watered down to some kind of institutional or other competence, especially assuming 
“that judges are public-oriented decision makers” (p. 630, Dayton, 1996) and the other 
branches have failed to act (Banks, 1991; Swenson, 2000).  Chayes also maintains that 
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courts have institutional advantages over the other branches (pp. 1309-1311), and that 
“the growth of judicial power has been, in large part, a function of the failure of other 
agencies to respond to groups that have been able to mobilize considerable political 
resources and energy” (1976, p. 1313).   
In the end, judges are similar to leaders in the other branches of government in 
status and background (Rubin & Feeley, 2003, p. 640; Scheingold, 1974).  Brown 
believes the court and the legislature “are close working partners in the ongoing give-
and-take of state government and politics” (1994, p. 555).  They often proceed 
cautiously, pragmatically and incrementally.  They, like the legislative and executive 
branches, are insulated from public opinion.  They often rely on experts and special 
assistants as they administer programs they control.  “Ultimately the success of judges as 
policy makers” depends on whether “their policies nest within a larger set of policies” 
and “fit within a larger accepted whole” (Rubin & Feeley, 2003, p. 664).  In sum, Rubin 
and Feeley see judges as policy makers with very similar motivations and limitations as 
legislators and bureaucrats, and see little reason why they shouldn’t make policy when 
they believe they should.  Ely echoes this notion saying, “since judges tend generally to 
be drawn from roughly the same ranks as legislators, the heart of the argument here is 
that moral judgments are sounder if made dispassionately, and that because of their 
comparative insulation judges are more likely so to make them” (1980, p. 57). 
While Rubin and Feeley view judicial policy-making as a necessary and positive 
development, Sandler and Schoenbrod take a decidedly different view, maintaining 
institutional reform litigation has “proved much less successful than its proponents admit, 
undermining the claim that people will be underserved without it” (Handler, 1978; 2003, 
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p. 9).  While they agree “institutional reform litigation promises to protect the powerless 
by making politicians cede some of their power to apolitical judges and public interest 
lawyers who will be guided by experts concerned with doing the right thing rather than 
the politically opportune thing” (p. 4), in reality “decrees negotiated by plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ attorneys” erode the responsibility, “constitutional and statutory powers of 
elected officials” (Handler, 1978) in favor of “plaintiffs’ attorneys, various court-
appointed functionaries, and lower-echelon officials” they call “the controlling group”  
(Handler, 1978; Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003, p. 6; van Geel, 1982).  They trace the root 
of the problem to Congress, which passed legislation declaring “soft,” “aspirational” 
rights enforceable in court without giving state or local governments the means to address 
these rights (Handler, 1978, p. 226).  Consequently “private, nongovernmental public 
interest law firms” were able to “steamroll statehouses and municipal councils throughout 
the land” (Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003, p. 26).  While the “basic premise of democracy 
by decree is that government can be made more compassionate only if judges impose 
their will on elected officials” (p. 33), in reality “democracy by decree gives the 
controlling group preemptive power over how much money and power to put at its own 
disposal” (Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003, p. 156).  Handler predicted this is the result 
(1978, p. 228). 
Sandler and Schoenbrod use a special education case in New York City, Jose P. v. 
Ambach, No. 79 Civ (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1979), and the subsequent activity featuring Michael 
Rebell, as their principal example.  “With the advantage of the quarter century since 
Chayes wrote,” Sandler and Schoenbrod supplemented Chayes’ views on institutional 
litigation as follows: 
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- State and local governments are the targets of litigation, and they consent 
to decrees rather than fight them. 
- The judge is a passive supervisor.  Higher federal courts and agencies 
charged with enforcing statutes rarely play a role. 
- The main actor, the controlling group, rules through long-term plans.  It 
operates without boundaries, prefers to work informally and privately, and 
makes up the law as it goes along. (Scheingold, 1974, p. 34) 
- Plaintiffs’ attorneys have the de facto power to veto modifications in the 
long-term plan, and tend to advance their vision of the public interest, 
often at the expense of some of their clients. (Handler, 1978, p. 224; 
Scheingold, 1974, p. 210) 
- Plaintiffs attorneys and the trial judge are the only constants – everyone 
else changes. 
- Members of the public harmed by the decree are often denied a full voice 
in the litigation.  
- There is potentially no end. (2003, p. 117-138) 
 
While Rebell maintains that the situation for special education in New York is 
better than it otherwise might have been as a result of his intervention regarding Jose P. 
(cited by Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003, p. 90), that is actually impossible to know.  
Leland DeGrasse ruled, “The most serious evidence of [the New York City Board of 
Education’s] inefficient spending concerns special education” (CFE II, 2001, p. 537), but 
he comes short of laying the blame at Rebell’s feet.  Rebell was litigating before him.  
New York’s high court concluded that “The available evidence-based conclusions are 
that overreferral (sic) to special education costs City schools somewhere between tens of 
millions and $335 million” (CFE IV, 2003). Sandler and Schoenbrod warn, “the failure of 
such competent people in pursuit of such a needed objective should compel attention on 
whether we should continue to rely so readily on courts to manage the complex 
institutions of state and local governments” (2003, p. 97).  They conclude: 
Society has conducted a long-running experiment with democracy by 
decree.  It is time for a reevaluation.  What needs reevaluation is not the 
values that underlie our best intentions.  What needs reevaluation is our 
continuing reliance on courts, judges, and lawyers to do the work that in a 
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representative democracy should properly be done by legislatures, 
representatives, and the people. (Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003, p. 226) 
      
Having discussed legal theory in broad terms, this paper will now focus more 
specifically on theories and techniques for explaining judicial decisions. 
 
Explaining Judicial Decisions in Education Finance Cases 
“Analysis of Supreme Court decision making in the American democratic setting 
is perennial” (Notes, 1977, p. 508).  Scholars have categorized various theories on the 
influences behind judicial decision making.  These categories include “case facts and 
legal rules,” external influences such as the “other governmental branches, the economy 
and social trends,” “institutional features” such as term length and selection method, and 
“personality characteristics or political values of the state or its jurists,” (Banks, 1991; 
Dayton, 1996; Lundberg, 2000, p. 1101; Swenson, 2000).  The ability of these factors to 
predict whether judges would declare state education finance systems unconstitutional 
was mixed.   
Case facts and legal rules, such as the strength of the state constitution’s education 
provision, variance in or level of per pupil spending, and the level of teacher salaries 
were usually insignificant predictors (Banks, 1991; Lundberg, 2000, p. 1101; Swenson, 
2000; van Geel, 1982).  Swenson (2000) found low per pupil spending predicted state 
high courts declaring education finance systems unconstitutional, although Lundberg did 
not find that result.  Lundberg found that the state’s education clause did not predict an 
outcome, but in states where the court had ruled against the education finance system the 
strength of the education clause was a factor.   
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That case facts or the strength of the constitution were not significant predictors 
of the results of education finance cases might cause one to pause before asserting that 
judges are simply interpreters of the law, balancing facts, statutes and precedents.  Segal 
and Spaeth (2002) offer an extensive critique of the legal model for explaining judicial 
decisions through textual interpretation, precedence, or framer/legislative intent.  In 
reference to the plain meaning they discuss rights to travel and privacy, which the 
Supreme Court upholds with strict scrutiny even though neither is found in the 
constitution.  On the other hand, they cite examples of limits on the First Amendment 
where the court contradicts itself, and they quote Justice Scalia in saying, “we have 
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says …” (p. 59, 
quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).  Precedent is 
no less slippery, since “precedents lie on both sides of most every controversy” (p. 77).  
Framer or legislative intent is least dependable.  First, it is impossible to know why 
people voted as they did.  Second, constitutional and statutory language might be 
deliberately vague as the result of a compromise in drafting the document.  Third, 
assuming that framer or legislative intent exists, advocates are often able to find plausible 
evidence from both sides of an argument to explain why they believed their position 
reflects framer/ legislative intent.  To summarize they quote Judge Richard Posner (The 
New York Times, September 26, 1999, p. A13): 
There is a tremendous amount of sheer hypocrisy in judicial opinion 
writing.  Judges have a terrible anxiety about being thought to base their 
opinions on guesses, on their personal views.  To allay that anxiety, they 
rely on the apparatus of precedent and history, much of it extremely 
phony. (Segal & Spaeth, 2002, p. 85) 
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That the constitutional language is not predicative of court rulings in education 
finance cases is a common conclusion.  Banks declared the “lack of any discernible 
relationship between the strength of commitment to education in the state constitution 
and the success rate of school finance challenges makes it clear that the outcome of these 
cases does not depend on the interpretation of the constitution involved” (1991, p. 154), a 
conclusion supported by Lundberg and Swenson.  Thro observed in regard to education 
finance cases that “there appears to be no coherent pattern of litigation results” (Thro, 
1994, p. 617), and “regardless of when the case was brought, the state constitutional 
provision relied upon, or the wording of the state constitutional provision, the outcomes 
were totally unpredictable” (Thro, 1990, p. 231-232).   Enrich said that although court 
opinions cited a variety of sources - “constitutional history, expert opinion and testimony, 
dictionary definitions, the thinking of other courts” - “it remains unclear how any of these 
can truly ground the crucial step from generic constitutional language to specific 
substantive criteria” (1995, p. 175).  Dayton, Dupre and Kiracofe summarize that many 
scholars studying education finance have determined that “variations in the decisions” in 
these cases are not consistent with “the direction of the variations in the law and facts” 
(2005, p. 1).  Specifically, “there is no clear evidence establishing that the strength of the 
language in a state’s education clause has any correlation with the actual outcome of the 
cases” (Dayton et al., 2004; Dayton et al., 2005, p. 6).  In fact Alexander declares, “the 
Kentucky case seems to indicate that virtually any constitutional provision for education 
suffices to establish the court’s right to apply strict scrutiny to legislation in securing 
equal educational opportunity” (1991, p. 351).  This seems to be consistent with 
scholarship showing justices are not “significantly influenced by arguments over text or 
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intent” (Segal & Howard, The Systematic Study of Stare Decisis, paper presented at the 
American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. (2002) cited in Segal & 
Spaeth, 2002).   
Since legal factors seem to be weak variables for explaining judicial decisions in 
education finance cases, perhaps other external factors matter.  External factors that 
Lundberg found predictive in school finance cases included a traditional state political 
culture and high per capita income, and a rural environment (Lundberg, 2000).  Swenson 
found the state’s political orientation was predictive (2000; Wirt et al., 1986).  Banks 
found “frustration with continual legislative inaction is implicit in virtually every case” 
where plaintiffs succeed in challenging the school finance system (1991, p. 155; Handler, 
1978; van Geel, 1982).  Swenson’s (2000) analysis reached the opposite conclusion.  She 
found judicial activism in light of prior legislative action on education finance reform 
“perhaps the most surprising, and disturbing, of all” (2000, p. 1160).  Regarding the 
influence of political factors, Dayton, Dupre and Kiracofe note an Alabama trial court 
judge who campaigned for a seat on the Alabama Supreme Court based on his orders to 
the governor and legislature to “fix the problem” (p. 4), and “the Supreme Court of 
Ohio’s eleventh hour decision terminating the DeRolph litigation in December, just 
weeks before two Republicans were to be seated on the court” (2004, p. 13).    
In an analysis of economic factors predicting judicial decisions, Dayton et al. 
examined the Index of Consumer Sentiment, assuming “state high court judges would be 
more inclined to declare a state funding system unconstitutional when there was a 
positive trend and sentiment about the national economy” (2005, p. 10).  Their results 
indicated some correlation between positive economic indicators and education finance 
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systems being declared unconstitutional.  On the other hand, when they wrote state 
economies were doing poorly and plaintiffs in education finance cases were succeeding.   
One final external factor is the race of the litigants.  Ryan noted  
In sum, predominantly minority districts have won only three of twelve 
(25%) school finance challenges in which they were plaintiffs.  
Predominantly white districts, by contrast, have won eleven of fifteen 
cases (73%)…. (1999, p. 455) 
   
Ryan speculates that “There may indeed be alternative explanations as to why urban 
minority districts almost never win school finance cases, while rural and suburban white 
districts win such cases more often than not” (1999, p. 457).  Indeed, the impact of race, 
economics, politics and perhaps other external factors deserve exploration in relation to 
school finance cases. 
Lundberg’s analysis of institutional factors, such as length of judicial terms or 
method of selection, indicated they did not predict the outcomes of educational finance 
cases.  Although she hypothesized that courts composed predominantly of Democrats 
would be more likely to overturn educational finance systems, her study revealed judges’ 
political parties did not predict the case results (Lundberg, 2000).  Swenson reached a 
similar conclusion (2000). 
To summarize, researchers have found that external factors are significant 
predictors of judicial behavior in education finance cases.  None of the literature 
reviewed indicates that case facts and legal rules, institutional features and judicial 
personality characteristics or political values are significant predictors of the outcomes of 
education finance cases.  “The state courts’ erratic application of the various 
methodologies suggests that they are being less than candid when they point to the 
individual characteristics of their state constitutions to justify their decisions” (Banks, 
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1991, p. 154), and “the likelihood that a state scheme of school finance will be declared 
unconstitutional depends almost solely on the whimsy of the state supreme court justices 
themselves” (Swenson, 2000, p. 1161). 
 
Judicial Attitudes 
The attitudinal model “holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of 
the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices” (Segal & 
Spaeth, 2002, p. 86).  Schubert put it more directly: “The Supreme Court’s major 
structural differences, in so far as these reflect differences in voting behavior, are a direct 
result of the relative strength from time to time of representation among the justices of 
three major ideological perspectives: liberalism, economic conservatism, and political 
conservatism” (Schubert, 1974, p. 13, emphasis added).  Neuborne marked the 
importance of “a series of psychological and attitudinal characteristics,” including 
judicial values, that shape judicial decisions (Neuborne, 1977, p. 1124).  According to 
some legal theories, “in interpreting this [constitutional] language the Court is forced to 
make a value judgment among several alternatives suggested by the particular 
constitutional provision” (Notes, 1977, p. 510).  Evidence of ideological influence below 
the Supreme Court level has been identified.  For example, appointees of Democratic 
presidents decide more often in favor of environmentalists in National Environmental 
Policy Act cases, while appointees of Republican presidents decide more often in favor of 
developers (Austin, Carter, Klein, & Schang, 2005). With specific reference to school 
finance litigation, Brown says, “the reformist, institutional litigation which has become so 
important in the federal courts presents three novel elements: an acceptance of the ‘public 
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action’ in which citizens challenge the legality of government conduct; a view of the 
judicial role in which articulation of public values becomes as important as dispute 
resolution; and an increasingly managerial role for trial courts at the remedial stage” 
(Brown, 1994, p. 559, emphasis added).  Although other examinations of jurists’ political 
persuasion (Lundberg, 2000; Swenson, 2000) failed to explain their decisions, this study 
goes further in trying to use attitudinal models of judicial ideology to explain judicial 
decisions in state high court adequacy decisions. 
Dworkin explained that judges’ decisions might be a reflection of personal values.  
In addition to indicating that lawyers and judges “reflect the general moral attitudes of 
their time” (p. 1074) and that judgments about statutes and precedents will “reflect [the 
judge’s] own intellectual and philosophical convictions,” (p. 1096) he says 
Lawyers believe that when judges make new law their decisions are 
constrained by legal traditions but are nevertheless personal and original.  
Novel decisions, it is said, reflect a judge’s own political morality, but also 
reflect the morality that is embedded in the traditions of the common law, 
which might well be different. (1975, p. 1063) 
 
Regarding his own idea explaining how and why judges must make decisions based on 
their own best informed opinion, Dworkin explains, “the thesis presents, not some novel 
information about what judges do, but a new way of describing what we all know they 
do” (1975, p. 1067).  Indeed Ely confirms, “I think we shall sense in many cases that 
although the judge or commentator in question may be talking in terms of some 
‘objective,’ non-personal method of identification, what he is really likely to be 
‘discovering,’ whether or not he is fully aware of it, are his own values” (1980, p. 44; 
Scheingold, 1974, p. 89).  Discussing a similar thesis, a Note from the Rutgers Camden 
Law Review discusses how “the Court’s authoritative statement of ‘what the law is’ [can 
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be] arrived at by intuitive judgment or derived from a recognizable social consensus” 
(Notes, 1977, p. 513). 
There is evidence within the history of educational finance litigation that supports 
the idea that judge’s ideas and values can be large determinants of the plain meaning of 
constitutional education clauses.  Montana’s high court unanimously upheld the state’s 
education financing system in Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (1974), only to reach the 
opposite conclusion 15 years later (Helena, 1989).  “Since the challenged foundation 
program was no less effective in 1989 than it was in 1972, one is forced to conclude that 
the substantial turnover in the membership of the court was a primary factor in the 
reversal” (Thro, 1990, p. 235).  “The opposite outcomes in the two cases may be 
attributed to changing financial realities, the demonstrated ineffectiveness of a system 
that was still relatively new in 1974, and the replacement of all but one of the justices on 
the court” (Thro, 1989, p. 1665, footnote 114).  A similar pattern emerged in Washington.  
The court upheld the finance system in 1974 in Northshore School District No. 417 v. 
Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (1974) but rejected four years later in Seattle School Dist.  v. State 
of Washington, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).  Thro explains 
the best explanation appears to be that one justice of the Kinnear majority 
of six switched his vote in Seattle School Dist. And four justices were 
replaced between the two decisions.  Three of the four old justices were in 
the Kinnear majority, and three of the replacements were in the Seattle 
School Dist. majority.  Thus Seattle School Dist. appears more a product 
of the swings of politics than of an independent analysis of the state 
education clause. (Thro, 1989, p. 1669, footnote 138) 
 
Courts also noticed that changes in the court’s membership rather than changes in the 
constitution or the statutes result in an education finance system being declared 
unconstitutional.  Arizona’s Vice Chief Justice Moeller explained 
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in Shofstall, this court, in a unanimous opinion, held that our school 
financing scheme did not violate the equal protection clause of our state 
constitution.  We still have the same constitution.  We still have school 
districts and property taxes.  Indeed, we have a much more ‘general and 
uniform’ public school system today considering the various equalization 
statutes passed by the legislature since 1973.  With the exception of 
greater equalization, the only thing that has changed since the Shofstall 
decision in 1973 is the personnel of this court. That is an insufficient 
reason to change a constitutional ruling.  (Roosevelt, 1994, p. 826-827, 
emphasis added). 
 
“One of [Kentucky Chief Justice] Stephens’ initial concerns with the Rose case was the 
composition of the court itself.  He knew that a change in the composition of the court 
might have a significant impact on the resolution of the case” (Day, 2003, p. 209). 
Segal and Spaeth summarized the idea when they said 
Assertions that judicial decisions are objectively dispassionate and 
impartial are obviously belied by the fact that different courts and different 
judges do not decide the same question or issue the same way, to say 
nothing of the fact that appellate court decisions – particularly, those of 
the United States Supreme Court – typically contain dissenting votes.  So, 
too, a single personnel change may fundamentally alter the course of 
constitutional law. (Segal & Spaeth, 2002) 
 
These cases indicate that the persons on the court have at least some influence on 
the outcome of the case, so that the values and beliefs held by those persons might be 
reflected in the outcomes.  Thomas and Davis attribute adequacy rulings to judicial 
opinion, stating, “these various court decisions make it clear that the vision of the justices 
far exceeds that of legislators when it comes to defining an adequate education for all 
children” (2001, p. 16).  Sandler and Schoenbrod attribute the provision of special 
education preventative services in wake of the Jose P. decree to the policy preferences of 
Judge Nickerson and Special Master Frankel rather than requirements of the law (2003, 
p. 65-66).  Wirt et al. observed “human action is purposive, that is, value-motivated, and 
so the actions involved in policy making can reveal latent values” (1986, p. 14).  They 
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used “interview transcripts, case reports, and an influence scale” (Wirt et al., 1986, p. 14) 
to discern the educational values of policy elites in six states.  Judges, too, are policy 
elites, and something might be learned from subjecting them to similar scrutiny. 
Political scientists who subscribe to attitudinal modeling maintain that judges use 
the language of the court, with its emphasis on plain meaning, precedent, and intent, as a 
screen while they pursue their individual preferences.  According to Smith, “judges see it 
to their advantage to appear restrained even as they promote their own policy 
preferences” (1994, p. 12).  Also since Bush v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) “everyone not 
totally disconnected from reality now recognizes that ‘judges make law,’” and they use 
legal rationale “only to rationalize the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality of the 
Court’s decision-making process” (Dershowitz, 2001; Dworkin, 2002; Klarman, 2001; L. 
Levin, 2001; Segal & Spaeth, 2002, p. 10, 53; Sunstein & Epstein, 2001; Taylor, 2001).  
Fiss says, “it is easier for judges, even unwittingly, to enact into law their own 
preferences in the name of having discovered the true meaning, say, of equality or 
liberty” (Fiss, 1979, p. 11). 
Herman Pritchett began the study of judicial attitudes as determinates of judicial 
rulings in the Roosevelt Supreme Courts.  He began with the idea that  
no one doubts that many judicial determinations are made on some basis 
other than the application of settled rules to the facts, or that justices of the 
United States Supreme Court, in deciding controversial cases involving 
important issues of public policy, are influenced by biases and philosophies 
of government, by “inarticulate major premises,” which to a large degree 
predetermine the positions they will take on a given question.  Private 
attitudes, in other words, become public law. (Pritchett, 1941, p. 890) 
 
In order to address the question of why justices, “working with an identical set of facts, 
and with roughly comparable training in the law” come to such different conclusions 
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(Pritchett, 1941, p. 890), he examined cases in which the justices’ split decisions revealed 
that they voted in blocks, and that these blocks could be defined along a conservative-
liberal, or left-wing-right-wing continuum that resulted “from differences of opinion as to 
desirable public policy” (Pritchett, 1941, p. 895).  His study emphasized “the influence of 
personal attitudes in the making of judicial decisions and the interpretation of the law” 
(Pritchett, 1941, p. 898). 
Political scientists have categorized studies of the influence of judicial attitudes 
on their decisions.  Fair listed four major categories: small group theory, social 
background analysis, survey research and cumulative scaling (1967, p. 449), while 
Spaeth added Role Theory (Spaeth, 1990).  Small group analysis looks at the leadership 
and followership among the court members in unanimous decisions, among the majority, 
and among the dissenters (Brenner & Spaeth, 1990; Spaeth & Altfeld, 1990).  
Background analysis assumes that social backgrounds result in attitudes that end in votes 
on certain issues.  Tate explored the importance of background characteristics in U.S. 
Supreme Court justices, claiming his regression models “explain 47% to 51% of the 
variance in the civil rights and liberties and economics voting behavior of the 46 Supreme 
Court justices serving the more than seven decades from 1916 to 1988” (Tate, 1981; Tate 
& Handberg, 1991, p. 477).  Spaeth claims that “psychological predispositions rooted in 
social background characteristics do not explain the dissenting votes of any of the justices 
who sat on the Warren or Burger Courts with the possible exceptions of Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens” (Spaeth, 1990, p. 153).  In reference to education, Wirt, Mitchell 
and Marshall also considered “the effects of elites’ personal qualities (status, 
partisanship, and ideologies) upon their preferences for program approaches” (1986, p. 
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4).  Fair describes survey research as “potentially the most fruitful” (1967, p. 450) 
approach; however, it’s hard to imagine justices providing completely honest answers to 
a survey in a politically charged environment.  Finally he describes cumulative scaling, a 
technique of correlating justices and their votes on individual cases, as a means for 
determining the attitudes of justices on issues.  This is a more sophisticated technique 
than that used by Pritchett, and Fair says the technique “could account for over 91% of 
the split decisions of the United States Supreme Court in recent years, [but]could account 
for only about 36% of the non-unanimous cases” in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
(Fair, 1967, p. 458).  While the Supreme Court is by far the more intensely studied, it is 
important that attitudinal analysis techniques have been used on state courts as well 
(Dolbeare, 1967).  Finally, Rhode and Spaeth examined William Rehnquist’s behavior 
both before and after becoming chief justice, and they determined the new role did not 
appreciably change his voting (Rhode & Spaeth, 1990). 
Recently Segal and Spaeth broke analysis of judicial attitudes into two major 
categories: attitudinal and rational choice models (2002).  The attitudinal model was 
further sub-categorized by the influence of influential groups of thinkers: the Legal 
realists, behavioralists, psychologists, and economists.  Economists have some influence 
on the Rational Choice model, since, “the rational choice paradigm represents an attempt 
to apply and adapt the theories and methods of economics to the entire range of human 
political and social interactions” (Segal & Spaeth, 2002, p. 97).  The essential difference 
between the economic model and the rational choice model is that the economic model 
recognizes that “decisions are the consequence of three factors: goals, rules and 
situations”(Spaeth & Rohde, 1976, p. xv), while in the rational choice model judges 
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“attempt to maximize their satisfaction” (Segal & Spaeth, 2002, p. 98).  A sub-type of 
rational choice model Segal and Spaeth mention is the Markist Separation-of-Powers 
model, which defines the courts range of action according to the ability of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate to contain them.  
There are several contrasts between the preceding studies and this study.  The 
models discussed above often depend on statistical analysis of “a small political elite who 
play a critical policy-making role” (Schubert, 1974, p. x).  That is they analyze the U. S. 
Supreme Court using statistics.  The U. S. Supreme Court operates under one set of rules, 
and it applies those rules to a broad range of topics, i.e. the Court’s docket.  In contrast, 
this study is attempting to examine the decisions of the high courts in various states, 
clearly a broader group than members of the U. S. Supreme Court.  Each state high court 
operates under slightly varying rules (K. Alexander, 1991; Grubb, 1974; McUsic, 1991; 
Ratner, 1985), not the single set of rules that guides the U. S. Supreme Court.  This study 
addresses a single topic, the adequacy of education finance systems, rather than the broad 
range of topics covered in other studies.  Because this study will examine essentially the 
same decision being made by various jurists just one time, statistical analysis as used in 
many of the political science studies is inappropriate.  Fortunately, political scientists 
have also examined judicial attitudes using document analysis.   
Danelski, Segal and Cover, Dayton, et al., and Smith offer examples of document 
analyses relevant to this study.  Supreme Court scholar Sidney Ulmer stated, “Each judge 
being unique, each opinion reflects, to some extent, the particular attributes of the writer 
– his conception of the law, his previous positions, his facility with language and 
concepts, and so on” (Ulmer, 1970, p. 51).  To confirm results shown by statistical 
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analysis of voting patterns, Danelski recommended “content analysis of personal 
documents, speeches, autobiographies, articles and books” (Danelski, 1966, p. 724).  The 
analysis of judicial dissents might be of particular value because “the assumption in the 
lone-dissent analysis was that generally a justice does not dissent by himself unless he is 
expressing some intensely held value” (Danelski, 1966, p. 728).  Although the lives and 
opinions of Supreme Court justices are more public than those of state high court justices, 
the ability to use public statements to discern private beliefs is relevant.  Segal and 
Cover’s study analyzed Supreme Court justices’ editorial statements in four leading 
newspapers from before they were nominated.  By classifying each statement as liberal, 
moderate, or conservative, they developed a scale of beliefs for each future nominee.  
These scales were correlated with justices’ votes on civil liberties cases by .80 (Segal & 
Cover, 1989).  In a specific example of using documents to classify beliefs, Segal and 
Spaeth note that Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinions in abortion cases reflect beliefs she 
expressed as a state legislator (Scheingold, 1974; Segal & Spaeth, 2002, p. 291-293).  
More recently in reference to Bush judicial nominee Janice Rogers Brown, Steve Barnett 
said, “You can’t believe what a judge says in speeches won’t creep into her views on 
issues before the court” (cited by Gilgoff, 2005).  Smith used textual analysis to rank 
court opinions according to their suggested direction and strength of recommendation, 
creating a scale of eight “types” of increasing power, and these rankings provided some 
indication of legislative response to the court orders (1994).  Dayton, et al. also examined 
judicial opinions to see if economic conditions influenced their decisions (2005, p. 3).  
Regarding their analysis Rubin and Feely declared, “it may not be possible to reconstruct 
the mental process of the federal judges who decided the prison reform cases, but the 
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language and substance of their opinions suggest that this is exactly the way they 
thought” (2003, p. 633).  Although it is controversial and subjective, “given the 
impossibility of surveying the justices themselves … content analysis has its place” 
(Segal & Spaeth, 2002, p. 322).  Indeed a textual analysis may add to the bank of 
knowledge, since “analytical methods provide different ways of asking questions and 
thus produce different understandings of a social phenomenon” (Wirt et al., 1986, p. 3). 
Scholars have used different scales of judicial values in the past.  Danelski used 
the concept of value spaces.  These three-dimensional constructs describe the range of 
justices’ values on certain topics, based on the intensity, congruency and cognitive 
completeness of their ideas.  Danelski’s theory is that decisions that fall within these 
value spaces will be decided predictably, based on the justice’s predilections and beliefs.  
He believes that movement of a judge’s beliefs within the value space may indicate the 
possibility of a changing opinion and “the likelihood of important policy changes in that 
area” (Danelski, 1966, p. 731).  Schubert created scales to measure Supreme Court 
justices’ attitudes on numerous topics; however, his scales of economic liberalism (E-
scale) and political liberalism (C-scale) proved to be the most powerful and telling 
(Schubert, 1965, 1974).  A justice’s position on any given issue could often be explained 
by matching the Justice’s position on the E or C scales to the range of possible opinions 
on that issue - civil rights for example (Segal & Spaeth, 2002, p. 90).  In a like manner, 
this study examines the results of adequacy cases in light of scaled judicial beliefs. 
Spaeth used a similar theory in examining U. S. Supreme Court cases, linking sets 
of cases in which justices’ attitudes would be manifested.  “The theory on which the 
model is based assumes that sets of these cases that form around similar objects and 
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situations will correlate with one another to form issue areas (e.g., criminal procedure, 
First Amendment freedoms, judicial power, federalism) in which an interrelated set of 
attitudes – that is, a value – will explain the justices’ behavior (e.g., freedom, equality, 
national supremacy, libertarianism)” (Segal & Spaeth, 2002, p. 91).  Although somewhat 
different from Schubert’s technique, Segal and Spaeth were able to glean judicial beliefs 
from their rulings in various cases.  Scales are not foolproof, so caution must be taken to 
avoid “errors in classification by analysts” (Spaeth & Peterson, 1990, p. 178). 
 
Values in Education 
“We know that all policy is rooted in values and that politics is a contest among 
adherents of clashing values” (Wirt et al., 1986, p. 4).  There is a universe of values that 
apply to the education of our children, but which to use for this study?  Among those 
considered was Guthrie’s conception of the dynamic tension among equality, efficiency 
and liberty in educational decision making (Guthrie, 2004. Fiss, 1979 and Verstegen, 
1990 also mention the tension between liberty and equality).  Essentially any decisions 
about education finance must balance these three elements.  Increasing equality often 
means depriving the wealthy of the liberty to use their resources, and it may decrease 
efficiency.  Increasing efficiency could mean decreasing equality and liberty, or one 
might believe that increasing liberty, perhaps through vouchers, will also increase 
efficiency through market mechanisms.  Increasing liberty might decrease equality, and it 
might also decrease efficiency, if consumers use liberty to make poor choices.  Spaeth 
and Rohde encountered an equivalent challenge in scaling freedom, equality and “New 
Dealism” in their analysis of Supreme Court opinions (Spaeth & Rohde, 1976, p. 142).  
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An individual’s positive or negative response to these values would vary along the 
political spectrum, but not necessarily in an intuitive or predictable manner. 
Wirt, Mitchell and Marshall conceived of similarly interrelated values – 
efficiency, equity, quality and choice (1986).  They conceived these values as reflecting 
other root values.  The root value for efficiency was that “those who exercise public 
authority must be held responsible for its use.”  The root value for equity was “the worth 
of every person in society and the responsibility of the total society to realize that worth.”  
The root value of quality was “the crucial importance of education for a citizen’s life 
chances and self-fulfillment,” and the root value for choice was “popular sovereignty.”  
They noticed that “these values are clearly not hierarchical, but rather may be 
conceptualized as dimensions along which some values reinforce but others are opposed” 
(Wirt et al., 1986, p. 7), and also that the preeminence of these values in society came at 
different historic points and are reflected in different state cultures. 
Levin found similar values as the result of “the general differences in perspective 
between libertarians or economic liberals with their reliance on the marketplace and 
political liberals with their reliance on government,” as well as between “valuing public 
versus private outcomes of education” (2002, p. 163).  As a result he found four values in 
tension: freedom of choice, productive efficiency, equity, and social cohesion.  Although 
freedom of choice, efficiency, and equity are arguably the same as liberty, efficiency and 
equity, the unique value here is social cohesion.  Social cohesion “incorporates a major 
public purpose of schooling in a democratic society, the provision of a common 
educational experience that will orient all students to grow to adulthood as full 
participants in the social, political, and economic institutions of our society” (H. M. 
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Levin, 2002, p. 163).  Levin links social cohesion with Friedman’s (1962) “neighborhood 
effects or social benefits of education” (p. 163), while Belfield gave examples of social 
cohesion that included “the public benefits that are generated,” such as social norms, 
voice, communitarian values, integration, and support of public education (Belfield, 
2004, p. 13).     
Rossmiller saw three major issues in education finance cases: equal protection, 
constitutional provisions for education, and educational need.  He believed the state’s 
interest in promoting local control of education, arguably a guardian of choice, efficiency 
and liberty, that be overwhelmed if the courts decided education was a fundamental 
interest which raised the level of court scrutiny.  If the court employed strict scrutiny to 
protect fundamental rights, arguably increasing equity and equality, then state actions 
might be overturned even if they were rational.  Overall he concludes, “litigation has 
been neither the expressway to school finance reform, nor has it been a cul-de-sac” 
(Rossmiller, 1986, p. 202), rather it is a road back to the legislature and executive where 
presumably these values can be negotiated democratically.  In retrospect, Sandler and 
Schoenbrod (2003) would say Rossmiller was mistaken about the return to the legislature 
and executive for discussion of those competing values. 
In a second analysis Wirt et al. described the values of elites in the policy process.  
They claim they operated to “maximize their individual values” including “political 
advancement, constituency satisfaction, following party ideology, penalizing out-groups 
or deviant game players, and so on” (1986, p. 16).  These values manifest in central 
questions including “who has the right and responsibility to initiate policy,” “what policy 
ideas are deemed unacceptable,” “what policy-mobilizing activities are deemed 
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appropriate,” and “what are the special conditions of the state that actors believe shape 
their policy making?” (Handler, 1978; 1986, p. 17).  Clearly the answers to these 
questions have changed through education finance adequacy cases.  The answers to these 
questions confirm Ward’s suspicion that, “rather than seeking to empower the powerless, 
[school finance reform] tried to shift power from one elite to another” (Handler, 1978; 
Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003; Ward, 1990, p. 245).   
Berne and Stiefel created the most appropriate equivalent measures of value and 
education finance (Berne & Stiefel, 1979), and they were quite explicit about the value 
judgments involved in distributing educational resources according to the answers to the 
questions who, what, how, and how much.  Their measures of “who? The group of 
choice” (p. 15) distinguished between students and taxpayers as objects of concern; 
however, this study is focused solely on students, so this measure does not fit this study.  
Their next question of “what? The choice of an object to be distributed” is important 
theoretically.  In adequacy cases judges were mostly concerned with distributing inputs, 
with an eye toward outputs and perhaps long term outcomes.  Consequently, this study 
focuses primarily on inputs, with the assumption the education production function works 
as discussed above.  Their question, “how? The choice of an equity principle” (p. 17), is 
the one most closely related to this study; however, the theoretical student distribution in 
this model is both related to and distinct from their vertical equity and effects of 
discrimination categories.  The theoretical distribution of students according to their 
educability is concerned with their ability to transform education inputs into levels of 
achievement - really an efficiency and equity question.  If a handicap or discrimination 
affects their ability to learn, then it is incorporated into their position on the educability 
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curve.  Finally, Berne and Stiefel’s discussion of “how much? The choice of a numerical 
summary measure” (p. 18), is a concise discussion of various ways of measuring equity.  
These are useful tools, but they were not useful for this paper. 
The values discussed above by various authors inform but do not shape the values 
used in this paper.  Were Berne and Stiefel’s questions to be translated for this study, then 
“who” would deal with educability, and the distribution of resources according to 
students’ ability to learn.  “What” would deal with the breadth of coursework, so the 
question addresses the variety of inputs.  Finally, “how much?” would be the level of 
achievement students are expected to reach.  In sum, Berne and Stiefel’s work is brilliant 
and important, but not directly applicable to this study. 
This study uses a set of beliefs about resources, school’s role in society, and 
student entitlements to explain a set of remedies, the ordered breadth, height and 
distribution of educational resources.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
There are four contemporary methods of measuring the adequacy of a state’s 
educational system: complex statistical analysis, expert opinion, model districts or 
schools, and whole school reform models.  While these methods attempt to define 
adequacy based on how states are currently spending money, the following model is 
conceptual and not based on how any specific state defines adequacy.  The following is 
an alternative theoretical attempt to describe an adequate educational system using a 
three-dimensional model.  Tufte said, “what is to be sought in designs for the display of 
information is the clear portrayal of complexity” (1983, p. 191).  Ladd and Hansen 
(1999) described two of the dimensions as qualitative and quantitative adequacy, and 
before them Arthur Wise hinted at two other dimensions: goals (quantitative adequacy) 
and student need (later described as educator effort).  Wise said, 
there are, then, two intersecting dimensions necessary to a determination 
of adequacy.  First, the goal(s) against which needs are to be measured 
must be articulated; these may be the same for all students or different for 
different groups or individuals.  Second, the source of the criteria for 
needs assessment must be determined and legitimized; the source may be 
the state, the service deliverers or the client.  This determination goes to 
the root questions about the purpose of education in a democratic society 
and about the role of the state, of professionals, and of consumers – 
parents and children – in shaping education. (Wise, 1983, p. 306)  
 
Using this model, the study hopes to demonstrate simply the complex concept of 
adequacy as defined in judicial decisions and its relationship to judicial beliefs.  It 
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assumes there is a positive relationship between educator effort and student performance 
and that educator effort is applied with perfect efficiency. 
 
Description of the Model 
 
The first dimension – educability and educator effort 
 
Imagine all the children entering school in the year 2005.  They will be of many 
different sizes, shapes, and colors.  They will come from various backgrounds, with 
different family situations, different socio-economic status, and different ideas and 
feelings about education.  Before you would be arrayed a rainbow of humanity 
encompassing the entire spectrum of potential.   
Imagine all these children could be evaluated according to their educability.  That 
is, we could rate the amount of educator effort it would take to impart a definable level of 
knowledge, a skill or an attitude (KSA) to that child.  Other terms we might use are 
trainability, or aptitude.  In the past children along this spectrum might have been 
described as mentally quick or slow, sharp or dull.  Some children could learn any 
particular skill quickly and easily, with very little effort from educators.  Others would 
have a lot of difficulty grasping the idea or mastering the skill, and the amount of 
educator effort needed to help these children grasp a certain idea would be much higher 
than for the more adept children.  If we placed all these children on a scale according to 
their educability, they would likely fall into a normal distribution.  On the far right side of 
the scale would be a few of the most educable children who master the skill with little 
effort from educators.  In the middle would be the majority of children who, with greater 
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or lesser effort from educators, will be able to master the skill.  Finally on the far left side 
of the scale would be children who require large amounts of educator effort to grasp a 
KSA as well as a few children who, regardless of how much effort is expended by an 
educator on their behalf, will not be able to master the skill (see Figure 2). 
 
Student Educability (less to more)
N
um
be
r o
f s
tu
de
nt
s
 
Figure 2: Educability of students displayed as a normal curve 
 
If we assume that the state provided each child with exactly the same educational 
resources, then we can expect that a chart of student performance would duplicate the 
normal curve of student educability.  That is, a small number of the more educable 
students would learn more given the same level of educator effort, the mass of average 
students would learn somewhat more or less than average amount, while the less 
educable students, given the same amount of educator effort, would learn less.  
If we were to graph student need such that providing for that need would ensure 
that every child would be able to meet the same level of proficiency at a specific KSA, 
we could take the normal curve describing student educability and twist it about its 
middle.  Now the curve descends sharply from some high point along the vertical left 
axis, levels out around the middle, and then descends slowly to the bottom, horizontal 
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axis.  This curve theoretically describes what is needed to ensure every child reaches a 
level of proficiency at a task.  Wise expressed this idea as follows: 
If it is assumed that the state’s purpose in providing public education is to 
ensure that the populace will attain certain kinds of capabilities, such as 
reading and computational skills, then the state’s responsibility may be seen 
as providing extra resources to those who have not attained the specified 
levels of capability.  The goal for all students is uniform, and needs are 
measured according to a deficit model.  The need is the difference between 
the state-defined goal and the student’s level of attainment.  Adequacy is 
achieved when the need is met (Wise, 1983, p. 306). 
 
This is also a graph of the amount of educator effort required to bring each 
student to the same level of skill.  Thus the least educable children require the most effort 
to educate, while the most educable children will require little effort to educate.  At the 
extreme right end of the graph will be children who have already mastered a skill, and 
thus require no educator effort to educate.  At the extreme left side of the graph will be 
children who cannot master the skill regardless of how much educator effort is expended.  
Clune (1994) and Levin (1994) use an estimate of about 2% “truly disabled,” while 
DeMitchell and Fossey estimate 12 percent of children are in special education; however, 
this will vary with the knowledge, skill or attitude.  This graph of student need or 
educator effort is the first dimension of the model (see Figure 3). 
 
Student need (more to less)
Ed
uc
at
or
 E
ff
or
t
 
Figure 3: Educator effort required to enable all children to achieve equally 
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As an example, imagine this group of children entering first grade on their first 
day, and the goal for the year is to teach them to read “Dick and Jane.”  Some will 
already know how to read, and thus it will need no educator effort for them to master the 
skill.  They would be on the far right side of the distribution.  The majority of children 
will need more or less help learning to read.  The educator will help some learn their 
letters, others to master phonics, and others to put all of this together to read.  Some will 
not learn to read before they finish first grade.  Those who do not learn to read would be 
on the far left side of the distribution. 
Educator effort refers to the resources needed to bring a student to a given level of 
proficiency in a given KSA.  Educator effort could be expressed in a variety of units.  For 
example, using an adequate elementary school model advocated by Odden (2001; Picus, 
2003b), a school of 500 children would have approximately 30 educators overseeing 
them (1 principal, 24 teachers, 1 instructional facilitator, 2 tutors, 2 outreach/student 
support) for a student/educator ratio of 16.7/1.  A 180-day year with six hours of student 
contact each day results in 10.8 educator days per student, or 64.8 hours per student.  For 
simplicity’s sake, if the average salary and benefits were $50,000 for each educator, then 
each educator day costs about $278, yielding about $3000 worth of educator effort for 
each student each year or $4.29 for each hour of student contact time.  Using this or 
similar conversions, educator effort could be expressed in days, hours, or dollars per 
student.  This assumes a clean, safe environment, transportation and enough instructional 
materials (Hanushek, 1994).  Wise echoes the link between adequacy and resources when 
he contrasts adequacy to the “usual” way of budgeting (incremental increases) (Winans, 
2002) with adequacy. 
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The concept of financing adequate education implies a budget that is 
driven by costing the delivery of adequate education.  In other words, an 
adequate educational opportunity must first be defined and 
operationalized; only then can the cost be determined. (Wise, 1983, p. 314)  
 
The National Education Association (NEA) echoed this sentiment when it accused state 
legislators of “drafting tough standards without inquiring what it really costs for teachers 
and education support professionals to implement them” (Winans, 2002, p. 1).   
These measurements can be adapted to individual student situations.  If the 
average student in a school received about $3000 worth of educator effort, a student who 
needed twice as much educator effort to reach a given level of proficiency (in the form of 
smaller class size, tutoring, counseling, etc.) would cost about $6000.  That could also be 
expressed as approximately 21.6 days or 129 hours of educator effort.  This is obviously 
done at the simplest level.  Schools have limited resources.  Any student who requires 
twice the educator effort to reach a level of proficiency denies that resource to other 
students in the school.  By the same token, students who require half the average educator 
effort to become proficient in a KSA free that resource to be used for other students.   
Assuming the normal distribution of educability, if equal educator effort were 
expended on all students then the resulting achievement would represent the inverse of 
the educator effort curve.  The least educable, least efficient at learning, will produce the 
lowest return of KSAs for each unit of educator effort.  On the other hand, the most 
educable students, the most efficient learners, would create more KSAs than their less 
educable peers.  This would result in inequity in student achievement, with the most 
educable achieving more than the least educable (See Figure 4).  
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Student need vs. student achievement 
given equal educator effort
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Figure 4: Need vs. achievement given equal educator effort 
 
To summarize the discussion of the first dimension of the model, student 
educability, Wise said,  
assuming uniform performance standards, it is surely the case that 
different students will require different amounts of time and resources to 
attain them.  Different amounts of time and resources cost different 
amounts of money.  Obviously, the higher the standards are set, the greater 
will be the disparity in time and resources required to bring all students to 
the standards. (Wise, 1983, p. 313) 
 
 
The second dimension – qualitative adequacy. 
Society expects educators to impart a breadth of knowledge, skills and attitudes to 
its children.  This breadth makes the second dimension of the model.  Ladd and Hansen 
call this the “adequacy of what” and refer to it as “qualitative adequacy” (Ladd & 
Hansen, 1999, p. 104).  Traditionally this range contained the “three R’s,” i.e. reading, 
writing and arithmetic; however, contemporary court orders have expanded this range.   
The breadth of education is controversial.  The Illinois court opined  
one might say that a student instructed in reading, writing, geography, 
English grammar and arithmetic had received a common school education, 
while another might insist that history, natural philosophy and algebra 
should be included.  It would thus be almost impossible to find two 
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persons who would in all respects agree in regard to what constituted a 
common school education. (Richards v. Raymond, 92 Ill. 612 (1879) cited 
in Edgar, 1996, p. 1190) 
 
The Abbott II court observed “there is no standard of the breadth of curriculum that must 
be offered” (1990, p. 374).  The Kentucky Supreme Court ordered that educators impart 
seven basic competencies to Kentucky’s school children in Rose v. Council for Better 
Education (1989).  Other courts have expressed similar sentiments, indicating that an 
adequate education goes beyond the basics with the intent of making students capable of 
competing with their peers in a global, information age economy.  These competencies 
could include knowledge of a foreign language, computer skills, vocational skills, art and 
music appreciation, etc. (see Figure 5). 
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                                                        Three “R’s” 
Figure 5: Breadth of knowledge or "Qualitative Adequacy" 
 
The second dimension is smallest when it includes the fewest skills.  If schools 
were only expected to teach the three R’s, then the dimension would be small.  On the 
other hand, were this dimension to include all the domains of human learning, it could be 
extraordinarily large.  Wise starts with the minimal definition of adequacy, “the provision 
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of that minimum educational opportunity necessary to minimally” prepare students for 
adult roles” (Wise, 1983, p. 309), which combines the minimal definition of the second 
and third dimensions of adequacy. 
 
The third dimension – quantitative adequacy. 
In all areas of human endeavor there are levels of ability or achievement.  
Reading ability ranges from recognizing letters and sounding out “Dick and Jane” to 
understanding complicated legal opinions or enjoying James Joyce.  Writing ability 
ranges from making one’s mark to intricate technical writing or creating the great 
American novel.  Mathematical ability ranges from simple sums to differential equations 
and Boolean algebra.  Many areas of expertise have similar scales of ability.  Ladd and 
Hansen refer to this as “quantitative adequacy” or the question of “how much” (1999, p. 
104) (see Figure 6). 
 
Level of 
difficulty 
Reading Mathematics 
Highest Shakespeare/Joyce Differential Equations 
 Mark Twain Algebra 
 Treasure Island Word Problems 
 Junie B. Jones Fractions 
 Dr. Seuss Multiply 
 Dick & Jane Add/subtract 
Lowest Sound letters Count 
Figure 6: Levels of ability or "quantitative adequacy" 
 
Adequacy is linked to accountability, but accountability has real meaning only 
when a student body is paired with the breadth of skills and the level of skills the state 
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desires for its students (Winans, 2002, p. 4).  The Abbott II court searched for a “broad-
gauged standard of performance” (1990, p. 374). 
 
Volume of Educator Effort 
Joining these three dimensions together describes a volume of effort required to 
educate a group of children to specific ability level over a range of skills.  The volume of 
effort equates to the cost of educating children to the desired level of ability over the 
desired range of knowledge, skills and attitudes (see Figure 7).  
 
Ability Level x Breadth
Educator Effort
 
Figure 7: The three-dimensional model of adequacy 
 
Manipulating the Model’s Qualitative and Quantitative Dimensions 
The volume of effort can be most easily manipulated over two dimensions: the 
breadth of abilities or qualitative dimension and the level of ability or quantitative 
dimension.  Manipulating quantitative adequacy is simply demonstrated.  For example, a 
basic minimum education might include reading, writing and arithmetic at the sixth grade 
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level.  People with this level of education would be able to read most newspapers and 
training material, correspond with their political representatives, complete job 
applications, and manage their personal and small business finances.  A lesser volume of 
effort would be required if the state were to decide a minimum basic education merely 
required the ability to add and subtract, read rudimentary materials and sign one’s name.  
A greater volume of effort would be required if all its citizens had to be able to use 
geometry, appreciate classical literature, or compose poetry.  For these changes one 
simply raises or lowers the horizontal line describing the level of ability (see Figure 8).  
 
Ability Level x Breadth
Educator Effort
 
Figure 8: Educator effort - three levels of ability or quantitative adequacy 
 
Manipulating the qualitative adequacy is similarly easily demonstrated.  While a 
core education has traditionally consisted of reading, writing, and arithmetic, there is an 
inclination in the courts to expand that definition (Abbott IV, 1997, CFE IV, 2003, Rose, 
1989).  As a greater breadth of requirements is added, the volume of effort expands 
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accordingly.  If competency in a foreign language, computer skills, interpersonal and 
self-awareness skills, vocational skills, swimming and art appreciation are added, then the 
breadth and the associated volume of effort expand accordingly.  For these changes, one 
simply moves the vertical line describing the breadth of ability (see Figures 9 and 10).  
The theoretical concept of qualitative and quantitative adequacy, breadth and 
height of education, has purchase in the real world.  The Connecticut high court said  
the financing system discriminates against pupils in Canton because the 
breadth and quality of the education they receive is to a substantial degree 
narrower and lower than that which pupils receive in comparable towns 
with larger tax bases and greater ability to finance education; that that 
narrower breadth and lower quality of education is a result of the state’s  
 
 
Educator Effort
 
Figure 3: Minimal breadth of skills or qualitative adequacy 
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Educator Effort
 
Figure 10: Maximum breadth of skills or qualitative adequacy 
 
delegation of its responsibilities without regard to Canton’s financial 
capabilities; (Horton v. Meskill, 1977, p. 370, emphasis added)the 
education they receive is to a substantial degree narrower and lower in 
quality than that which pupils receive in comparable towns with a larger 
tax base. (Id., p. 373, emphasis added) 
Manipulating the qualitative and quantitative adequacy affects the students on the 
extreme ends of the educability curve in different ways.  Raising the level or breadth of 
quantitative or qualitative adequacy will decrease the numbers of students who require 
little or no effort to reach those goals and increase the numbers of those who require large 
amounts of effort or may never reach the goal.  For example, assume swimming was an 
ability all educated American should have, and the ability to swim from the middle of the 
pool to the side was the quantitative threshold.  Some children at the right side of the 
normal distribution would be able to swim to the side of the pool before entering school, 
while others at the extreme left side of the distribution, perhaps due to a severe mental, 
physical or emotional handicap, would not be able to swim to the side of the pool 
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regardless of how much educator effort were expended on their behalf.  Between would 
be children who would require many hours of educator effort to overcome their fear of 
the water, allow them to breathe properly and doggy paddle to the side, as well as 
children who would take to the water “like ducks” with very little educator effort (see 
Figure 11).  
Now assume the 200 meter individual medley (a combination of 50 meters each 
of freestyle, backstroke, breaststroke and butterfly) were the standard all students were 
expected to achieve.  This involves raising the level of ability, quantitative adequacy, 
from reaching the edge of the pool to 200 meters.  It also expands the breadth, qualitative 
adequacy, from doggy paddle to four different, difficult strokes.  A significantly larger 
volume of educator effort would be required to bring children to this level of proficiency.  
At the same time, a larger number of children at the left side of the distribution would not 
be able to meet the standard regardless of the volume of educator effort expended on 
 
Educator Effort  
Figure 11: Model of minimal adequacy in swimming 
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their behalf, and a smaller number of children would require no educator effort to meet 
the standard.  The bottom line is conceptually simple: as a wider variety of KSAs become 
entitlements (qualitative adequacy) more educator effort and associated expense is 
required.  Similarly, as the level of desired proficiency increases (quantitative adequacy) 
educator effort and associated expense increase (see Figure 12).  
Manipulating these two dimensions has genuine applicability in court cases and 
legislatures because it helps relate the goal to the costs.  Assume for a moment that the 
average student requires 10 years of educator effort to reach proficiency in reading, 
writing, and arithmetic, with educator effort totaling $3000 per student per year, and that 
 
 
Figure 12: Model of maximum adequacy in swimming 
 
effort is equally split between the three goals, or $1000 per subject.  Assume also that the 
court imposed a fourth and fifth goal, for example civics and science, each requiring an 
equivalent amount of educator effort.  Done simply, that implies an increase in educator 
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effort from $3000 to $5000 per student per year.  Even assuming some overlap, that 
studying civics will improve students’ reading skill and that studying science will 
improve students’ arithmetic, filling the expanded breadth of qualitative adequacy 
requires a substantial increase in educator effort and funding.  Similarly, to declare that a 
skill level equivalent to a high school education rather than an eighth grade education is 
the quantitative definition of adequacy implies an additional $12000 in educator effort 
per student (four years of education at $3000 per year), plus facilities and transportation.  
 
Discussion of the Educability Dimension 
Begin by assuming the state requires all students to achieve an equal, modest level 
and range of ability in its educational system.  With varying degrees of effort, more for 
the least educable and less for the more educable, schools can help most students reach 
this level of proficiency (see Figure 13).   
 
Educator Effort Achievement
 Figure 13: Model of educator effort and student achievement 
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Beginning at the extreme left side of the educability distribution curve, some 
children will not be able to acquire certain KSAs regardless of how much educator effort 
is expended on them.  Clune and Levin estimate that due to severe mental, emotional or 
physical handicap, approximately two percent of children will not be able to reach even 
rudimentary levels of proficiency in basic skills, while DeMitchell and Fossey estimate 
12 percent of children are in special education.  Kentucky allows ½ to 1 percent of its 
students, “those students with the most significant cognitive disabilities,” to take 
alternative assessments (Kearns, Kleinert, & Kennedy, 1999).  Many laws and programs 
provide for these children, and they will not be included in this model of adequacy.  
Instead, this paper focuses on the most-educable 95% of students.   
At the extreme right side of the educability curve, some children might achieve 
state mandated levels of achievement with little or no educator effort.  Much of the 
educator effort expended on these children enables them to go beyond adequate.  For the 
purposes of this model, assume this is the top 5% of students. 
Most students are between the extremes within a wide range of educability.  Some 
students will achieve the modest level of accomplishment across the range of abilities 
with little educator effort.  Other students will require significantly greater educator effort 
resources to achieve the same modest level of achievement.  If a specific level of 
accomplishment is the entitlement, then any student who fails to achieve the mandated 
level of accomplishment is entitled to more and more educator effort.  “The failure to 
acquire the basic skills may be taken as prima facie evidence that the proper opportunity 
has not been provided” (Wise, 1983, p. 304). 
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Together these three dimensions constitute a model of adequacy that encompasses 
the goals of education for the state’s students.  One’s conception of the breadth, height, 
and distribution of educator effort across the student population is likely a result of 
values.  Judicial decisions about adequacy might also be the result of judicial values.  The 
next section of this paper will discuss some values and beliefs in education. 
 
Judicial Values and Beliefs in Education 
That beliefs can be analyzed and graded is controversial.   
Belief systems are tricky things to deal with.  It is one thing to agree that 
cultures tend to perpetuate themselves by inculcating patterns of values 
and favorable perceptions of social institutions, but quite another to 
specify with any degree of confidence the contours of that belief system 
(Scheingold, 1974, p. 39). 
 
Beyond the simple problems of expression and interpretation, there are methodological 
issues involving imputing beliefs to authors from a miniscule sample of writing. 
Using court cases to discern the values judges are expressing is not new or 
unique.  Daniel R. Hodgdon “argued that in fact court decisions revealed a governing 
social philosophy that lawyers and school officials needed to recognize” (Hodgdon, 1933, 
cited in Tyack, 1982, p. 44).  “legal case digests can be a useful historical source in 
studying the relationship of law and society” and “all in all, we are convinced that the 
type of research strategy we describe in this appendix highlights the historical value of 
legal case digests and suggests new ways of studying historical patterns in the 
relationship of law and society” (Benavot, Blackmore, Harbeck, & Looper, 1981, p. 52).  
Surveys of court cases also exist in the literature.  Thro’s 1989 study set out to “survey 
and examine the responses of the twenty-four state supreme courts that have confronted 
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state constitutional-based public school finance reform cases” (Thro, 1989).  In reality, 
discerning judicial values from their dicta in cases is similar to what judges claim to do in 
discerning framer, legislator, or jurist values from historical documents.   
Scholars have examined judicial attitudes with some success in the past, and 
“research on judicial behavior indicates the unmistakable impact of personal policy 
preferences on judicial decisions” (Scheingold, 1974, p. 87).  For example, Smith used 
textual analysis to rank court opinions according to their suggested direction and strength 
of recommendation, creating a scale of eight “types” of increasing power; these rankings 
provided some indication of legislative response to the court orders (1994).  Smith did 
not include dissenting opinions, which this study includes to help illustrate the central 
thesis.  Danelski examined the speeches of Justices Brandeis and Butler before their 
appointments to the Supreme Court for indications of their support or opposition to 
laissez faire economic policies.  The results of this content analysis correlated with later 
judicial votes in economic cases (Danelski, 1966).  Segal and Cover trained three 
graduate students to read and code comments from Supreme Court justices that appeared 
in the nation’s leading newspapers.  By dividing the number of liberal, neutral and 
conservative paragraphs in these writings by the total number of paragraphs, they created 
a minus one to plus one scale of political bias, resulting in “a correlation of .80 between 
values and votes” in civil liberties cases (Segal & Cover, 1989).  Dayton, Dupre, and 
Kiracofe also examined judicial opinions to see if economic conditions influenced their 
decisions (2005, p. 3).  Finally, when Banks examined court opinions he found, “the 
clearest evidence of judicial frustration is the language of the various state court 
opinions” (1991, p. 157). 
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Judicial beliefs will be examined through three lenses: beliefs about children’s 
entitlements, beliefs about the role of schools in society, and beliefs about resources.  
Many have argued that there is no rational relationship between how the state funds 
education and its goals, but that education is merely the result of what is politically 
feasible.  How much effort can the state afford to expend educating its citizens (Monk & 
Theobald, 2001)?  Most states have faced the question of what their constitutions require; 
however, this involves judicial interpretation of a phrase, sentence or clause.  A rational 
state might ask what type of educated citizenry is in the state’s long-term interest, or what 
are the parents’ desires for their children, or what is the most the state can do to educate 
its citizens considering the totality of its obligations.  These three lenses can help 
rationally consider our beliefs about education and link our beliefs to how we expend 
educational resources. 
Earlier researchers on judicial beliefs have used different scales.  Schubert’s 
scales of political and economic liberalism are good examples.  Schubert also scaled 
judicial attitudes on other scales; for example, anti-business, pro-union, political equality, 
political freedom, religious freedom, fair procedure, and right to privacy (Schubert, 
1965).  In a sense, the scales this study uses might be subsets of larger measures of 
political or economic liberalism, which may be reflected in personal characteristics or 
party affiliation as used by Lundberg (2000).   
These broader measures will not be used in this study.  First, politicians from all 
points in the political spectrum advocate better schools, although they might not 
necessarily agree on the means to the end; thus party affiliation might not be indicative of 
a judge’s beliefs about schools.  Furthermore, persons along different points of the 
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political/economic liberalism scales also could support better schools, although an 
economic conservative might want better schools to have a cheaper, higher quality work 
force and an economic liberal might want better schools to reduce inequality in wealth or 
income.  Finally, because of the breadth of the study and the limited resources of the 
author, it was undesirable to try to find independent confirmation of the political and 
economic views of every judge in every court, or to model every court according to 
Schubert’s technique, even if that was possible.  In fact, Fair’s experiment indicated that 
the variety of cases state high courts handle made statistical analyses like those done on 
the Supreme Court less sure (1967).  Thus, although these scales might have been useful 
tools for Schubert’s analyses, for theoretical reasons they were too blunt for this analysis. 
More discreet alternative scales also were considered and rejected, especially 
Guthrie’s conception of the dynamic tension among equality, efficiency and liberty in 
educational decision making (Guthrie, 2004.  Fiss, 1979, and Verstegen, 1990, also 
mention the tension between liberty and equality).  While Guthrie is undoubtedly correct 
in asserting that any decisions about education finance must balance these three elements, 
scaling them was conceptually difficult and attempting to identify where individuals 
stand on these issues from their writing might be very difficult.  For example, few 
modern Americans would speak against increasing equality, efficiency or liberty, but few 
are clear about what they mean when they advocate increasing those things or the cost of 
doing so.  In education finance, increasing equality often means depriving the wealthy of 
the liberty to use their resources, but few politicians would state their agenda so plainly, 
and it is unimaginable that an American judge would use that justification.  Spaeth and 
Rohde encountered an equivalent challenge in scaling “freedom,” “equality” and “New 
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Dealism” in their analysis of Supreme Court opinions (Spaeth & Rohde, 1976, p. 142).  
An individual’s positive or negative response to these values would vary along the 
political spectrum, but not necessarily in an intuitive or predictable manner.   
Guthrie’s conceptualization also had practical limitations for this paper.  The 
dynamic tension in Guthrie’s model comes from describing a zero-sum contest in which 
the area in the equality-efficiency-liberty triangle remains somewhat constant, while the 
length of the individual legs grows or shrinks.  No single leg can grow without a 
corresponding shrinkage in one or both of the other legs.  This was not useful for this 
study, which attempts to show how increases in certain judicial beliefs result in increases 
in the size of the adequacy remedy.  Ultimately I was unable to conceive how to scale 
these three beliefs usefully, to imagine their ability to effectively discern levels of judicial 
beliefs, or to see how they could demonstrate the relationship between judicial beliefs and 
adequacy remedies. 
Fortunately, beliefs about resources, school’s role in society, and children’s 
entitlement to education can be placed on scales.  These scales might help us understand 
our beliefs and why we make certain decisions about education and educational 
resources.  Beliefs about children’s entitlements address the question of what society 
owes its children and what it expects for them.  The range can be envisioned as reaching 
from laissez faire to children as wards of the state.  Beliefs about the role of schools in 
society address what society expects its schools to accomplish.  These beliefs range from 
society having no stake in schools and schooling to schools as an active instrument of 
social policy.  Our beliefs about public resources are much like the range of beliefs about 
personal resources.  Some people are misers, and some are spendthrifts.   
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Beliefs about children’s entitlement to education might be scaled as in Table 4.  
The state has no role in educating them in belief E1, and it assumes a minimal role in 
educating children, perhaps with a negative purpose, like reducing ignorance or vice, in  
 
Table 4  
Beliefs about children's levels of entitlement 
Level Description of “entitlement” 
E1  Children deserve what their families and circumstances provide. 
E2 Children deserve a minimum opportunity. 
E3 Children deserve equal resources from the state. 
E4 Children deserve a generous opportunity. 
E5 Children deserve equal outcomes. 
 
Table 5  
Beliefs about school’s role in society 
Level Description of the role of school in society 
S1   Education is an individual/family responsibility. 
S2 School must enable citizens to read, write, count and participate in the 
political process. 
S3 School prepares workers for the economy, national defense, etc. 
S4 School must enable citizens to pursue personal fulfillment. 
S5 School exists to reduce social inequity. 
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E2.  Children are either autonomous individuals or parts of their families, and what 
becomes of them is not a state concern.  In belief E3 the state provides equally for all 
children, regardless of their need.  E4 pushes the students’ entitlement further, 
requiringthe state to provide abundantly for all students, probably with some positive 
purpose.  Finally, with belief E5 the state is an active participant in the race of life, 
attempting to ensure the children of the wealthy do not enter adulthood with more 
advantages than the children of the poor. Next are ideas about the role of school in 
society (Table 5).  As in belief E1, the state has little or no role in S1.  The state takes on 
increasingly higher roles in S2-S5, acquiring responsibility for more and more desirable 
results of education in its citizens.  The state takes on a small role in S2.  S2 may be 
illustrated by Thomas and Davis quote a state legislator who declared, “I’m satisfied with 
current levels of achievement” in a state where high school graduates were reading at the 
4th grade level (2001, p. 15).   In S3 the state takes an active role in educating its citizens, 
but with a definable, somewhat self-serving end (good citizenship, supporting the 
economy, national defense, etc.).   
As expensive as public education may be, the cost to society of not 
educating people is much higher.  The detrimental effect of illiteracy on 
employment, on military capability, and on the size of welfare and relief 
roles is strong evidence of the costliness of permitting people to remain 
uneducated. (Burrup, Brimley, & Garfield, 1993, p. 59)  
 
S4 represents a higher level of commitment because it is open ended.  What does it mean 
to enable a someone to be personally fulfilled?  What amount and kind of education 
furthers that end?  Presumably if a student is uncompetitive in the marketplace or is 
unhappy in her life, then the state has failed in its obligation to educate her.  It is also 
more focused on creating value for the individual, while S3 creates value that is shared 
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between the individual and the community.  Finally S5 creates the most state 
intervention, intervening between what students and parents might do otherwise to 
manipulate who wins and loses the game of life. 
Alongside what children deserve and why society provides schooling are beliefs 
about society’s resources (Table 6).  Belief R1 essentially claims there are no resources 
available for public education.  Belief R2 attempts to maximize individual initiative and 
opportunity by minimizing state interference in people’s lives.  Belief R3 recognizes that 
schools are only one investment states make in their futures, and that investments in 
transportation, communication, safety, environmental quality and et cetera also benefit 
the people of the state.  Belief R4 looks at society’s wealth and the wealth of many 
individuals and sees misappropriation.  Belief R4 speculates the reason students are not  
   
Table 6  
Beliefs about resources 
Level Description of belief about resources 
R1 The state lacks resources to spend on public education. 
R2 The state should minimize all expenses and expenditures, including 
spending on education (Friedman, 1962). 
R3 Because resources are limited, investment in schooling should balance 
available resources, return on investment, and other spending needs. 
R4 Resources are practically unlimited; Lack of will and misappropriation 
causes shortages in school funding and student failure. 
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properly schooled is because society has wasted resources on defense, roads, prisons, or 
conspicuous consumption. 
 
How Values Interact with the Model 
Using these lenses we can picture how different values would be reflected in the 
three dimensional model.  Each different value and combination of values will result in a 
different way of deploying resources with different results according to the model.   
To begin, different beliefs about school’s role in society will result in different 
models (Table 7).  
In addition to different beliefs about school’s role in society, different beliefs 
about student entitlements also will shape the model (Table 8). 
Finally beliefs about resources will also shape the model (Table 9). 
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 Table 7  
Impact of beliefs about school's role in society on the 3-D model 
Level Description of “role” Impact on 3-D model 
S1 Education is an 
individual/family responsibility  
Acting fully on this belief would minimize or eliminate 
public schooling and the model. 
S2 School must enable citizens to 
read, write, count and vote  
Narrow breadth and low quantitative adequacy; however, it 
would include students from the entire educability curve.  It 
also implies that good citizenship requires a certain level of 
knowledge and ability (Rebell, 2001). 
S3 School exists to support 
economic growth, etc. 
The most educable students would receive the broadest 
qualitative and highest quantitative levels of education 
because they would give society the most KSAs for each unit 
of educator effort.  Less educable students would get smaller 
qualitative and quantitative levels of education.   
S4 School must enable citizens to 
pursue personal fulfillment 
Very broad qualitative dimension, and perhaps also a very 
high quantitative level.  How much public education is 
needed to ensure students are fulfilled?  One might ask, 
perhaps while writing a dissertation, if education past a 
certain level decreases personal fulfillment. 
S5 School exists to reduce social 
inequity 
Qualitative and quantitative dimensions much like S3 or S4, 
since students must have the knowledge to become 
economically successful.  The educator effort curve would be 
strongly biased toward the least educable students. 
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Table 8  
Impact of beliefs about student entitlements on the 3-D model 
Level Description of  entitlement Impact on 3-D model 
E1 Children deserve what their 
families/circumstances provide. 
No public education system. 
E2 Children deserve a minimum 
opportunity. 
A short, narrow model, perhaps with educator effort 
distributed by influence and chance. 
E3 Children deserve equal 
resources from the state. 
Equal educator effort expended on each student, although the 
breadth and height of the model are hard to predict.  The 
likely result would be the inverse of the educator effort curve, 
with the least educable students acquiring the fewest KSAs, 
and the most educable students acquiring the most KSAs. 
E4 Children deserve a generous 
opportunity. 
This model will be larger than E2 and probably biased more 
toward the least educable. 
E5 Children deserve equal 
outcomes. 
Assumes that the race of life should not begin until 
graduation, and therefore, educator effort should be expended 
so that all children are equally educated at the end of school.  
Educator effort may be highly biased toward the least 
educable, perhaps directing educator effort as depicted in 
Figure 3.  Imagine Harrison Bergeron (Vonnegut, 1961). 
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Table 9  
Impact of beliefs about resources on the 3-D model 
Level Description of resource belief Impact on 3-D model 
R1 The state lacks resources to 
spend on public education. 
This results in no public education system. 
R2 The state should minimize all 
expenses and expenditures, 
including spending on education 
(Friedman, 1962). 
This results in small qualitative and quantitative dimensions.   
R3 Because resources are limited, 
investment in schooling should 
balance available resources, 
return on investment, and other 
spending needs. 
This view reflects the importance of an educated citizenry, 
but also understands the importance of other social 
investments and the importance of the consent of the 
governed.  The resulting model may have moderate 
qualitative and quantitative dimensions.  Educator effort may 
be biased toward the most educable since they provide the 
most KSAs for each dollar of education spending.   
R4 Resources are practically 
unlimited; Lack of will and 
misappropriation causes 
shortages in school funding and 
student failure. 
This view emphasizes education as the states primary 
function and spending priority.  It may assume investment in 
education will cure other societal ills.  The result will be the 
largest qualitative and quantitative dimensions with educator 
effort curve biased toward the least educable.  
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 Scoring 
The theoretical volume of each model can be calculated.  Although these numbers have 
no concrete meaning, they are useful for comparing models.  The models also can be 
characterized as progressive, neutral or supporting liberty.  In a progressive model, the 
state provides more resources to the least educable so there is less discrepancy between 
the least and most educable at graduation.  In a neutral model the state provides equal 
resources to all students.  In liberty model, the state allows the wealthy to join together 
and spend freely for their children’s education. 
Belief scores are the product of entitlement beliefs, school role beliefs, and 
resource beliefs:  
Belief Score = E * S * R       (1) 
Input scores attempt to model the educational resources the courts directed 
towards the schools.  This is the product of the theoretical breadth multiplied by the 
theoretical level multiplied by 130, the number of units in the models.  If the judges 
allowed wealthier districts to spend more, 10 was added to the units in the last quintile.  If 
the judges ordered compensation for low educability, 10 was added to the units in the 
first quintile.  If the judges ordered equal outputs for the least educable, then inputs were 
added to simulate the educability curve to raise the least educable to the mean. 
KSA scores are calculated by multiplying the theoretical breadth of the model by 
theoretical student achievement levels for 130 student units.   
KSA score = Σ (breadth*level of achievement of a hypothetical student body)  (2)  
A base model was designed with a mean level of achievement of 50 and student 
achievement ranging from 0 to 100.  Subsequent models were based on the base model.  
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The first and last quintiles were adjusted to account for judges allowing the wealthy to 
spend more or insisting on compensation or equality for the least educable. 
 
Sample 
The sample is state high court rulings since 1989 regarding the state education  
and education finance systems (Mills & McLendon, 2000, p. 402).  Thro maintains these 
cases are different from their predecessors because (1) “the plaintiffs have argued that all 
children are entitled to an education of at least a certain quality,” (2) these decisions have 
been based “on the education clauses of individual states’ constitutions,” and (3) “the 
courts have been more sweeping in their pronouncements and their willingness to take 
control of the financing of education” (Thro, 1994p. 603-604).  These differences are 
important for this study since the model requires a court definition of a certain quality of 
education and the decision must be of sufficient magnitude to attempt to reshape 
education in the state.  For the study to tie judicial values to adequacy remedies, the court 
must decide that the state “education clause does impose a standard of quality” and then 
define “exactly what that quality standard means” (Thro, 1994, p. 607). 
 
Collection of Data 
Cases were drawn from Westlaw Campus.  Cases were used rather than other 
sources because they are “readily available to researchers” and they provide “a large 
volume of data that can be reasonably used for comparisons among the states” (Smith, 
1994, p. 28).  According to Smith, 
Opinions are official pronouncements of the courts.  They are the 
conventional way a court communicates not only its decisions, but the 
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rationale for arriving at them, and its attitudes in general, about the issues 
involved.  Opinions are understood to contain both “holdings,” 
authoritative statements of what the law is in the case, and “dicta,” the 
court’s non-binding observations about and reflections on matters related 
to the case.  Courts use both holdings and dicta to communicate their 
policy views to the legislature. (Smith, 1994, p. 28) 
 
 
Description of the Sample 
Table 10  
Cases examined  
State Case 
AL Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107 (1993) 
Ex parte James, 836 so.2d 913 (2002) 
AZ Roosevelt Elementary School District v. Bishop, 179 Ariz. 233, 877 P.2d 806  
(1994); Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (1997) 
AR Dupree v. Alma School District No. 20, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1984); Lake View 
School District v. Huckabee, 10 S.W.3d 892 (2000); 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002) 
CT Sheff v. O’Neil, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996) 
FL Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 
400 (1996) 
ID Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 
(1993); Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State Board 
of Education, 976 P.2d 913 (1998) 
IL Committee for Education Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (1996) 
KY Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989) 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
State Case 
ME School Administrative District No. 1 v. Commissioner, 659 A.2d 854 (1994) 
MA McDuffy v. Secretary, 615 N.E.2d 616 (1993) 
MN Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (1993) 
MO Committee for Educational Equality v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446 (1994) 
MT Helena Elementary School District Number 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 
684 (1989); 236 Mont. 44, 784 P.2d 412 (1990) 
NE Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (1993) 
NH Claremont School District v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183, 635 A.2d 1375 (1993); 
703 A.2d 1353 (1997); 794 A.2d 744 (2002) 
NJ Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) 
Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (1985); 575 A.2d 359 (1990) 
NY Levittown School District v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982); Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (1995); 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (2001); 744 
N.Y.S.2d 130 (2002); N.Y.Slip. Op. 15615 (2003) 
NC Leandro v. State, 488 S.E. 249 (1997) 
ND Bismark Public School District v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (1994) 
OH DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (1997); 728 N.E.2d 993 (2000); 754 N.E.2d 
1184 (2001); 786 N.E.2d 60 (20030 
OR Coalition for Equitable School Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (1991) 
PA Marrero v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956 (1998) 
RI City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (1995) 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
State Case 
SC Abbeville County School District v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999) 
TN Tennessee Small Schools v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (1993) 
TX Edgewood Independent School District  v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (1989); 804 
S.W.2d 491 (1991); 826 S.W.2d 489 (1992); 893 S.W.2d 450 (1995) 
VT Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (1997) 
VA Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (1994) 
WI Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 
(2000) 
WY Campbell County School District v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (1995); State v 
Campbell County School District, 32 P.3d. 325 (2001) 
Extracted from Mills and McLendon, 2000 and NSBA, 2004 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
 
This chapter is divided between cases that yielded models and those that did not.   
The initial modeled cases include a table with value scores and model dimensions, a 
graph of the adequacy model, and a brief discussion of the case.  Later cases include the 
table, a discussion of the case and a reference to an earlier case’s graph.  Since many of 
the adequacy remedies are similar in shape if not in size, repeating similar graphs was 
unnecessary.  The cases are then compared on a summary table and graph.  
Cases that did not yield adequacy models are also examined in this section.  
While they do not show the link between judicial beliefs and adequacy remedies, some 
bolster the hypothesis that judicial values are important to the results of education finance 
cases.  These differences in values show up most starkly in concurring and dissenting 
opinions. 
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Adequacy Cases that Resulted in Models 
 
Rose v. Council for Better Education,(Ky., 1989) (Rose). 
Four of six justices joined in Kentucky’s Rose (1989) decision, but four justices 
filed separate opinions.  Of the separate opinions, one concurring opinion urged the court 
to act more strongly to force the legislature’s hand (Gant, p. 216), and one dissenting 
opinion argued there was no justiciable case and the plaintiffs really wanted a political 
declaration on a policy question (Leibson, p. 223).  The majority opinion, 
Wintersheimer’s concurring opinion and Vance’s dissenting opinion described theoretical 
models of adequacy and are reviewed here. 
The majority opinion reflected the belief that resources could not be better spent 
than on education, and that it was misappropriation or under-taxation that led to 
education being inadequately funded (R4).  The majority opinion expressed the belief 
that all children are entitled to equal resources from the state, although it would not 
restrain localities from generating money for their school system (E3), demonstrating an 
“liberty” bias.  Finally the majority opinion expressed the belief that the state educated its 
children so they could compete in the regional market for work and education (S3). 
The resulting model reflects the court’s beliefs.  The breadth of skills the court 
defined, although vague, clearly exceeded the minimum (qualitative adequacy).  The 
level of skill was also beyond minimum, enabling students to compete favorably 
(quantitative adequacy).  Finally the court specified both equal resources for all students 
and freedom of local funding.  State neutrality in educational resources for students has 
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Table 11  
Rose Majority opinion matrix 
Category Justices’ opinion 
State funding “same opportunity and access to an adequate education” (p. 211) 
Local funding [In no way does the requirement for equal opportunity limit local school entities] 
“authority to supplement the state system” (p. 211) 
Educability – L Equal funding for all students allowing wealthy the liberty to spend more 
Breadth – 6 six skill sets (p. 212) 
Level – 5 “sufficient”  
Compete regionally (p. 212) 
Belief Set 
  
R4 – “No tax proceeds have a more important [purpose] than those for education….  
The importance of [schools] cannot be overemphasized or overstated” (p. 211) 
E3 – “Equality is the key word here.” (p. 211) 
S3 – “sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students 
to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in 
the job market” (pp. 211-212) 
 
 
Input Achievement
 
Figure 14: Rose Majority model – Belief score 36; Input score 4,940; KSA score 40,632L 
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the likely result that the least educable children will acquire the fewest KSAs and the 
most educable children will acquire the most KSAs.  Because of the provision for local 
funding, and with the assumption that wealthier districts have a larger portion of more 
educable children and more disposable income, the model contains a bump for the more 
educable children.  This bump assumes they will acquire even more KSAs because of 
local funding.  The bottom line is the Rose majority opinion had the highest belief score, 
and the highest theoretical KSA and input scores, with a bias toward liberty.  
Although Vance and Wintersheimer came down on opposite sides of the decision, they 
reflected similar beliefs in their separate opinions.  Both emphasized the role of families 
in education and the primacy of equal resources from the state, so the score split the scale 
at E2.  Both emphasized the state’s responsibility to provide a minimum education rather 
than an adequate education (S2).  While Vance did not indicate a belief on resources 
(defaulted to R3), Wintersheimer showed an appreciation for the difficult job the 
legislature must perform and the danger of demanding more education than could 
reasonably be delivered (R3).  Each had equal belief scores, and the difference in their 
KSA and input scores was their difference of opinion about local funding.  
Wintersheimer’s provision for local funding biased his model toward “liberty,” while 
Vance’s insistence on equality gave his model a neutral bias. 
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Table 12  
Rose, Wintersheimer concur matrix  
Subject Justices’ opinion 
State funding “educational opportunity should be equal for all” (p. 219) 
Local funding “The total independence and authority of local school districts to supplement any state 
effort should be carefully preserved” (p. 219) 
Educability – L Equal funding for all students allowing wealthy the liberty to spend more 
Breadth - 3 “constitutional responsibility of providing a minimum level of opportunity” (p. 219) 
Level – 3 “Our concern should be primarily focused on the [schools] at the primary level” (p. 219) 
Belief Set 
  
R3 – “too much emphasis has been placed on the role of the legislature in the entire 
educational framework” (p. 218) 
E2 – “primary responsibility for the education of children is with the parents” (p. 218);  
education is not a fundamental right (p. 219); “lack of scholastic success is not just the 
fault of the system” (p. 219) 
S2 – “Our concern should be primarily focused on the [schools] at the primary level”;  
“constitutional responsibility of providing a minimum level of opportunity” (p. 219) 
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Input Achievement
Figure 15: Rose Wintersheimer model – Belief score 12; Input score 1,664; KSA score 12,190L 
 
Table 13  
Rose Vance dissent matrix 
Category Justice’s decision 
State funding “substantial equality of educational opportunity” (p. 221) 
Local funding Allows no district supplemental funding (p. 221) 
Educability – N Strict equal funding for all students 
Breadth - 3 Minimal – majority’s goals are vague and unsupported by the constitution (p. 223).   
Only basic educational necessities are required (p. 221) 
Level – 3 Minimal – “I can find no such requirement as to the level of funding.”  Delegates 
discussed including the word “adequate” but did not include it (p. 221). 
Belief Set 
  
R3 – Default – no view expressed 
E2 – “provide substantially equal educational opportunity” (p. 220) 
S2 – “‘adequate’ did not make it into the [constitution]” (p. 221) 
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Input Achievement
  
Figure 16: Rose Vance dissent model – Belief score 12; Input score 1170; KSA score 11,862N 
 
 
 
Input Achievement
 
 
Figure 17: Campbell I theoretical model – Belief score 100; Input score 9,721; KSA 
score 152,712P 
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Campbell County School District v. State (Wyo., 1995). 
The decision in Campbell v. State (1995) (Campbell I) followed the case of 
Washakie County Dist. No. One v. Herschler (1980), in which the Wyoming high court 
declared the state education finance system unconstitutional.  Washakie looked closely at 
the distribution of education dollars, called for rough “equality of dollar input” and 
eliminating “the evil” of disparate spending (Id., p. 334).  The Campbell I decision 
extended Washakie “beyond a wealth-based disparity to other types of causes of 
disparities” (Campbell I, p. 1266).   
The court made its beliefs plain.  In asserting “all other financial considerations 
must yield until education is funded” (Id., p. 1279) the court declared its belief that 
resources were plentiful and that it was misappropriation that kept schools from having 
enough resources (R4).    In insisting upon a “level playing field” (Id., p. 1270) and 
borrowing Superintendent Jack Iversen’s belief that “there doesn’t have to be losers in 
the system”  (Id., p. 1278) the court showed the belief that students are entitled to some 
level of guaranteed success if not equal outcomes.  This declaration is not as clear, 
focused or strident as that in Abbott II (1990, discussed below), and consequently it is 
scored E4.5.  Finally, in observing “Our children’s readiness to learn is impacted by 
social ills, learning deficiencies” (Campbell I, p.1278), and assigning to schools the role 
of ameliorating personal and social ills as well as learning deficiencies, the court was 
acknowledging its belief in the school’s ability to reduce social inequality (Id., p. 1278).  
Here, too, the call is less emphatic than that in Abbott II, so it rates S4.5.    
The resulting adequacy remedy reflects the court’s beliefs.  By insisting the 
education finance system reduce disparities, including personal and social ills as well as  
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Table 14  
Campbell I opinion matrix 
Category Justices’ opinion 
State funding “review any legislative school financing reform with strict scrutiny to determine whether 
the evil of financial disparity, from whatever unjustifiable cause, has been exorcized 
from the Wyoming educational system” (p. 1266) 
Local funding “Historical analysis reveals local control is not a constitutionally recognized interest and 
cannot be the basis for disparity in equal educational opportunity” (p. 1270) 
Educability - P “[A] finance system which distributes dollars without regard for the need to level the 
playing field does not provide an equal opportunity for a quality education” (p. 1270) 
Breadth – 10 The right to education “must be construed broadly” (p. 1258); “the best educational 
system” (p. 1279) 
Level – 9 “Educational success must be defined as graduating from high school equipped for a role 
as a citizen, participant in the political system and competitor both intellectually and 
economically” (p. 1278); “Entry into the University of Wyoming” (p. 1279) 
Belief Set 
  
R4 – “Supporting opportunity for complete, proper, quality education is legislature’s 
paramount priority; competing priorities not of constitutional magnitude are secondary, 
and legislature may not yield to them unless constitutionally sufficient provision is made 
for elementary and secondary education” (p. 1279); “lack of financial resources will not 
be an acceptable reason for failure to provide the best educational system.  All other 
financial considerations must yield until education is funded” (p. 1279) 
E4.5 – “‘There doesn’t have to be losers in the system’ is definitive of the meaning of 
equal educational opportunity to a proper education” (p. 1278) 
S4.5 – “the role of education in reducing social problems pressures those same schools 
to respond” (p. 1253);   “Children with an impaired readiness to learn do not have the 
same equal opportunity for a quality education as do those children not impacted by 
personal or social ills simply because they do not have the same starting point” (p. 1278) 
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learning deficiencies so that the education system would produce no “losers” and 
rejecting local control, the order directs educational resources towards the least educable, 
giving it a strong progressive/anti-liberty bias.  The court-expressed goal is that all 
students should be prepared to enter higher education (Campbell I, p. 1279), thus raising 
the level of learning, and its insistence on the “best” educational system “broadly 
construed” indicates a wider breadth of learning for Wyoming students.  
The model features large inputs for the least educable in an effort to prepare them 
for the University of Wyoming.  The model does not remove resources from the most 
educable, so they are still able to create more KSAs than their less educable peers. 
It is interesting to note that in State of Wyoming v. Campbell County School 
District (2001) (Campbell III, which deals primarily with capital construction projects) 
Chief Justice Lehman’s 11-page opinion spends six pages explaining why he is a strict 
constructionist, including quotes from Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia.  Ironically he 
also quotes a “Note” from Harvard Law Review,  “Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance 
Remedies and State Courts,” which argues courts must act more assertively in school 
finance cases because the “disproportionate influence of property-rich districts and 
collective action problems lead to underrepresentation of the school finance plaintiff’s 
interests in the political process” (1991, p. 1073).  This is Ely’s central argument (cited in 
the article), although he is on the other end of the constitutional construction spectrum 
from Bork.  Justice Doggett noted a similar problem in Texas where, as his colleagues 
defined it, “their own conduct is an example of conservativism and restraint, even if, as in 
this case, it ignores precedent, the rules, and the Constitution” (Edgewood II, p. 506). 
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Alabama Coalition for Equity, et al. v. Hunt (Ala., 1993) (Hunt). 
The Hunt (1993) case is peculiar to read because everyone agreed that education 
in Alabama was deficient.  The court noted, “Interestingly, Governor Hunt himself has 
said that Alabama public schools need more money” (Hunt, p. 141), and [Governor Hunt] 
concedes the inequity and inadequacy of educational opportunity in Alabama’s public 
schools to a large extent” (Id., p. 144).    
Dr. Martha Barton, assistant state superintendent of schools for 
instructional services, indicated that such [resource] disparities are evident 
among schools within the same system but on opposite sides of the 
tracks…. Dr. Anita Buckley-Commander, Governor Hunt’s education 
advisor, admitted that intra-system disparities existed among the schools 
she viewed. (Hunt, p. 123-124)   
 
Alabama Justice Woodall explained why “the parties were not averse to one another.”  
The history of the realignment of parties in this case is as follows.  
Originally, Governor Guy Hunt was a defendant, along with State Director 
of Finance Robin Swift, Lieutenant Governor James Folsom, Jr., Speaker 
of the House of Representatives James Clark, State Superintendent of 
Education Wayne Teague, and the members of the Alabama State board of 
Education.  Later, all the defendants except Governor Hunt and his finance 
director were realigned as plaintiffs.  Why?  Because those defendants 
agreed with the position advanced by ACE. (James v. Coalition for Equity 
et al., 2002, p. 869, Woodall concurring).  
 
The issue for state officials was that the court was “not the forum to solve the educational 
woes of this state” (Id., p. 144).  Nevertheless, the justices confirmed what the defendants 
conceded; education in Alabama was not equitable or adequate. 
In reaching this conclusion, judicial beliefs seem apparent.  The justices 
acknowledge Governor Hunt’s claim that it is the lack of money statewide that prevents 
more from being spent on education, and although they quote Mobile’s superintendent in 
asserting that education will create wealth, they also note earlier constitutional language
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Table 15  
Alabama Coalition for Equity (ACE) v. Hunt opinion matrix 
Category Justices’ opinion 
State funding “upon all alike, without reference to their condition” (p. 150)  
Local funding “operate upon, and in favor of, all children equally without special local privileges to 
any” (p. 151);  “too often in Alabama local control has actually been synonymous with 
local discrimination” (p. 160); “equitable and adequate educational opportunities shall 
be provided to all schoolchildren regardless of the wealth of the communities in which 
the schoolchildren reside” (p. 166) 
Educability – N “the public schools must be free and open to all schoolchildren on equal terms” (p. 165) 
Breadth – 7 7 skill sets plus guidance (p. 166) 
Level – 6 [Providing] children with a minimally adequate education is the only kind of system that 
conforms with a liberal reading of the constitutional text” (p. 154); “sufficient” (p. 166); 
Compete nationally and internationally (p. 166) 
Belief Set 
  
R3 – Quoted Alabama’s 1875 constitution in saying “condition of the treasury and 
resources of the state may justify” (p. 152) 
E3 – “free and open to all schoolchildren on equal terms” (p. 165) 
S3 – “If you are anxious for the prosperity of your people, then you will lose no time in 
giving them a ‘liberal’ education.  Intelligence is a great money maker.  If you wish to 
make Alabama grow in wealth and progress, you must have general intelligence and 
skilled labor” [quoting Supt. John O. Turner, December 30, 1896] (p. 153) 
 
allowing education funding based on the overall condition of the treasury.  Although the 
justices say “the governor’s assertion that the state cannot afford better schools is 
doubtful, at best; as a matter of law, it is no defense to a claim of constitutional 
infringement because individual rights do not obtain only when the state believes that it 
can afford them” (Id., p. 139, emphasis in original), they stop short of  asserting that the 
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Input Achievement
 
Figure 18: ACE v. Hunt theoretical model– Belief score 18; Input score 7,800; KSA 
score 46,130N 
NOTE: Because the models are theoretical, charts of the first several cases were presented.  Latter cases 
will either refer to previous similar charts or will present a new chart if required. 
 
state must put every other consideration aside in favor of education.  They embraced a 
balanced view of resources (R3). 
Because of Alabama’s racist history and the resulting discrepancy in funding for 
black schools and white schools, the justices are concerned with equalizing funding 
rather than equalizing outcomes.  Despite Governor Hunt’s argument that the word 
“equal” was struck from the constitutional language between 1901 and 1975, the justices 
observe that all parties agree “‘equal’ was stricken from the constitution for racial 
reasons, apparently to avoid any explicit requirement for equal treatment of the races 
other than for school terms of equal duration” (Id., p. 150).  The court noted that unequal 
treatment did not extend to whites in 1901, and the court said it should not extend across 
races in 1993.  Although the justices maintained appropriate treatment for special 
education (Id., p. 166), their intent otherwise was for equal funding for all children (E3). 
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The lack of funding for schools and lack of money in the state were linked in the 
justices’ minds.  The quotes the justices chose reflect a pragmatic view of schools as 
elements in developing the economy and the hope that a developing economy will allow 
greater funding for schools.  Thus their belief on the role of schools in society was S3.  
To define an adequate education in Alabama, the justices explained “this Court is 
not empowered to determine whether the Alabama education system is sufficient to meet 
standards or achieve purposes that the Court might itself prefer.”  It then went on to 
compare education in Alabama to standards set by the Southern Association and the 
Alabama Education Improvement Act.  Ironically, it then borrowed the phrases from 
Rose (1990) and added mathematics and guidance, including the “sufficient” level to 
define adequacy.  The level is one higher than Rose, since the demand was for national 
and international competitiveness, not regional (6).  The breadth was expanded to 7 to 
include the demand for mathematics, with the assumption that “sufficient support and 
guidance so that every student feels a sense of self-worth” (Id., p. 166) requires less 
educational effort than another skill.  Because they were unwilling to allow local 
discretionary funding of education, the resulting model is shaped very much like the 
Vance dissent model above, but it is larger than the Vance model. 
 
DeRolph v. State (Ohio, 1997) (DeRolph I). 
Another case in which there was little or no disagreement between the plaintiffs 
and defendants was DeRolph v. Ohio (1997).  Appellate Judge Reader noted that “there 
were few facts in dispute” and “if there was ever a case in where the parties acted more in 
concert than this one, I haven’t seen it” (DeRolph I, p. 195).  In the end a collection of 
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advocacy groups (ACLU, associations of school administrators, school boards, public 
school employees, the Ohio Federation of Teachers, 37 lawmakers, et al.) and their 
nominal opponents (the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and State Department 
of Education) (Niskanen, 1994), formed an iron triangle (Adams, 1982) with the courts in 
an effort to force change upon the Ohio General Assembly and the citizens of Ohio.  
Sandler and Schoenbrod noticed that “lower-level officials from the agency being sued 
who chafe at ordinary bureaucratic restrictions gain valuable purchase on policy and 
budgets,” and “commissioners and other heads of departments keep the budgetary 
advantages that can come from being subject to a decree” (2003, p. 131, also Handler, 
1978, pp. 15, 34).  Not just bureaucrats but also perhaps “locally elected officials have 
seen the advantage of [education finance] litigation” (van Geel, 1982, p. 74), and in fact 
the DeRolph litigation included state legislators as plaintiffs.  This iron triangle forms 
because “Plaintiffs’ and defendants’ representatives, although opponents in the 
courtroom, have a mutual interest in building up the budget and power of the government 
agency that is the target of the lawsuit” (Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003, p. 156).  
Despite the alignment of advocates for change in Ohio’s educational funding system, the 
majority opinion provided “minimal guidance in developing a constitutional. school 
financing system” (Moyer dissent, p. 268), and thus it is also difficult to model.  Much of 
the testimony and evidence involved facilities problems, and the remedy is genuinely 
specific only about the basics (Hanushek, 1994, p. 466). 
In accepting this case involving “questions of public or great general interest” 
(DeRolph I, p. 198), it’s reasonable to believe the justices in the DeRolph I  opinion were 
concerned about equality and adequacy.  However, their belief scores are relatively low.  
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Table 16  
DeRolph I majority opinion matrix 
Category Justice’s decision 
State funding “The responsibility for maintaining a thorough and efficient school system falls upon 
the state” (p. 210) 
Local funding “We recognize that disparities between school districts will always exist.”;   “in no 
way should our decision be construed as imposing spending ceilings on more affluent 
school districts.  School districts are still free to augment their programs if they 
choose to do so.” (p. 211) 
Educability – L Although there is considerable discussion of adequate inputs, there is little discussion 
of student need as a determinant of adequate input.  Lack of tutors for failing students 
is mentioned (p. 209) as well as the cut-off of “additional distributions which increase 
according to the concentration of [Aid to Dependent Children] pupils” at 20% of the 
population (p. 200), but the legislature is not instructed to change these conditions. 
Breadth – 3 Minimal – “A thorough and efficient system of common schools includes facilities in 
good repair and the supplies, materials, and funds necessary to maintain these 
facilities in a safe manner, in compliance with all local, state, and federal mandates.” 
(p. 213)   
Level – 3 Minimal – “A thorough and efficient system of common schools includes facilities in 
good repair and the supplies, materials, and funds necessary to maintain these 
facilities in a safe manner, in compliance with all local, state, and federal mandates.” 
(p. 213)   
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Table 16 (continued) 
DeRolph I majority opinion matrix 
Category Justice’s decision 
Belief Set 
  
R3 – “Because of its importance, education should be placed high in the state’s 
budgetary priorities.” (p. 213)  Douglas’ concurrence indicated a reformed 
educational system “should include mandates for cost cutting (additional money is not 
the only answer) and cost containment with clear accountability.” (p. 214) 
E2 – “[educational opportunity] requires, at the very least, that all of Ohio’s children 
attend schools which are safe and conducive to learning” (p. 220);  “this case does not 
seek equality of education throughout Ohio, but rather seeks a quality education for 
every single child in Ohio”; “education need not be equal or substantially equal in all 
districts.” (Resnick, concur, p. 260) 
S2 – “educated adequately so they are able to participate fully in society” (p. 745); 
“We recognize that money alone is not the panacea that will transform Ohio’s school 
system into a model of excellence…a student’s success depends upon numerous 
factors besides money” (p. 221) 
 
 
They showed an appreciation that education was not the state’s only priority, but an 
important priority, earning an R3.  While they believed schools were important, schools 
were just one influence in a child’s development, and certainly not solely responsible for 
a child’s complete development, garnering an S2.  And while the case involved student’s 
constitutional entitlement to an education, in the end the justices ordered little more than 
clean, safe, comfortable facilities and adequate supplies.  The majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions all affirmed the intent was not to provide equal education, and 
certainly not more education to the less educable for level outcomes, thus scoring E2.   
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Regarding equity, the court allowed for disparities in funding between districts.  
Resnick’s concurring opinion states “there must be a threshold amount of funding 
provided by the state which affords each district in Ohio the ability to meet certain 
standardized requirements…[but]districts may provide for their students above and 
beyond the state’s responsibility” (Id., p. 260-261).  Justice Pfeifer disagreed, explaining 
the current statutes “do not adequately smooth out the unconscionable funding inequities 
that exist between school districts in this state” (Id., p. 262). 
Because the court order essentially required that the General Assembly rework the 
funding system and provide adequate facilities and supplies for all Ohio students (Id., p. 
213) it would be possible to build a model with minimal inputs (2x2 according to the 
models discussed) for a potential input score of 520.  This would result in a model 
essentially like the Vance Dissent Model, but smaller.  Considering that the court knew 
Ohio had one of the better funded systems in the country (“ranked eleventh among the 
fifty states in per-pupil educational spending” (Id., p. 787)) which already compensated 
for students in need, even if imperfectly, it is unlikely the court intended for the 
legislature to build a system of sanitary facilities with minimal purpose.  Consequently 
the model is 3 x 3 with provision for extra funding for wealthy districts, similar to 
Wintersheimer above (Figure 15).   
Despite their specific words, the majority wanted to expand an already well-
funded system.  In the model’s defense, dissenting Chief Justice Moyer said the “majority 
opinion provides the General Assembly with minimal guidance in developing a 
constitutional school financing system” (Id., p. 785), and it is “difficult to imagine the 
creation of any funding system that would pass constitutional muster” (Id., p. 791).    
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The dissenting justices in the DeRolph I case did not offer an alternative definition of 
adequacy.  They note “the agreement among the parties to this case that all plaintiff 
school districts have met the minimum standards set by the State Department of 
Education” (Id., p. 266) and anything beyond that is a political question, not a 
constitutional one.  They favorably note decisions from Illinois and Rhode Island that 
adequacy is either indefinable or “inherently [a question] of policy involving 
philosophical and practical considerations that call for the exercise of legislative and 
administrative discretion” (Id., p. 269, citing Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 
(1996) and Pawtucket v. Sundlun, (1995)).  They maintain students are not entitled to 
equal education or an education of any specific level of quality (E2), and “success in 
education is not solely the responsibility of the providers of public education.  Students 
themselves, their families, and their local communities bear their own responsibility, 
inside and outside the classroom” (S2), and the dissenters said that no party to the suit 
had addressed prudent fiscal management (R3). 
 
Input Achievement
 
Figure 19: DeRolph II theoretical model – Belief score 42; Input score 6,126; KSA score 
41,202N 
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Table 17 
DeRolph II majority opinion matrix 
Category Justices’ decision 
State funding The “state is responsible for funding an adequate education for all primary and 
secondary students who attend public schools” (p. 1031).  “The basic aid formula has 
structural deficiencies and may not in fact reflect the amount required per pupil to 
provide an adequate education” (p. 1021). 
Local funding “The state’s failure to specifically address the school-funding system’s overreliance 
on local property taxes is of paramount concern as we evaluate the state’s attempts to 
craft a thorough and efficient system of funding” (p. 1015). 
Educability – N “… and a commitment to provide extra resources and support to students and schools 
who start out furthest from the goal line” (p. 1019). 
Breadth – 6 “We are still a long way from the goal of providing sufficient computers to allow a 
high quality education in this computer age” so that “students nearing graduation will 
be computer-literate” (p. 1020-1021). 
Level – 6 Resnick favorably quoted an Achieve, Inc. report calling for “rigorous academic 
standards, challenging assessments” (p. 1019), while Pfeifer’s concurrence  says “this 
case is not about high standards.  It is about a constitutionally required foundation of 
basic educational opportunity.  The difficulty lies not in building that foundation, but 
in sustaining a democracy without it” (p. 1029).   
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Belief Set 
  
R4 – “These budgetary and political concerns must yield, however, when compliance 
with a constitutional mandate is at issue” (p. 1000).  
E3.5 – “Even if the system were very generously funded, [ ] it might not be thorough 
and efficient.” “If students have access to the latest technology but cannot take 
advantage of it, then our state has failed them.  If students have the most up-to-date 
textbooks but cannot comprehend the material in those books, then our state has failed 
them” (p. 1001).  The majority  “suggests that student success is yet another criterion” 
of a thorough and efficient system (p. 1034).  The majority “thus hints that the 
ultimate criterion of thoroughness and efficiency is whether some undefined 
percentage of Ohio students are achieving academically” (p. 1034). 
S3 –  default – no view expressed. 
 
 
DeRolph v. State (Ohio, 2000) (DeRolph II). 
Although a sequel to the first DeRolph I decree, DeRolph II (2000) shows inflation in 
both exhibited values and the demanded adequacy model.  Justice Moyer says, “I am 
additionally dismayed by the majority’s apparent expansion of its view of thoroughness 
and efficiency beyond the issues of school financing and improvement of physical school 
facilities, which was the focus of DeRolph I” (DeRolph II, p. 1033-1034), although the 
dissenters observe these are “unpredictable and indefinite concepts of educational 
thoroughness and efficiency” (Id., p. 1030).  This unpredictability is apparent in 
comparing Pfiefer’s concurrence, which insisted the case was not about “high standards,” 
and Resnick’s majority opinion, which called for “rigorous” standards.  The inclusion of 
computer literacy is a specific example of mission creep, and the resulting height and 
breadth were raised to 6.  This ambiguity carries through to the model’s bias.  While the 
court insisted it was not calling for equal funding between districts in DeRolph I (1997), 
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its emphasis on “overreliance” on local funding indicates it wanted a system more equal 
than it said.  It is not clear what the DeRolph II majority meant when it claimed its 
assessment of “complete systematic overhaul” of school finance in Ohio “is qualitative 
rather than quantitative” (Id., p. 1006), although the dissent’s characterization of the 
majority opinion as “taking the position that it will know it when it sees it” (Id., p. 1036) 
perhaps says it better.  The majority also called for a “commitment to provide extra 
resources and support to students and schools who start out furthest from the goal line” 
(Id., p. 1019).  Although not specific, there is clear movement away from the liberty bias 
in DeRolph I toward a progressive bias, resulting in a neutral, N rating. 
This changed model seems to be the result of different expressed values.  While 
the court respected the challenges of budgeting in DeRolph I, it insists other priorities 
must yield to education in DeRolph II, thus moving from R3 to R4.  Similarly, student 
entitlements moved from sufficient equipment and buildings that met code to an output 
entitlement, E3.5.  The school role in society score remains at S3. 
This changed model is probably not the result of changed basic values in the 
judges, but rather the recognition of an opportunity to create change in light of the 
General Assembly’s response to DeRolph I.  Parts of the majority opinion sound like 
political stump speeches.   
The General Assembly should not allow the momentum of recent efforts 
to be impeded for any reason.  Everyone’s cooperation and best efforts are 
required as we strive to ensure that educational opportunities are available 
to all children in this great state … . (Id., p. 1002)   
 
Consequently educators, lawmakers, businesses, parents, and students 
must all work together to strengthen Ohio’s system of public schools. (Id., 
p. 1020) 
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Now is the time for Ohio’s governmental, educational, and corporate 
leaders to forge a new agreement to enable local communities and their 
schools to move forward to realize those goals.  Governor Taft is 
providing the leadership to establish this compact, and now is the time for 
the General Assembly, educators, corporate leaders, and parents to join his 
efforts. (Id., p. 1022) 
   
Douglas’s concurring opinion sounds even more idealistic.  It referred to “the 
continued quest for a constitutional funding system”  through the “education revolution, 
in which we are all engaged” (Id., p. 1024).  Douglas declares, “the cause of educational 
opportunity is a noble one.  We should not shrink from our duty” (Id., p. 1026).  Indeed 
the dissenting justices assert they, too, “care deeply about education” (Id., p. 1035), but 
that the majority opinion  “constitutes an expression of the majority’s estimation of good 
public policy; it has nothing to do with constitutional law” (Id., p. 1035).  
In DeRolph III (2001) the court again affirmed its belief in “the fundamental 
importance of education to the children and citizens of this state” (1189), and a new 
majority declared the system constitutional with some reservations.  The court “created 
the consensus that should terminate the role of this court in the dispute” (p. 1190), 
although none “of us is completely comfortable with the decision we announce” (p. 
1189).  The resulting order called for adjustments to what the state was already doing and 
does not warrant a separate model. 
The dissolution of the majorities (Sweeny, Douglas, Resnick, and Pfeifer) from 
DeRolph I and DeRolph II  seems to rest somewhat on differences in the judges’ beliefs 
and values about education.  Douglas and Pfeifer remained in the majority in all three 
opinions, while Resnick and Sweeny dissented in DeRolph III.  Pfeifer’s concurring 
opinion in DeRolph I emphasized “the unconscionable funding inequities” and “coal bin 
classrooms, free-floating asbestos fibers, leaking roofs” (p. 780), which essentially were 
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equity and facilities issues.  In DeRolph II Pfeifer emphasized “statewide minimum 
educational requirements,” “horrible funding inequities” and “considerable school 
facilities deficiencies” (Id., p. 1028) before concluding, “this case is not about high 
standards” (Id., p. 1029).  Douglas’s lengthy concurring opinion in DeRolph I spent five 
pages (pp. 763-768) discussing facility problems in school districts, and although he 
would declare education a fundamental right, his remedy emphasized equity and facilities 
(DeRolph I, p. 778).  Douglas’s concurrence in DeRolph II waxes eloquent and 
aspirational, but it also discusses time “to fine-tune, tinker with, and /or scrap what has 
been done in their (and our) incessant search to do what is constitutional, necessary and 
right,” “patience” (Id., p. 1024), “our request that something be done” (Id., p. 1025), and 
“the majority herein prefers to be problem-solvers by helping the Governor and General 
Assembly solve a problem” (Id., p. 1026).   
On the other hand, in DeRolph I Resnick discussed “the lack of honors programs, 
language courses, and other electives” as well as “self-esteem” (Id., p. 780), and her 
higher aspirations for education are apparent in the majority opinion she wrote for 
DeRolph II.  Sweeny’s majority opinion in DeRolph I might not have reflected all of his 
values, since in his dissent in DeRolph III he mentions the base cost is flawed because it 
does not define “what resources are necessary so that disadvantaged students can have 
the same opportunities to achieve as more affluent students” (Id., p. 1243), and he quotes 
John Adams in saying “laws for the liberal education of youth, especially for the lower 
classes of people, are so extremely wise and useful that to a humane and generous mind, 
no expense for this purpose would be thought extravagant” (Id., p. 1244, emphasis 
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added).  If the majority’s belief scores could be scaled from largest to smallest, they 
might descend from Resnick, through Sweeny and Douglas to Pfeifer. 
The fact that Pfeifer and Douglas joined the former dissenters, Moyer and 
Lundberg Stratton, in the DeRolph III majority might be related to their beliefs about 
education.  Pfeifer’s concurring opinion in DeRolph III speculated that the current 
legislation would “smooth out the unconscionable funding inequities that exist between 
school districts in this state,” and he speculated further smoothing could occur with 
expanded school building construction because “school buildings are tangible evidence 
that we cared, that we saw an opportunity to help our children, and that we accepted our 
responsibility to do so” (Id., p. 1216).  Thus Pfeifer’s lower belief score with its 
continued emphasis on good facilities and minimum requirements made him available to 
the majority in DeRolph III.  Douglas’s opinion in DeRolph III discusses separation of 
powers extensively.  Although he cites Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 
(1803), his opinion reflects the theory of judicial policymaking discussed by Chayes 
(1976), with the judiciary an equal partner with the executive and legislature in public 
policymaking.  In this context he discusses the court’s options and decides that declaring 
what the General Assembly had done up to that point as constitutional was the best 
option.  He opines 
certainly Ohio’s schoolchildren are better off today than they were before 
DeRolph I and DeRolph II.  New facilities have been and are being 
constructed.  Learning materials, including books, have been updated and 
replaced.  Student-teacher ratios have been decreased.  Technology has 
been introduced and improved. 
Is the solution perfect?  No.  Is the solution adequate?  I hope so.  The 
constitutional mandate is one of adequacy – not equality (DeRolph III, p. 
1212). 
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In sum Douglas concluded that the state was providing sufficient inputs, and his political 
judgment was to “forgo insisting that in Ohio, education is a fundamental right” (Id., p. 
1214) and implement, with modifications, the policy solution that had been developed. 
Resnick’s dissent in DeRolph III further highlighted her more expansive 
educational beliefs.  She maintained the model districts were not good models because 
not all included “all-day, everyday kindergarten for all students,” “three foreign language 
courses” for high schools and programs for gifted students (Id., p. 1229).  Furthermore, 
the costs of “educating disadvantaged pupils in both inner cities and poor rural areas” 
(Id., p. 1229) had not been determined or included in the plan.  Also mentioned are “strict 
academic standards,” “advanced placement courses for high school students and foreign 
language opportunities in elementary schools; replacement cycles for textbooks; 
professional development time for all teachers; classroom materials and equipment such 
as computers, televisions, and VCRs” (Id., p. 1233).  
In retrospect, there appears to be a relationship between the belief and values 
displayed in the members of the majority in DeRolph I and II and their willingness to 
certify the constitutionality of the education system established by Ohio’s government in 
DeRolph III.  The judges with the lower apparent education belief scores, Pfeifer and 
Douglas, accepted what the General Assembly had written up to that point, while Resnick 
and Sweeny, with the higher education belief scores, were unwilling to accept what the 
legislature had created.  This association should not be oversimplified.  Certainly other 
philosophical questions, such as the proper role of the judiciary in the American 
governmental system, weighed heavily in the equation.  Justice Cook, the consistent 
dissenter in the DeRolph decisions, continually emphasized the policy nature of the 
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question and the impropriety of judicial involvement.  “I view this court’s ill-conceived 
foray outside its legitimate role to be a most serious affront to individual freedom and 
democratic ideals” (DeRolph II, p. 1037). 
 
Claremont School District v. Governor (N.H., 1993/1997) (Claremont I and II). 
Although a successor to McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of 
Education, 615 N.E.2d 616 (1993) in a sense, New Hampshire’s Claremont decisions 
also show a gradual expansion of judicial intervention into the governing process.  The 
Claremont School District v Governor  (1993) (Claremont I) cannot be modeled.  It 
declares the literature clause of the state constitution “commands, in no uncertain terms, 
that the State provide an education to all its citizens and that it support all public schools” 
(Claremont I, p. 1378).  Furthermore the justices conclude “that in New Hampshire a free 
public education is at the very least an important substantive right” (Id., p. 1381), and that 
the right is “not based on the exclusive needs of a particular individual” (Id.).  That might 
put the level of entitlement between E2 and E4.  Finally they say education should extend 
“beyond mere reading, writing and arithmetic.  It also includes broad educational 
opportunities needed in today’s society to prepare citizens for their role as participants 
and as potential competitors in today’s marketplace of ideas” (Id.)  This conception of 
school’s role in society ranks S3.  
In Claremont School District v. Governor (1997) (Claremont II),  the court 
declares the education finance system unconstitutional.  They conclude “we find the 
purpose of the school tax to be overwhelmingly a State purpose and dispositive of the 
issue of the character of the tax” (Claremont II, p. 1356).  Since some districts paid four 
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times the tax rate of other districts, clearly “there is nothing fair or just about taxing a 
home or other real estate in one town at four times the rate that similar property is taxed 
in another town to fulfill the same purpose of meeting the State’s educational duty.”  
Later they disagree “that the taxation of property to support education must reach the 
level of confiscation before a constitutional threshold is crossed” (Id., p. 1360), thus 
earning an R3.  They also announce “our decision does not prevent the legislature from 
authorizing local school districts to dedicate additional resources to their schools or to 
develop educational programs beyond those required” (Id., p. 1360), showing an L bias. 
In Claremont II the court ratcheted up its demands on two accounts.  First, it 
declared “a constitutionally adequate public education is a fundamental right” (Id., p. 
1359) rather than “at the very least an important substantive right” (Id., p. 1381) as it did 
in Claremont I.  In a second irony, the court then adopted the “sufficient” skills criteria 
from Rose (1989), thus earning a breadth of 6 and a height of five.  This appears to 
contradict its profession in Claremont I that “We do not define the parameters of the 
education mandated by the constitution as that task is, in the first instance, for the 
legislature and the Governor” (Claremont I, p. 1381).  The opinion is also peculiar since 
New Hampshire’s constitution has its own list of curricular areas and KSAs.  It calls for  
“the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, [and] 
manufacturers” and [inculcating] “the principles of humanity and general 
benevolence, public and private charity, industry and economy, honesty 
and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous 
sentiments among the people” (cited in Claremont I, p. 1381).    
 
In the end Claremont II yields belief scores and a model very similar to Rose (1989).  
Legal activity trailed Claremont II like August dust: March 1998, May 1998, 
November 1988, September 1999, October 1999, December 1999, December 2000, 
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September 2001 and December 2001 are all dates of actions listed in Claremont III  
(2002).  Justice Doggett identified the “allure” of the court working with the legislature, 
but in Claremont III it seemed the judiciary were not “mere appendages” (Edgewood II, 
p. 505) of the legislature, but rather leaders and counselors in the development of 
legislation.  The bone of contention in Claremont III was the accountability system.  The 
court declared, “if the State cannot be held accountable for fulfilling its duty, the duty 
creates no obligation and is no longer a duty,” and therefore “the State’s duty to provide a  
Table 18  
Claremont II majority opinion matrix 
Category Justice’s decision 
State funding Property taxes “are in fact State taxes that have been authorized by the legislature” to 
provide for a constitutional education (p. 1356). 
Local funding Local school districts may “dedicate additional resources to their schools” (p. 1360). 
Educability – L “not based on the exclusive needs of a particular individual” (p. 1381). 
Breadth - 6 “We view these [Kentucky] guidelines as benchmarks of a constitutionally adequate 
public education” (p. 1359). 
Level - 5 “We view these [Kentucky] guidelines as benchmarks of a constitutionally adequate 
public education” (p. 1359). 
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Belief Set 
  
R3 – Should not “reach the level of confiscation” (p. 1360).  “We agree with those 
who say that merely spending additional money on education will not necessarily 
insure its quality” (p. 1360). 
E3 – “Comparable funding must be assured in order that every school district will 
have the funds necessary to provide” an adequate education (p. 1360). 
S3 – “Broad exposure to the social, economic, scientific, technological, and political 
realities of today’s society is essential for our students to compete, contribute, and 
flourish in the twenty-first century” (p. 1359). 
constitutionally adequate education includes accountability” (Claremont III, p. 751).  The  
court then reviewed the existing accountability systems and declared “the State has not 
provided a sufficient mechanism to require that school districts actually achieve” the goal 
of educating children, and thus “has not met its constitutional obligation to develop a 
system to ensure the delivery of a constitutionally adequate education” (Id., p. 758).  It’s 
interesting that Claremont III, in addition to the extensive judicial involvement in the 
governing process shown by the dates, is the insistence upon measurable standardsJustice 
Resnick in DeRolph II made similar demands.  Also reminiscent of Justice Resnick is the 
insistence that “this court has consistently declined to determine whether the State’s 
definition of an adequate education is constitutional” (Id., p. 759), and “we recognize that 
we are not appointed to establish educational policy and have not done so today” (Id., p. 
760).  So despite repeated involvement in the policy process, the Claremont III majority 
insisted it was not making policy. 
The dissent in Claremont III recognized the creeping standards.  It noted 
accountability “does not appear in and is not required by any of the court’s Claremont 
decisions” (Id., p. 522).  It concludes “that by deciding the State is required to set 
standards that when applied indicate whether the school districts are providing an 
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adequate education and hold those school districts accountable, the majority moves 
unnecessarily into the province of the legislative and executive branches” (Id., p. 524). 
   
Vincent v. Voight (Wis., 2000) (Vincent). 
The dissent in Vincent v. Voight (2000) also noted creeping standards from the 
Wisconsin high court’s earlier decisions.  The Vincent decision came from a fractured 
court in which three justices supported the new constitutional definition of educational 
adequacy and thought the current education finance system was unconstitutional, three 
justices opposed the new adequacy definition and thought the current system was 
constitutional, and one supported the new adequacy definition and thought the system 
was constitutional.  Justice Prosser dissented in part from the majority “because I am 
unwilling to impose legal standards that did not exist before this decision” (Vincent, p. 
664), and Justice Sykes wrote that the difference between Vincent and previous cases was 
“that this court has never before arrogated to itself, under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation, the power to dictate educational content, character or scope” (Id., p. 682).  
This shift in the constitutional standard can be attributed to the values expressed in an 
earlier education finance case, Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989) (Kukor). 
Although neither Kukor nor Vincent overturned Wisconsin’s education financing 
system, they help reveal the link between beliefs and adequacy.  The 4/3 split in the 
Kukor decision can be reasonably attributed to differing beliefs about children’s 
entitlement, with the majority reflecting an E3 equal entitlement position and the dissent 
supporting an E4 or nearly E5 position resulting in more equal outcomes..  The majority 
stated, “the question of whether [the constitution’s education section] mandates that 
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resources be allocated such as to guarantee that each district operates with sufficient 
resources to assure equality of opportunity for education in the sense of responding to the 
particularized educational needs of each child has not been previously addressed” (Kukor, 
p. 485).    It summarized its position by saying the  
legislature is only required to present an equal opportunity for an 
education to the students.  If the students are not able to take advantage of 
the opportunities, there is no way a change in the formula can force those 
opportunities upon them” (Id., p. 586).   
 
To add emphasis, the majority concluded the constitution “does not require the legislature 
to allocate funds to provide a school system which produces students who are educated to  
a level as nearly uniform as practicable, although the latter may be desirable” (Id., p. 
587).  The dissent explained that “the uniformity clause does not mandate that … 
everyone must score a touchdown; it does mandate that everyone on the playing field 
have an equal opportunity to do so” (Id., p. 588).  For the dissent equal opportunity meant 
funding numerous “special needs programs,” thus “raising the quality of educational 
opportunities for children at the lower end of the spectrum” … “to give these children an 
equal opportunity to become educated citizens” (Id., p. 592). 
To a lesser extent the differences between the majority and dissent in Kukor can also be 
attributed to differences in beliefs about the role of schools in society.  The majority 
declared “our deference would abruptly cease should the legislature determine that it was 
‘impracticable’ to provide to each student a right to attend a public school at which a 
basic education could be obtained” (Id., 582, probably S2).  In contrast, the dissent 
concluded children should be “equipped for their future roles as citizens, participants in 
the political system, and competitors both economically and intellectually” (Id., p. 590, at 
least S3).  In Kukor the dissent lamented “we have never had the occasion to define 
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[equal opportunity for education]” (Id., p. 589), but they retained their seats on the high 
court until Vincent. 
 In Vincent (2000) the court claimed to “affirm Kukor, but explain further the 
Kukor definition of equal opportunity for an education” (Vincent, p. 401).  They did this 
employing “the notion of educational adequacy as a better approach than previous 
educational equality analyses” (Id., p. 406).  Consequently they proposed to consider “the  
Table 19  
Vincent majority opinion matrix 
Category Justice’s decision 
State funding “A school finance system that uniformly funds school districts to provide a basic level 
of education is constitutional” (p. 632). 
Local funding “Wisconsin requires districts to fulfill a constitutional minimum educational offering, 
not a maximum” (p. 633). 
Educability – P “takes into account districts with disproportionate numbers of disabled students, 
economically disadvantaged students, and [ESL] students” (p. 397); “non-uniform 
education can result … from treating differently situated students and school districts 
in the same way” (p. 418);  “equality of resources for school districts and special 
attention to special needs, beyond equality” (p. 427).   
Breadth – 8.5 “proficient in mathematics, science, reading and writing, geography, and history” (p. 
396); “receive instruction in the arts and music, vocational training, social sciences, 
health, physical education and foreign language, in accordance with their age and 
aptitude”(p. 397). 
Level – 5 “proficient” (p. 396). 
172 
Belief Set 
  
R3 – “The state has significantly increased its total state aid to the public schools, and 
the increase in state aid outweighs any disproportionate distribution of tax credit to 
wealthy property owners” (p. 401). 
E4.5 – “The opportunity to be proficient in these core subjects must be as equal as 
practicable; the performance on proficiency tests is not expected to be equal.” (p. 
407). “The objective is to adopt a standard that will ‘equalize outcomes, not merely 
inputs’” (p. 408, citing Enrich, 1995, p. 151). “The new approach emphasizes the 
objective of equalizing student outcomes” (p. 431). 
S4 – “equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed 
economically and personally” (p. 396). 
quality of the educational services delivered to children in disadvantaged districts (Id., p. 
406, citing Enrich, 1995, p. 109), and to list “the types of knowledge that a child should 
possess to guide a legislature in fulfilling its constitutional obligations” (Id., p. 407).  
Essentially they grafted the Kukor dissent’s beliefs about addressing student needs and 
legislative descriptions of curriculum onto the Kukor majority’s decision in favor of a 
basic education.  The result is a new interpretation of the constitutional wording that 
departs significantly from previous interpretations while it better reflects the beliefs of the 
Kukor dissent.  While the Kukor majority specified “to assert that equal opportunity for 
education mandates an entirely different scheme of financing requiring the state to 
distribute resources unequally among students to respond to the particularized needs of 
each student is inconsistent with the intent evidenced in the express language” (Kukor, p. 
579), the Vincent majority said, “An equal opportunity for a sound basic education 
acknowledges that students and districts are not fungible and takes into account districts 
with disproportionate numbers of disabled students, economically disadvantaged 
students, and students with limited English language skills” (Vincent, pp. 397 & 415).  
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Whereas Kukor does not attempt to list the subjects in a basic education, Vincent lifts 
contemporary legislation to constitutional status in creating a list similar to that in Rose 
(1989).  Indeed Justice Bablitch, the dissenting author in Kukor and partially concurring 
in Vincent, says “the standard we adopt today [in Vincent] recalls the standard which I 
urged in my dissent 11 years ago in Kukor” (Id., p. 422). 
Although the Kukor decision did not yield an adequacy model, the differences in 
values and results between it and the Vincent case are apparent.  Kukor evinced a Neutral 
or Liberty bias, arguably an E3 level of entitlement and an S2 role of schools in society.  
The result would be similar to the models of Vance or Wintersheimer above (Figures 15 
and 16).  The dissent in Kukor and the majority in Vincent evinced a strong Progressive 
bias.  They came short of calling for equal outcomes; however, greater equalization of 
outcomes was their goal, thus garnering an E4.5.  The new entitlement to an education 
that will produce economic and personal success describes schools fulfilling role S4.  
While Kukor might have resulted in a model similar to those of Vance or Wintersheimer, 
Vincent yields a model similar to but smaller than that of Campbell I (Figure 17).   In an 
final ironic twist, Chief Justice Abrahamson, who dissented in Kukor and supported the 
new definition of adequacy in Vincent, exclaimed, “If the function of interpreting the 
Wisconsin Constitution were left to the legislature, there would not only be a violation of 
the separation of powers doctrine, but also the legislature would be empowered to amend 
the constitution without abiding by the constitutional requirements for amendments” 
(Vincent, p. 416).  While the constitution remained the same between the Kukor and 
Vincent rulings, Chief Justice Abrahamson helped amend its meaning in Vincent “without 
abiding by the constitutional requirements for amendments.” 
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Leandro v. State (N.C.,1997) (Leandro). 
Although North Carolina’s constitution calls for a “general and uniform system of 
free public schools” rather than an efficient system, the high court’s 1997 decision is very 
much like that in Rose (1989).  In Leandro v. State (N.C., 1997) the court asserts the 
system must have four sufficiencies, and the North Carolina high cited Rose after giving 
its definition.  The value scores are lower than those in Rose.  Because the court 
expresses some comprehension of the large portion of resources North Carolina dedicates 
to its schools, it scores an R3 rather than an R4.  While the Rose court emphasized 
equality in its opinion, the Leandro majority did not, resulting in an E2 entitlement score 
and a liberty bias.  Leandro’s model is similar in contour and height, but modestly 
narrower than the Rose model.  Its value scores and model fall between the Rose majority 
and dissents (Figures 14, 15 and 16). 
The dissent in Leandro argues for equality between districts.  The dissent 
emphasizes that the 1970 constitutional convention added the phrase “wherein equal 
opportunities shall be provided for all students” (cited in Leandro, p. 262).  The dissent 
then goes on to observe that 
the majority apparently gives no significance to its meaning.  Defendants 
contend that the phrase was adopted for the sole purpose of addressing 
racial segregation.  I disagree and believe that the majority fails to give this 
constitutional mandate the full scope of its meaning. (Leandro, p. 262). 
 
The dissent notes the low performance of students from poorer districts as well as 
court cases from the 1800s that bolster the position that to “interpret the phrase ‘equal 
opportunities … for all students’ as equal opportunities for only minority students creates 
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a restrictive definition that the framers could not have intended” (Id., p. 262).  The result 
is an E3 value score and a neutral bias.  
The Leandro majority opinion is modeled in Table 20.  The dissent differs in its 
provision for equality and its bias.  The dissent does not have a separate table, but its 
scores are included in Table 25 and Figure 20. 
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Table 20  
Leandro decision matrix 
Category Justice’s decision 
State funding The constitution “requires that all children have the opportunity for a sound basic 
education” (p. 257). 
Local funding “Because the North Carolina Constitution expressly states that units of local 
governments with financial responsibility for public education may provide additional 
funding to supplement the educational programs provided by the state, there can be 
nothing unconstitutional about their doing so or in any inequality of opportunity 
occurring as a result”  (p. 256). 
Educability – L The constitution “requires that all children have the opportunity for a sound basic 
education, but it does not require that equal educational opportunities be afforded 
students in all of the school districts of the state” (p. 257). 
Breadth - 5 “The right to education provided in the state constitution is a right to a sound basic 
education” (p. 345).  Definition includes reading, writing, and speaking English, 
math, science, social studies, academic and vocational skills. 
Level - 5 Sufficient – “compete on an equal basis with others in further formal education or 
gainful employment in contemporary society” (p. 255) 
Belief Set 
  
R3 – “We note that in every fiscal year since 1969-70, the General Assembly has 
dedicated more than forty percent of its general fund operating appropriations to the 
public primary and secondary schools” and “more than fifty-nine percent of the 
general fund operating appropriations were dedicated to overall public education.” In 
addition, planned reforms “will require additional large appropriations” (p. 260). 
E2 – “does not require substantially equal funding or educational advantages in all 
school districts” (p. 256) 
S3 – “Purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in the society in which 
they live and work is devoid of substance and is constitutionally inadequate” (p. 254). 
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Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (N.Y.,1995, 2001, 2003) (CFE I, CFE II, CFE 
IV). 
The malleability of constitutional education clauses under the steady banging of 
judicial hammers was demonstrated again in New York1.  In the case of School Board of 
Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist (Levittown, 1982) the state 
high court declared “that the present admixture of statutory provisions for State aid to 
local school districts, considered in connection with the existing system for local 
financing, is constitutional” (Levittown, p. 363).  Levittown was fundamentally an equity 
case in which no claim was made “that the facilities or services provided in the school 
districts that they represent fall below the State-wide minimum standard” (Id., p. 363).  
The overriding theme is of judicial restraint in which the court “would be reluctant to 
override those [legislative] decisions by mandating an even higher priority for education 
in the absence, possibly, of gross and glaring inadequacy – something not shown to exist 
in consequence of the present school financing system” (Id., p. 369).  The majority 
concluded “if what is made available by this system (which is what is to be maintained 
and supported) may properly be said to constitute an education, the constitutional 
mandate is satisfied” (Id., p. 369). 
Justice Fuchsberg’s dissent in Levittown forcefully argued high-level beliefs in 
education.  The dissent exclaimed education would help answer “many seemingly 
insoluble societal problems,” and “without education there is no exit from the ghetto, no 
solution to unemployment, no cutting down on crime, no dissipation of intergroup 
tension, no mastery of the age of the computer” (Id., p. 371).  Fuchsberg quoted Horace 
                                                 
1 Note: The New York high court opinion in CFE IV is so dependent upon that of Judge DeGrasse in CFE 
II that both are analyzed.  Thus the study of New York departs from that of other states in that it is not 
based solely on the state’s highest court opinions. 
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Mann with approval in saying “education is not only ‘the great equalizer of men,’ but, by 
alleviating poverty and its societal costs, more than pays for itself” (Id., p. 370).  
Fuchsberg further quoted with approval the Education Committee of an older 
constitutional convention saying education should be “paramount to every other interest 
in this State” (Id., p. 370), and he said children “are entitled to an education that prepares 
today’s students to face the world of today and tomorrow” (Id., p. 375).  Fuchsberg 
displays S5, E4 or E5, and R4 values.  The difference between Fuchsberg and the 
majority is that he wanted the results that accrue to an educated public while the majority 
was certifying the constitutionality of the existing system regardless of results. 
In 1995 a case “virtually identical to that advanced, fully tried and ultimately 
rejected on appeal in Levittown” (Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 1995, p. 664) 
was heard in New York’s highest court as an adequacy pleading rather than an equity 
pleading, on the basis that “the State’s educational financing scheme fails to provide 
public school students in the City of New York … an opportunity to obtain a sound basic 
education” (CFE I, p. 664).  In this decision the court indicated a “sound basic education” 
“should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable 
children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and 
serving on a jury” (Id., p. 666).  The court hedged its bet, however, saying  
we do not attempt to definitively specify what the constitutional concept 
and mandate of a sound basic education entails.  Given the procedural 
posture of this case, an exhaustive discussion and consideration of the 
meaning of a “sound basic education” is premature.  Only after discovery 
and the development of a factual record can this issue be fully evaluated 
and resolved.  Rather, we articulate a template reflecting our judgment of 
what the trier of fact must consider in determining whether defendants 
have met their constitutional obligation.  The trial court will have to 
evaluate whether the children in plaintiffs’ districts are in fact being 
provided the opportunity to acquire the basic literacy, calculating and  
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Table 21  
CFE I majority opinion matrix 
Category Justices’ decision 
State funding “The Education Article imposes a duty on the Legislature to ensure the availability of 
a sound basic education to all children of the State” (p. 665). 
Local funding Some variety permitted, although absolute equality not required, as discussed in 
Levittown 
Educability – L Freedom to spend extra in localities confirmed in Levittown 
Breadth – 3 “We think it beyond cavil that the failure to provide the opportunity to obtain such 
fundamental skills as literacy and the ability to add, subtract and divide numbers 
would constitute a violation of the Education Article” (p. 667). 
Level – 3 “The trial court will have to evaluate whether the children in plaintiffs’ districts are in 
fact being provided the opportunity to acquire the basic literacy, calculating and 
verbal skills necessary to enable them to function as civic participants capable of 
voting and serving as jurors” (p. 666). 
Belief Set 
  
R3 – Default, although described in Levittown 
E2 – “Children are entitled to minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms 
which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn.  Children 
should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, 
chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks.  Children are also entitled to 
minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, 
writing, mathematics, science, and social studies, by sufficient personnel adequately 
trained to teach those subject areas” (p. 666). 
S2 – “function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a 
jury” (p. 666). 
 
180 
verbal skills necessary to enable them to function as civic participants 
capable of voting and serving as jurors. (Id., p. 666-667) 
 
While acknowledging the court’s caveat, the CFE I majority’s description of adequacy is 
modeled above.   The result is similar in values and result to DeRolph I (Table 16). 
The incongruous thing about the adequacy model defined by the court in CFE I is 
its tentativeness.  As the self-proclaimed source of deepest knowledge and absolute truth 
regarding all things constitutional, before whom all other branches of government and 
citizens should yield, the court is saying it needs more information before it can  decide 
what the education article really means.  Necessarily then the meaning of the education 
article depends not upon the plain wording of the constitution or the intent of the framers 
or the existing case law, all available to the court before this case, but upon some 
evidence yet to be presented.  Dissenting Justice Simons noted that “conspicuously 
absent [from the constitution] are descriptive words, establishing a qualitative or 
quantitative standard for the education the State must provide;” “[t]he quality of that 
education was mentioned only in passing, a delegate stating that it should be ‘adequate;’” 
(Id., p. 677).  Justice Simons also noted that in Levittown “we rejected the extensive 
qualitative analysis of the lower courts, holding that the courts were not free to review the 
adequacy of the appropriations, except ‘possibly,’ in the case of ‘gross and glaring 
inadequacy’” (Id., p. 679).  Not able to justify its choice based on traditional reasons, the 
court set itself up to receive new justifications.  In a manner similar to Claremont, 
Edgewood and Vincent, the dissenting position from Levittown became the majority 
opinion in CFE I.  
CFE I concurring Justice Levine fretted “the determination of the adequacy of all 
such educational resources will be made by the Trial Judge in this case” (Id., p. 675).  
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New York County Judge Leland DeGrasse tackled this job with relish.  While explaining 
“the Court of Appeals set forth a ‘template’ to guide this court’s determination,” (CFE II, 
2001, p. 480), he maintained that clearly “the Court of Appeals’ template describes 
qualities above [the requirements to vote or be a juror]” (CFE II, p. 485).  Consequently 
he determined that productive citizenship means being “an engaged, capable voter” with 
the “intellectual tools to evaluate complex issues, such as campaign finance reform, tax 
policy, and global warming” (Id., p. 485).  According to Belfield and Levin 
fundamentally, the DeGrasse ruling articulated standards of a sound basic 
education as productive service on a jury and informed voting at a high 
level of demands.  These two capacities may be representative of a more 
broad idea of ‘civic engagement:’…  In addition, the Court stipulated that 
a sound basic education is one that equips individuals for career jobs, i.e. 
jobs beyond a low grade work with flat lifetime earnings profiles.  This 
definition sets out the social importance of education clearly: jury 
participation and competence for enfranchisement must be established, 
along with the development of human capital to provide both social and 
private returns to productive employment. (2002) 
 
The education article also meant students should be high school graduates who obtained 
good jobs.  Although education in New York City was already very well funded, the trial 
court laid the blame for student failure upon the state.  Student demographics were not an 
acceptable reason for students’ failure.  The state was to blame for their failure. 
The resulting model is comparable to Vincent.  Considering the high cost of 
resources and demographic factors, the input score could be much higher.  What is 
striking is how different CFE II is from CFE I.  Although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to investigate, it might be interesting to know how much local politics affected the 
ruling.  As a local judge DeGrasse had the opportunity to single-handedly bring billions 
of other people’s dollars into the city against their will with only the higher courts to 
stand in his way.   
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Initially the higher court did stand in his way.  In CFE III (2002) the intermediate-
level appeals court reversed DeGrasse’s CFE II decision, declaring “the IAS court went 
too far in stating that a sound basic education must prepare students for employment 
somewhere between low-level service jobs and the most lucrative careers” (CFEIII, p. 8).    
Essentially the CFE III court held that an eight grade education met constitutional muster.  
New York’s high court disagreed with the intermediate court and essentially 
reinstated the original DeGrasse decision in CFE IV (2003, p. 329).  The high court 
determined a high school education was constitutionally required, although they are not 
perfectly clear (Id., p. 331), so the model level was reduced from 7 to 6.  The high court 
did not list courses but called for a “meaningful high school education” (p. 332), so the 
breadth for this model copies CFE II.    The value scores and educability bias are 
identical to CFE II except for the high court’s recognition of competing priorities for 
state money.  In sum, the values, input, and KSA scores of CFE IV are similar but 
slightly lower than those in CFE II. 
Both the majority and the dissent in CFE IV, as well as the foregoing analysis, 
describe the changing meaning of the education article of New York’s constitution.  The 
majority notes that in Levittown the right was initially described as a “sound basic 
education,” which was expanded upon in CFE I.  Based upon mountains of testimony 
that would have come before the legislature in a previous era, CFE II measurably 
expanded the meaning of the education article.  That expansion took the intermediate 
court by surprise in CFE III, but the high court substantially affirmed it in CFE IV. 
The dissent notes that the court approved the existing finance system in 
Levittown, approving the existing distribution of state funds to districts and noting with 
183 
Table 22  
CFE II opinion matrix 
Category Justice’s decision 
State funding “Under the State Constitution the state is ultimately responsible for the delivery of a 
sound basic education, and any failure to do so may not be blamed on the actions of 
its subdivisions BOE or the City” (p. 535). 
Local funding While “New York City is a relatively wealthy district,” (p. 531)  “the State’s method 
for financing education is a substantial cause of the failure to provide New York City 
public school students with the opportunity for sound basic education” (p. 535). 
Educability – P Regarding poverty, race, ethnicity, immigration status, homelessness, teen pregnancy, 
poor health and other special needs the court said, “these negative life experiences can 
be overcome by public schools with sufficient resources well deployed.” “The court 
finds that the City’s at risk children are capable of seizing the opportunity for a sound 
basic education if they are given sufficient resources” (p. 491).  “The court rejects the 
argument that the State is excused from its constitutional obligations when public 
school students present with socio-economic deficits” (p. 517). 
Breadth – 7 Although not listed, some abilities mentioned included analyzing “campaign finance 
reform, tax policy, and global warming,” “DNA evidence, statistical analyses, and 
convoluted financial fraud.”  High school graduates should have “foundational skills” 
for employment and education (p. 484-485) 
Level – 7 “Some middle ground between” “low-level jobs paying the minimum wage” and 
acceptance “into elite four-year colleges” (p. 486).  Discussed students obtaining jobs 
requiring “rigorous formal education” (p. 486). 
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Table 22 (continued) 
CFE II opinion matrix 
Category Justice’s decision 
Belief Set 
  
R4 – The court’s objective was to bring additional state money into one of the best 
funded school systems in the country.  Other state priorities were not a concern. 
E4 – The court’s indicated New York City graduates were entitled to high paying jobs 
in the service sector or work in “New York City’s Silicon Alley” (p. 487). 
S4 – “The labor needs of the City and State must be balanced with the needs of high 
school graduates.” “A sound basic education would give New York City’s high 
school graduates the opportunity to move beyond [low level service jobs]” to obtain 
“jobs that pay a living wage in the service sector” (p. 486). 
 
 
approval the high level of education funding in New York (CFE IV, p. 362).  CFE I 
provided a “template” for adequacy, then the trial court was “left with policy choices to 
make, not factual contentions to resolve” (Id., p. 362).  In CFE II the trial court fashioned 
“‘the constitutional concept and mandate of [what] a sound basic education entails on the 
testimony of competing experts” (Id.).  “The trial court modified the ‘template’ to reflect 
a ‘dynamic’ understanding of the constitutional imperative that must ‘evolve’ with the 
changing demands of a modern world,” and in the process the “template was transmuted 
from a constitutional minimum into ‘the aspirational, largely subjective standards 
expressed by the lower courts and the dissent in Levittown, representing what typically 
one would desire as the outcome of an entire public education process” (Id., p. 363, citing  
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Table 23  
CFE IV opinion matrix 
Category Justices’ decision 
State funding “The State remains responsible when the failures of its agents sabotage the measures 
by which it secures for its citizens their constitutionally-mandated rights” (p. 343). 
Local funding “If the State believes that deficient city tax effort is a significant contributing cause to 
the underfunding of City schools, it is for the State … to consider corrective 
measures” (p. 344). 
Educability – P Quoted with approval CFE II in saying the opportunity for a sound basic education 
must still “‘be placed within reach of all students,’ including those who ‘present with 
socioeconomic deficits’” (p. 337). “Inputs should be calibrated to student need and 
hence that state aid should increase where need is high and local ability to pay is low” 
(p. 348).   
Breadth – 7 “meaningful” (p. 332) 
Level – 6  “The mandate of the Education Article for a sound basic education should not be 
pegged to the eighth or ninth grade, or indeed to any particular grade level” (p. 331). 
A sound basic education “means a meaningful high school education” (p. 337). 
Belief Set 
  
R3 – “In issuing our directive to the State we recognize that it has fiscal governance 
over the entire State and that in a budgetary matter the Legislature must consider that 
any action it takes will directly or indirectly affect its other commitments” (p. 348). 
E4 – Quoted with approval Regents in saying “all children can learn given 
appropriate instructional, social, and health services” (p. 337). 
S4 – “An employment component was implicit in the standard” (p. 330) but “[m]ore 
is required” than the ability to get a job and stay off welfare (p. 331).   “It should not 
be the purpose of public schools to prepare students for [menial low-skills jobs]” (p. 
352, Smith concurring). 
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Levine concurring, CFE I).  If New York City had been a state at the time of CFE IV it 
would have “ranked fifth in per-pupil expenditures; it would rank ninth if spending were 
adjusted for cost-of-living differences” (Id., p. 366), thus financing remained generous 
from Levittown to CFE IV.    
Thus what the majority saw as a positive development of judicial thought, the 
dissent saw as formerly rejected lower court and dissenting opinions becoming the 
majority opinion in later cases.  This study has noted similar creeping in judicial thinking 
in Edgewood, Claremont, Vincent and DeRolph.    
 
Abbott v. Burke (N.J.,1985, 1990) (Abbott I, Abbott II) 
New Jersey’s Abbott v. Burke cases are the among the most famous adequacy 
cases, and they have their roots in Robinson v. Cahill (1973).  Consequently Robinson 
will be examined briefly before the Abbott cases.   
Reading Robinson is a bit like reading a predictable but poorly-written novel.  
Even knowing the outcome in advance, the reader is surprised when the author arrives 
there.  First the court disposes of the federal and state equal protection clauses.  Then  
addressing the education amendment, the court finds its roots in an 1871 statute that  
provided for free schools and said in part that “if the moneys received by any township 
from the tax imposed by this act shall not be sufficient to maintain free schools for at 
least nine months each year, then the inhabitants thereof shall raise, by township tax, 
such additional money as they may need for that purpose” (Sec 1, p. 94 cited in 
Robinson, p. 291, emphasis added).  After noting that there “appears to be no helpful 
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history spelling out the intended impact of this [1875 constitutional] amendment” the 
court declares 
we can be sure the amendment was intended to embody the principle of 
the 1871 statute that public education for children shall be free.  It is also 
plain that the ultimate responsibility for a thorough and efficient education 
was imposed upon the State.” (Id.) 
 
The court then cites a series of cases affirming that “it is the duty of the [State] 
Commissioner [of Education] to see to it that every district provides a thorough and  
efficient school system (Board of Education of the City of Elizabeth v. Elizabeth, 55 N.J. 
501, 506, 262 A.2d 881, 883 (1970) cited in Robinson, p. 292).  They also specify  
we cannot say that the amendment of 1875 was intended to bar the 
delegation of the taxing responsibility to local government.  We know that 
with respect to the cost of providing the schoolhouse itself, the 1871 
statute left the burden with local government and that burden continued 
there after the 1875 amendment.  (Id., emphasis added) 
 
Finally they confirm “our Constitution was amended in 1958 in terms which did assume 
that fiscal responsibility was properly reposed in the local school district” (Id., p. 294). 
Having thus established a legal and constitutional basis that the free public 
schools would feature local responsibility for funding, local responsibility for capital 
expenses, disparate local funding and quality, and the State’s power to ensure local 
districts maintained thorough and efficient schools, the court declares “we do not doubt 
that an equal educational opportunity for children was precisely in mind” (Id., p. 294), 
and if a school system is not thorough and efficient  
whatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the State’s to rectify 
it.  If local government fails, the State government must compel it to act, 
and if the local government cannot carry the burden, the State must itself 
meet its continuing obligation (Id) 
 
The court then declared its vision for the school system. 
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Indeed the State has never spelled out the content of the educational 
opportunity the Constitution requires.  Without some such prescription, it 
is even more difficult to understand how the tax burden can be left to local 
initiative with any hope that statewide equality of educational opportunity 
will emerge. (Id., p. 295) 
 
The State’s obligation includes as well the capital expenditures without 
which the required educational opportunity could not be provided. (Id., p. 
297) 
 
The trial court found the constitutional demand had not been met and did 
so on the basis of discrepancies in dollar input per pupil  We agree.  We 
deal with the problem in those terms because dollar input is plainly 
relevant and because we have been shown no other viable criterion for 
measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate. (Id.) 
 
Today a system of public education which did not offer high school 
education would hardly be thorough and efficient.  The constitution’s 
guarantee must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity 
which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as 
a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market. (Id., p. 295) 
 
Robinson I may be summarized this way.  First, where localities had been responsible for 
raising money to provide adequate schools in the past, that responsibility was now the 
state’s.  Second, even though there was no definition of quality, the state had not met it.  
The Abbott II court commented 
in Robinson I there was no showing that any district failed to achieve a 
thorough and efficient education.  Rather, it was the absence of 
substantive educational proofs – a measure to assess whether the 
constitutional command was being met – that led the Court to declare the 
statute unconstitutional in its entirety (1990, p. 376-377).   
 
Third, even though prior law required local capital funding, the court directed state 
funding of capital needs.  Finally, even though prior law provided for different levels of 
local funding and school quality, the court insisted upon equal funding.  In the end, 
it is reasonable to label the court’s construction of the century-old 
thorough and efficient clause an intuitive judgment.  Certainly nothing in 
the literal language of the clause mandates equating “equal opportunity” 
with thorough and efficient. (Notes, 1977, p. 514) 
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Litigation related to Robinson continued until 1976 after the legislature enacted the 
Public School Education Act of 1975 in response to the court’s order to redistribute state 
aid funds in accordance with the court’s wishes (Notes, 1977, p. 515). 
Although the court certified the constitutionality of the Public School Education 
Act of 1975, they did so with the proviso that if they didn’t like how it worked after a 
while, they would become involved again.  The 1975 Act defined the goals of a thorough 
and efficient education, which the court said, “satisfies the constitutional requirement for 
legislative standards” (Abbott II, 1990).  In Abbot v. Burke (Abbott I, 1985) the court 
ordered litigants and the state to other forums.  The Commissioner of Education found 
that the statutory system was constitutional so the plaintiffs returned to the state high 
court in Abbott II (1990).  The court in Abbott II explained the “change in focus from the 
dollar disparity in Robinson I to substantive educational content in Robinson V is clear” 
(Id., p. 369), thus foreshadowing similar transformations in other courts. 
“Indeed, while the [Public School Education Act of 1975] statute was sustained as 
facially constitutional, the doubts and qualifications expressed by some members of the 
Court suggested the inevitability of the litigation [in Abbott II]” (Id., p. 369).  By way of 
comparison, just as New York’s high court set itself up for further involvement in 
defining adequacy in CFE I, so New Jersey’s high court set itself up in Robinson.  Like 
the New York high court in CFE I, the New Jersey high court explained, “our decision in 
Robinson I was necessarily general because of the narrow record in that case” (Id.).  Both 
courts were unable to define adequacy with the traditional tools of the court, i.e. 
constitutional language, precedent, and history.  The ability to define adequacy did not 
reside in the high courts of either state, and they had to look outside to define it. 
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Abbott II is the culmination of the court’s thinking up to that time, but the 
evolution of that thought is not broken out here.  The New Jersey high court’s social 
agenda was plainly displayed in Abbott II (1990), and it shaped its definition of adequacy.  
As a result of the litigation it did not declare the entire system unconstitutional.  In fact it 
maintained that for the vast majority of districts there was no evidence that the system 
was unconstitutional.  The court was concerned with the plight of children in 29 poorer 
urban districts plagued by crime, disease, drug addition, teenage pregnancy and 
unemployment (Id., p. 392).  “These are districts where not only the students and 
education are failing, these are the districts where society is failing” (Id., p. 387).  The 
court was concerned with children in these districts, explaining that “without an effective 
education they are likely to remained enveloped in this environment” (Id.).  The danger 
the court perceived was that this 
substantial segment of our population is isolated in a separate culture, in a 
society that they see as rich and poor, for to the urban poor, all other classes 
are rich.  There is despair, and sometimes bitterness and hostility.  The fact 
that a large part of our society is disintegrating cannot help but affect the 
rest.  Everyone’s future is at stake, and not just the poor’s. (Id., p. 393)  
 
The high court declared the constitutional education clause “will enable the urban poor to 
compete in the marketplace, to take their fair share of leadership and professional 
positions” (Id., p. 392).  The court’s goal was to use education to break the cycle of 
poverty so that children from poor families could enter the upper middle classes along 
with children from wealthier backgrounds.  In theory this would reduce the friction of 
social stratification, resulting in a happier and more stable society.  These ideas are not 
new.  In fact, Tyack noted 
WASP citizens found it more feasible to shift the burden of reform to the 
next generation, to define problems as educational rather than as injustices 
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or evils calling for immediate action.  In the process conflicts arising from 
differences of class, race, gender ethnicity, and religion became defused 
and postponed” (Tyack, 1982, p. 32). 
 
“Reforming the public schools has long been a favorite way of improving 
not just education, but society” (Tyack & Cuban, 1995, p. 1). 
 
These are laudable goals; however, they are heavy burdens for an entire well-developed 
and efficiently functioning social welfare system to bear.  By shoehorning these goals 
into the “thorough and efficient” education clause of the constitution the court avoided 
public debate on and taxpayer consent to their lofty social agenda. 
The court’s beliefs about education come through the opinion as clearly as the 
social agenda.  In regard to resources the court announced,  
the need is great and the money is there.  We are the second richest state in 
the nation.  Therefore, while the relatively high level of our expenditures 
must give us pause, it must also be viewed in the light of our needs and 
our wealth. (Id., p. 393-394) 
 
At the same time the court was not quite as dogmatic as the Wyoming court about 
resources, explaining “we are also aware of the fact that the increased funding may 
constitute a heavy burden for the State to adjust to” (Id., p. 389).  Consequently, the court 
allowed a phase in period, thus justifying a resource score of  3.5.   
The court’s goal was to raise students from poor urban districts into society with 
their peers from affluent suburbs.  The court maintained that students from poor urban 
districts “require above-average access to education resources” (Id., p. 402).  To  
achieve the constitutional standard for the student from these poorer urban 
districts – the ability to function in that society entered by their relatively 
advantaged peers – the totality of the districts’ educational offering must 
contain elements over and above those found in the affluent suburban 
district.” (Id., p. 402) 
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Thus the children of the poor were entitled to the same outcomes from education as their 
wealthier peers, E5, and they were entitled to extra resources, above those provided to 
their wealthier peers, in order to raise them to a higher social plane.  Plainly the court 
wanted to use schools to decrease social inequity, S5.  The court announced, “that part of 
the constitutional standard requiring an education that will enable the urban poor to 
compete in the marketplace, to take their fair share of leadership and professional 
positions, assumes a new significance” (Id., p. 412).  The New Jersey court’s beliefs 
about school’s role in society exceeds those of all other courts.  The model’s dimensions 
follow the court’s beliefs.  The Abbott II decision is clearly the most progressive opinion 
examined here.   
The state education standards, “instruction intended to produce the attainment of 
reasonable levels of proficiency in the basic communications and computational skills” as 
well as “a breadth of program offerings designed to develop the individual talents and 
abilities of pupils” (N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-5 cited in Abbott II, p. 390), could be scored like 
the Rose (1990) standards.  However, in considering the programs available in the richer 
districts the court was trying to recreate, they noted advanced placement courses and 
courses in computers, science, social studies, foreign language, music programs, art 
programs, industrial arts, vocational and physical education (pp. 395-398).  Assuming 
they intended these courses for the poorer districts, they score a 10 for breadth.  Although 
the level of achievement since Robinson I had been high school graduation, Abbott II 
looked beyond graduation.  The judges wanted children from poor districts to mingle 
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Table 24  
Abbott II opinion matrix 
Category Justices’ decision 
State funding “Funding cannot be allowed to depend on the ability of local school districts to tax” (p. 
363). 
Local funding “The social and economic pressures on municipalities, school districts, public officials, 
and citizens of these disaster areas – many poorer urban districts – are so severe that tax 
increases … are almost unthinkable” ; “municipal overburden … prevents districts from 
raising substantially more money for education” (p. 394).  
Educability – P “The level of funding must be adequate to provide for the special educational needs of 
these poorer urban districts in order to redress their extreme disadvantages” (p. 363);  “The 
State’s obligation to attain that minimum is absolute – any district that fails must be 
compelled to comply” (p. 369); “some districts may exceed [the minimum]” (p. 369); 
“students of low [SES] are just as capable, just as bright and industrious as those of higher 
SES, but that their [SES] has overwhelmed their native talents” (p. 385); “We have 
decided this case on the premise that the children of poorer urban districts are as capable 
as all others; that their deficiencies stem from their [SES]; and that through effective 
education and changes in that [SES], they can perform as well as others” (p. 385-386).  
Breadth – 10 “Virtually every subject that ties a child, particularly a child with academic problems, to 
school – of art, music, drama, athletics, even, to a very substantial degree, of science and 
social studies” (p. 398); “However articulated, such a requirement must encompass more 
than ‘instruction … in the basic communications and computational skill,’ which the 
statute cites as another major element in education” (p. 398). 
Level – 7 “requirement of a specific substantive level of education” (p. 368); high school education.  
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Table 24 (continued) 
Abbott II opinion matrix 
Category Justices’ decision 
Belief Set 
  
R3.5 – “Such funding must be guaranteed and mandated by the state” (p. 363); “we 
recognized that the State not only had the power to spend in excess of the norm in view of the 
presumed greater needs of such [poorer] students, but that it might be required to do so” p. 
371, emphasis in original); “we view the State’s constitutional obligation to provide a 
thorough and efficient education as not adequately satisfied if dependent on federal aid” (p. 
381); “Funding must be certain every year” (p. 408).  
E5 – “It is a level that all must attain” (p. 368, emphasis in original); “the Constitution indeed 
requires that poor children be able to compete with the rich” (p. 375); “the education needed 
to equip the [poor] students for their roles as citizens and workers exceeds that needed by 
[rich] students (p. 375); “in poorer urban districts something more must be added to the 
regular education in order to achieve the command of the Constitution” (p. 403). 
S5 – “Poorer disadvantaged students must be given the chance to be able to compete with 
relatively advantaged students” (p. 372); “to what extent does the requirement of thorough 
and efficient education impose on the schools the responsibility to account for and attempt to 
remedy the problems students bring with them to schools, intractable problems, problems 
never dreamed of in the past as being within the schools’ responsibility, problems created not 
by the schools but by society?” (p. 375); “The goal is to motivate them, to wipe out their 
disadvantages as much as a school district can, and to give them an educational opportunity 
that will enable them to use their innate ability” (p. 400);  “The nation has come to recognize 
the education of the urban poor as a most difficult and important problem” (p. 401); 
something is needed that deals “with the environment that shapes these students’ lives and 
determines their educational needs” (p. 401); students from poorer districts “have not been 
able to achieve any level of equality in that society with their peers from the affluent 
suburban districts” (p. 408). 
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 in the social classes with children from affluent districts and to take “their fair share of 
leadership and professional positions” (Id., p. 412).  This is at least as ambitious as the 
Campbell standard of all students being able to enter the University of Wyoming, and it is 
scored the same at 9. 
The resulting model reflects the court’s ambition, although like other models it 
may be difficult to pin the court down on any specific definition of adequacy.  New 
Jersey’s high court offered the explanation that “embedded in the constitutional provision 
itself, at least in its construction thus far by this Court, are various objectives and 
permissible outcomes – equality, uniformity, diversity, and disparity – that may require, 
if they are to be allowed, a continued general definition of the constitutional mandate” 
(Id., p. 367).  The model is most like that for Campbell, although for Abbott II the lowest 
quintile received 20 additional points, rather than the 10 attributed to the previous 
models, and 10 points to the upper quintile as well.  The court directed that poorer urban 
districts receive the same state funding as the richest districts, plus categorical aid, plus 
federal assistance.  This seems to better reflect the additional resources the court hoped to 
direct toward these poorer urban districts. Some additional achievement was added to the 
last quintile to account for higher spending in the wealthier districts. 
 
Summary of modeled cases 
 
The table and chart below illustrate the relationship between judicial beliefs and 
adequacy remedies.  Although the numbers are simply qualitative scoring of the language 
used in the opinions, the correlation between judicial values and the hypothetical inputs 
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and KSA outputs seems consistent across the cases.  Judges who showed higher belief 
scores tended to order more comprehensive adequacy remedies. 
 
Table 25 
All cases and scores 
Case  Belief Score Input Score Model Volume 
Rose (1989) 
Majority  
 
R4, E2, S3 
24 
B6, H5, L  
4,940 
40632 
Rose (1989) 
Wintersheimer Concur 
R3, E2, S2 
12 
B3, H3, L 
1,664 
12,190 
Rose (1989) 
Vance Dissent 
R3, E2, S2 
12 
B3, H3, N 
1,404 
11,862 
Campbell I R4, E4.5, S4.5 
81 
B10, H9, P 
14,300 
104,602 
Hunt (1993) R3, E3, S3 
27 
B7, L6, N 
6,552 
46,130 
DeRolph I (1997) R3, E2, S2 
12 
B3, H3, L 
1,664 
12,190 
DeRolph II (2000) R4, E3.5, S3 
42 
B6, H6, N 
6,126 
41,202 
Claremont II (1997) R3, E3, S3 
27 
B6, H5, L  
4,940 
40632 
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Table 25 (continued) 
All cases and scores 
Case  Belief Score Input Score Model Volume 
Vincent (2000) R3, E4.5, S4 
54 
B8.5, H5, P 
7150 
58,871 
Leandro (1997) R3, E2, S3 
18 
B5, L5, L 
4160 
33,860 
 
Leandro dissent (1997) R3, E3, S3 
27 
B5, L5, N 
3900 
32,950 
CFE I (1995) R3, E2, S2 
12 
B3, L3, L 
1664 
12,190 
 
CFE II (2001) R4, E4, S4 
64 
B7, L7, P 
8164 
48,482 
CFE IV (2003) R3, E4, S4 
48 
B7, L6, P 
7,072 
41,556 
Abbott II (1990) R3.5, E5, S5 
87.5 
B10, L9, P 
14,840 
104,648 
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Figure 20: Relationship of  beliefs to input and KSAs 
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Cases examined but not modeled 
Many education finance cases did not lend themselves to analysis according to the 
adequacy model or the value scales discussed above.  Some were equity cases, where the 
central dispute was the difference in resources available to different districts.  Some were 
adequacy cases that did not develop an adequacy standard.  Some were cases where the 
existing system was upheld, and some reflected unique state concerns.  They are 
discussed briefly here. 
 
Edgewood v. Kirby (Tex.,1989, 1991, 1992, 1995) (Edgewood I, II, III, IV). 
Texas’s Edgewood cases illustrate creeping judicial opinions in much the same 
way as some of the cases above.  In the case of Edgewood v. Kirby (1989) the Texas 
court did not indicate any opinions not firmly based in the constitution and state history, 
nor did it proffer an adequacy remedy, and so the case is not analyzable in this paper.  
Edgewood I was strictly an equity case calling for equal funding for equal tax effort 
across the state.  Its successors became increasingly divided and contentious.   
In Edgewood II (1991) the court struck down as unconstitutional an education 
finance plan that continued to rely upon property tax and equalized the lower 95% of 
districts rather than all the districts.  The court offers opinions about how the legislature 
could meet the court’s constitutional demands, which a concurring judge described as 
“social policy preferences” (Edgewood II, p. 501).  In response the legislature passed a 
bill enacting the proffered judicial desires, which the court struck down in Carrollton-
Farmers Branch Independent School District v. Edgewood Independent School District 
(Edgewood III, 1992).    
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In Edgewood III dissenting Justice Cornyn recommended that “the court discard 
its collective mask of inscrutability and describe the basic elements of an efficient system 
of public education in Texas” (Edgewood III, p. 526).  In this he calls for a definition of a 
“minimally adequate education” (perhaps S2) and says that the “state must fund remedial 
instruction and programs, triggered by substandard performance, to bring [ESL and 
learning disabled children] up to the legislatively articulated standard” (Id., p. 527), 
arguably an S5.  He offers no opinion about resources and loosely advocates standards 
similar to those from Rose (1989).  Justice Cornyn’s “bold adventure in revisionism of 
this court’s unanimous writing in Edgewood I” (Id., p. 570), replacing the existing input-
based equity model with an output-based adequacy model, was received either coldly or 
contemptuously by his peers and will not be reviewed here. 
Justice Cornyn, the bold adventurer of Edgewood III, became the author of 
Edgewood IV.  Consequently, the one-justice opinion written by Cornyn in Edgewood III, 
“which advocated a standard very different from the one set out in Edgewood I, has now 
been adopted by a majority of this Court” (Justice Spector dissenting, Edgewood IV, p. 
767).  While the question addressed in the earlier cases dealt with the efficiency of a 
system with disparities in revenue raising ability of 700:1, the answer in Edgewood IV 
was that the system distributed money fairly enough and that the accountability regime 
met “the Legislature’s constitutional obligation to provide for a general diffusion of 
knowledge statewide” (Edgewood IV, p. 730).  Thus Cornyn declared the legislative 
goals to be the constitutional standards.  Justice Spector observed 
all of this will come as a surprise to the litigants.  The ‘general diffusion of 
knowledge’ requirement has never been a part of this case.” (Id., p. 768)  
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Even though none of the litigants argued based on the general diffusion of knowledge, 
“on its own initiative, the majority simply seizes upon these four words: equates them 
with accreditation requirements; and decides that our constitution requires no more” (Id.).  
That is not to say that the requirements are stable, since the majority notes “the State’s 
provision for a general diffusion of knowledge must reflect changing times, needs, and 
public expectations” (Id., p. 732, see CFE and Abbott above).  The majority then quotes 
Edgewood I to say that while a general diffusion of knowledge is not precise, it does 
“provide a standard by which this court must, when called upon to do so, measure the 
constitutionality of the legislatures actions” (Id., p. 736).  It then quotes a different case 
saying “the word ‘suitable’ used in connection with the word ‘provision’ in this section of 
the Constitution, is an elastic term, depending upon the necessities of changing times or 
conditions, and clearly leaves to the Legislature the right to determine what is suitable, 
and its determination will not be reviewed by the courts if the act has a real relation to the 
subject and object of the Constitution” (Id., p. 736).  Dissenting Justice Spector observed  
today’s departure from the strict Edgewood I standard will mire the 
judiciary in deciding purely political questions.  Even if we could speak 
coherently on such issues, addressing them at all is inconsistent with the 
proper role of the judiciary. (Id., 768). 
 
      From reading the Edgewood decisions it is difficult to know the true meaning of the 
provisions of the Texas constitution.  This is not just true of the constitution’s education 
and equal protection language, but of other sections as well.  As seemed true in other 
serial cases, the meaning seemed to shift with the membership of the high court. 
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Brigham v. State of Vermont (Vt.,1997) (Brigham). 
The case of Brigham v. State of Vermont (1997) is strictly an equity case.  The 
“plaintiffs here have not alleged that public education in Vermont is fundamentally 
inadequate or fails to impart minimal basic skills” (p. 387).  The court expounds upon the 
co-location of provisions for civic virtue and education in the constitution as evidence of 
education’s fundamental importance.  The court denied that “the gross inequities in 
educational opportunities evident from the record” and conceded by the state have “a 
legitimate governmental purpose” or were “necessary to foster local control” (p. 396).  
Ultimately absolute equal funding was not required, only “substantially equal opportunity 
to have access to similar educational revenues” (p. 397).  The justices rely on history to 
bolster their argument, and they leave “the specific means of discharging this broadly 
defined duty” to the legislature, so neither judicial values nor the adequacy remedy are 
available for study. 
 
Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State (Mont., 1990) (Helena). 
Montana’s constitution states, “Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed 
to each person of the state.” (cited in Helena, 1990, p. 698).  Helena is an equity case 
which is unsuited to analysis in this study.  Like the court in Lake View below, the court 
denied separation of powers applies to education finance questions.   
The guarantee provision of subsection (1) is not limited to any one branch 
of government.  Clearly the guarantee of equal educational opportunity is 
binding upon all three branches of government, the legislative as well as 
the executive and judicial branches. (Helena, 1990, pp. 689-690) 
 
Thus the Montana high court declared itself co-equal in policy-making with the 
legislative and executive branches of government.   
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Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter (Tenn.,1993) (McWherter). 
Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter (Tenn., 1993) is also an equity 
case.  Although the court asserts the “certain conclusion is that [Tennessee’s constitution] 
guarantees to the school children of this state the right to a free public education” 
(McWherter, p. 152), the court does not define the parameters of that education.  Also, 
although the court quotes a delegate to the 1978 convention saying the delegates’ intent 
was to “leave the legislature free to act as conditions and circumstances change, to 
provide the necessary types of programs across the State that the people need and to fund 
it in a way that was feasible at that particular time” (Id., p. 151), the court separates the 
legislature’s freedom to define the education programs from its freedom to fund those 
programs.  It then confirms “that the disparities in educational opportunities available to 
public school students throughout the state, found to be constitutionally impermissible, 
have been caused principally by the statutory funding scheme, which, therefore, violates 
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection” (Id., p. 156).  No further analysis is 
possible using the models from this paper. 
 
Bismark School District v. State (N.D.,1994) (Bismark). 
In the case of Bismark School District v. State (N.D., 1994) the majority was not 
sufficiently large to overturn the state education finance system, and the majority treated 
it fundamentally as an equity case.  The majority opined “relative differences in funding 
significantly interfere with some children’s right to an education” (Bismark, p. 261), and 
their listing of different pupil-teacher ratios in different districts shows their thinking was 
input oriented.  Furthermore, the majority did not “define what level of funding equality 
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is mandated under its requirement” nor did it provide “a blueprint for constructing a new 
system” (Bismark dissent, p. 275), making analysis for this paper impossible. 
Ironically, Sandstrom’s dissent in the Bismark School District case was an 
adequacy defense of North Dakota’s education finance system.  Sandstrom noted that “all 
public schools in North Dakota, including those in the plaintiff districts, currently meet 
the statutory curriculum requirements,” and all public secondary schools and all but one 
public elementary school “currently are accredited” (Id., p. 269-270).  Furthermore, 
Sandstrom asserts “student output is the appropriate measure of education quality,” and 
test results show “North Dakota students on an average scored higher than the national 
average on all CTBS subtests at all grade levels” and they “achieved the top scores in the 
United States on the 1990 NAEP eighth grade mathematics assessment” (Id., p. 270).  He 
concludes “contrary to the plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence, differences in district funding 
do not have an effect on student learning as measured by standardized tests” (Id., p. 270).  
So while the majority in the Bismark School District case used an input model of equity, 
the dissent used an output adequacy model. 
 
Skeen v. State (Minn.,1993) (Skeen). 
In Skeen v. State (1993) Minnesota’s high court described a relatively progressive 
education finance system that provided extra funding for “at risk” students and in which 
“all plaintiff districts met or exceeded the educational requirements of the state” (Skeen, 
pp. 302-303).  The disputed discretionary funding was approximately 7% of total 
education spending.  The court concluded that since all districts were adequately 
educating their students, the remaining discretionary funding was rationally related to the 
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state’s interest in increasing education funding.  Their belief scores help explain the 
difference between the majority and the dissent. 
The court noted that “in the absence of glaring disparities” education finance 
policy was a legislative matter (Id., p. 318), indicating an E3 entitlement value.  The 
majority also explained that  
‘adequacy’ as used here refers not to some minimal floor but to the 
measure of the need that must be met.  In this case, where the funding is 
‘more than adequate,’ such a system satisfies the constitutional 
requirement. (Id., p. 318) 
 
Taken together, these sentences indicate an E4 entitlement belief, probably an S3.5 role 
of school in society.  The court did not address resources. 
The dissent in Skeen approached education finance with somewhat different 
values.  While emphasizing the importance of equal educational opportunities for all 
children, the dissent says  
while the state has a compelling interest in providing extra funding for 
districts with a large concentration of low income students, for districts 
with sparse populations, for desegregation expenses, or for complying 
with the Americans with Disabilities Act, no compelling interest exists for 
creating disparities in educational opportunities which are based solely on 
a school district’s wealth.  
 
Giving any child an advantage over others because of the wealth of the 
school district in which he or she lives denies children who do not live in 
such districts the opportunity to prepare for the future on equal footing.  It 
harms the state generally by creating a disparity in the relative abilities of 
children educated in our schools.  Indeed, this disparity in the opportunity 
to learn ensures that the disparity in wealth will continue into the future. 
 
I read this [constitutional] language to say that the education of all 
children is paramount, and that the education system and its funding must 
provide equal opportunity for all children. 
 
The court’s decision today ensures that some of our children will be less 
prepared than others for the difficult issues of the future. (Id., p. 322-323) 
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These statements indicate a stronger emphasis on equality, leaning toward equalizing 
outcomes, and the emphasis on the “paramount” importance of education could be 
construed to rate a higher resources score.  These attitudes are similar to those shown in 
Campbell and Abbott II.  Although not definitive, the dissent rates perhaps an E4.5, an 
S4.5, and an R3.5.  While allowing a little liberty for districts who chose to increase their 
education funding did not offend the majority in Skeen, it seemed to offend the dissent’s 
egalitarian notions of school as an equalizing and homogenizing influence in society 
helping to reduce “disparities in wealth.”  Once again, given identical evidence and 
similar training, the difference between the majority and the dissent was rooted in their 
beliefs about resources, student entitlement and school’s role in society.     
  
Idaho Schools for Equal Opportunity v. State (Idaho,1992) (ISEO). 
The justices in the case of Idaho Schools for Equal Opportunity v. State (1992) 
declared the state education system constitutional despite disparities in funding.  The 
majority concluded that a uniform system meant “only uniformity in curriculum, not 
uniformity in funding” (ISEO, p. 731), and they declared that the current law defined a 
thorough system.  The concurring and dissenting opinions did not support the idea that 
current law equaled the constitutional standard of thoroughness because of potential 
problems in the future and the risk inherent in allowing another branch of government to 
interpret the constitution.  The Idaho court used the rational basis test rather than a higher 
level of scrutiny in examining the state school finance system.  Overall the opinion did 
not define an adequate education system in a way that could be modeled, nor did it 
express judicial values about education that could be measured. 
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The one exception in Idaho Schools for Equal Opportunity v. State (1992) was in 
McDevitt’s separate concurring/dissenting opinion.  McDevitt quoted Thompson v. 
Engelking96 Idaho793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975) quoting the constitution’s framers in saying 
the state must merely teach the children the three R’s, but noted that today that could not 
“be given its literal meaning.  There is, at least in the context of our present society, more 
inherent in a thorough system of education than instruction in the three ‘R’s’” (ISEO, p. 
740, emphasis in original).  Thus McDevitt was echoing the Idaho court’s conviction that 
the breadth of a thorough education exceeded the three “R’s,” but he did not elaborate on 
that conviction besides noting the demands of modern life.  This is only one dimension of 
the adequacy model.  
Coincidentally, the majority in Idaho and the dissent in DeRolph used similar 
lines of argument regarding constitutional guarantees.  The Idaho majority noted that 
their constitution “provides that the government should promote temperance and 
morality; however, this section does not create a positive right to the enjoyment of the 
same” (ISEO, p. 733).  In DeRolph II  (2000) dissenting Justice Cook cites an article by 
Professor David Mayer in the Toledo Blade (September 12, 1998), which asks  
that we imagine the federal courts declaring the military budget 
unconstitutional based on the “common defense provision.”  This is 
implausible enough, Mayer notes, but would the United States Supreme 
Court then order Congress to prioritize a certain defense system above all 
other national budgetary concerns and give Congress a year to allocate 
sufficient funds? (p. 1036)   
 
Their logic is similar.  It is absurd to imagine the state courts forcing legislatures to 
guarantee public morality, just as it is absurd to imagine the Supreme Court directing 
military spending.  This is not to say that the courts don’t find strong morality and 
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national defense desirable.  In the American scheme of government, it has been the 
legislatures’ job to provide and control funds for those purposes. 
 
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education (Mass.,1993) 
(McDuffy). 
Although cited as important (Thro, 1994), the case of McDuffy v. Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Education (1993) cannot be analyzed for this paper.  This case 
discusses the history of education in Massachusetts extensively; however, only the role of 
schools in society (S2) can be discerned.  The justices note that schools exist “not only to 
serve the interests of the children, but, more fundamentally, to prepare them to participate 
as free citizens of a free State to meet the needs and interests of a republican government” 
(McDuffy, p. 606), and that is based soundly in history and the founder’s writings.  The 
judges offer no opinion regarding student entitlements or resource usage.  Ironically, they 
then declare “the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court of Kentucky fairly reflect our 
view of the matter and are consistent with the judicial pronouncements found in other 
decisions” (Id., p. 618), although the connection between republican government and 
“self-knowledge,” “grounding in the arts,” “preparation for advanced training” (Id., p. 
618) is not explained.  The seventh criteria from the Rose decision, “sufficient level of 
academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with 
their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market” suits an S3 
rather than an S2 role of school in society ranking. 
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Lake View School District No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee (Ark., 2002) 
(Lake View). 
In the case of Lake View School District No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee 
(2002) the court ruled the state education financing system unconstitutionally inadequate 
and inequitable; however, it did not define an adequate education or a constitutional 
finance system.  For example, even though the court noted “that there is more than a 25% 
difference between the 5th and 95th percentile in amount spent per pupil” (Lake View, p. 
482) and less than a 25% difference in revenue per pupil, the court did not define what 
percentage of difference would meet constitutional muster.  Even though lower courts 
twice used the standards from Kentucky’s Rose (1989) as a guide, the concurrence 
affirmed that “it appears doubtful to me that the framers of our constitution had a 
definition of ‘efficient’ in mind similar to that set out in Rose’” (Lake View III, p. 515).   
This judicial restraint is somewhat surprising since the court declared itself co-
equal with the legislative and executive branches in setting educational policy.  Based on 
historical changes in constitutional language which gave responsibility for education to 
the State rather than the General Assembly, the court declared “the people of the state 
unquestionably wanted all departments of state government to be responsible for 
providing a general, suitable, and efficient system of public education” (Id., p. 484).  
Justice Doggett observed “to some there is a certain allure to the notion of this [Texas] 
court working hand-in-hand with the Legislature as different drafts are submitted for 
review,” with the result that  
Texans excluded from the joint legislative and judicial decision-making 
process would be denied all opportunity for unbiased judicial review of 
legislative conduct.  Judges would become mere appendages to other 
branches of government. (Edgewood II, p. 505) 
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Although the Arkansas court did not define adequacy in Lake View III, it did 
indicate some beliefs.  Statements, including “that education has been of paramount 
concern to the citizens of this state since the state’s inception is beyond dispute” (Lake 
View, p. 492) and “the State, in the budgeting process, continues to treat education 
without the priority and the preference that the constitution demands” (Id., p. 495), 
indicate an R3 or R4 resource belief.  The statement “however, Amendment 74 [allowing 
districts the discretion to enhance local spending] does not authorize a system of school 
funding that fails to close the gap between wealthy school districts with premier 
educational programs and poor school districts” (Id., p. 499) indicates an E3 entitlement 
belief.  A concurring opinion indicated “that bare and minimal sufficiency does not 
satisfy the requirements of a suitable public school system” (Id., p. 517), confirming the 
E3 entitlement belief and indicating an S3 role for schools in society belief.  The ability 
of localities to spend more was provided by constitutional amendment.  Since Arkansas’ 
education system was arguably one of the worst in the country, the court seemed 
concerned with raising funding for the poorest districts, but not to address varying 
educability.  The poor condition of the education funding system relative to other states 
and the judicial beliefs are similar to conditions and beliefs in Kentucky and Alabama. 
 
Sheff v. O’Neill (Conn.,1996) (Sheff). 
Connecticut’s equity case, Horton v. Meskill (1977), occurred before the third 
wave of education finance cases, but it helped set the stage for a unique adequacy case, 
Sheff v. O’Neill(1996).  By the time of Sheff education funding was uniform across 
Connecticut; however, there was a large concentration of minority children in Hartford, 
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even though the state had not “intentionally segregated racial and ethnic minorities in the 
Hartford public school system” (Sheff, p. 1274).  Responding to an argument similar to 
the one rejected by New York’s high court in CFE I (1995, p. 669), the high court 
combined the constitution’s education and equal protection clauses to determine that 
racial segregation denied children an adequate education. 
The failure adequately to address the racial and ethnic disparities that exist 
among the state’s public school districts is not different in kind from the 
legislature’s failure adequately to address the ‘great disparity in the ability 
of local communities to finance local education’ that made the statutory 
scheme at issue in [Horton] unconstitutional in its application. (Sheff, p. 
1278) 
 
The dissent in Sheff was scathing.  Since the remedy of equal distribution of ethnic 
groups in all schools is completely outside the theoretical framework for this paper, Sheff 
will not be modeled. 
 
Abbeville County School District v. State (S.C.,1999) (Abbeville). 
The high court in South Carolina seemed to create constitutional education 
standards out of thin air.  The case of Abbeville County School District v. State (1999) is 
less than eight pages long, and educational adequacy is explained in under a page.  In 
short, because South Carolina’s constitution says “the General Assembly shall provide 
for the maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in 
the state” (S.C. Constitution, article XI, section 3), the court held the General Assembly 
must “provide the opportunity for each child to receive a minimally adequate education” 
(Abbeville, p. 540).  The high court’s definition included a list of subjects plus vocational 
skills.  Since the lower courts set no definition of adequacy, and the opinion offered no 
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history or indication of values besides a brief listing of other adequacy cases, it is 
impossible to link the adequacy standard the court created to judicial values. 
 
Committee for Educational Equality v. State (Mo.,1994). 
In Missouri the legislature responded to the trial court’s demand to change 
education finance before the high court examined the case.  The high court’s discussion 
in Committee for Educational Equality v. State (1994) decided to dismiss the appeal 
because the trial judgment was not final (Id., p. 448).  Because education finance was not 
examined in the state high court, it is not suited to this study. 
 
Roosevelt Elementary School District Number 66 v. Bishop (Ariz.,1994) 
(Roosevelt). 
The case of Roosevelt Elementary School District Number 66 v. Bishop (1994) 
deals principally with facilities, “does not define what constitutes a ‘general and uniform’ 
public school system” (Roosevelt, p. 824), and is inappropriate for this analysis.  Like 
DeRolph and Hunt, the state offered virtually no defense.  It did not file for a motion for 
summary judgment; it did not dispute the facts, and Superintendent of Public Instruction 
Bishop, the nominal defendant in the suit, provided testimony used by the plaintiffs.  The 
majority opinion included two curious rulings.  First they said, “even if every student in 
every district were getting an adequate education, gross facility disparities caused by the 
state’s chosen financing scheme would violate the uniformity clause” (Id., p. 815), 
indicating that the court’s insistence upon uniform facilities was not tied to the facilities’ 
contribution to student learning.  Second, in a bit of circular logic, the majority declared 
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variation in facilities was permissible, but any variation that resulted from the state’s 
chosen financing scheme was unconstitutional (Id., p. 815).  The fact that the state 
financing scheme would have to allow variation if variation were to occur did not deter 
the majority in its opinion.  Joseph Heller would be proud.  “That’s some catch, that 
Catch-22” (Heller, 1955, p. 52).  In a final echo of DeRolph, the dissent declared, “if I 
were in the executive or legislative branch of government and charged with the 
responsibility of fixing the allegedly broken system, I would have no idea where to 
begin” (Id., p. 827). 
 
Discussion of cases decided for the state. 
The case of Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District v. State (Alaska, 1997) 
also deals with capital finance and taxpayer equity rather than educational adequacy.  
Expert testimony revealed Alaska’s school system was equitably funded. 
Pennsylvania’s high court declared the question of if “the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and statutes governing education require the Commonwealth to provide for 
an adequate system of public schools in the [Philadelphia] School District” and “the 
greater and special education needs” (Marrero v. Commonwealth, (Penn., 1998, p. 965) 
of its students was nonjusticiable. 
In the case of Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. 
Chiles (Fla., 1996), Florida’s high court determined “an insufficient showing has been 
made to justify judicial intrusion” (Id., p. 407) into the powers of the legislature.  They 
did not declare Florida’s educational funding system unconstitutional.  The concurring 
opinion said “certainly a minimum threshold exists,” for example, if “a county in this 
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state has a thirty percent illiteracy rate” (Id., p. 409).  The concurring opinions’ emphasis 
on “minimum threshold,” “literate, knowledgeable population,” “not requiring absolute 
uniformity among school districts” and “recognition of the fact that education is 
absolutely essential to a free society” (Id., p. 409) earn value ratings of E2 and S2.  The 
dissent indicated that it would hold for a higher quality of education, saying “I reject the 
view that our education article allows any lesser system of education because it uses the 
word “adequate” as opposed to some superlative like ‘terrific’ or ‘first class,’ etc.” (Id., p. 
411).  The dissent may earn higher value scores, perhaps S3 and E3.  The dissent also 
indicated a greater willingness to “hold the legislature accountable for the responsibility 
and trust placed in it to provide for Florida’s children” (p. 411). 
In the case of School Administrative District No. 1  v. Commissioner, Department 
of Education (Maine, 1995) the plaintiffs did not present, nor did the court consider, an 
adequacy model.  Maine’s constitution provides that the legislature require “the several 
towns to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the support and maintenance 
of public schools” (Maine Constitution, article VIII, part 1, section 1 cited in School 
Administrative District No. 1, p. 857).  Thus this is neither an equity or adequacy case. 
Like Maine, Oregon’s constitution also contains language strongly supporting 
local financing of education.  In the case of Coalition for Equitable School Funding, Inc. 
v. State (Or., 1991), the argument that the education finance system violated Oregon’s 
constitutional call for “a uniform, and general system of Common schools,” (cited Id., p. 
118), uniform taxation and equal protection “was answered by a later-adopted 
constitutional provision that allows the state” (Id., p. 120) to rely on local property taxes 
to fund schools.  Thus the resulting discrepancies were constitutionally permissible.  
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The case of Gould v. Orr (Neb., 1993) affirmed the summary judgment of the 
lower courts in favor of the governor because the “petition clearly claims there is 
disparity in funding among school districts, but does not specifically allege any assertion 
that such disparity in funding is inadequate and results in inadequate schooling” (Gould, 
p. 353).  Consequently this could be considered an equity case that did not present 
adequacy evidence, or enough adequacy evidence to prove a constitutional deficiency.  
The dissent indicated a willingness to review an adequacy case, and it showed that 
diversity of inputs or outputs would be acceptable evidence.  One concurring opinion 
indicated an E2 value, saying the constitution “requires ‘free instruction’ in the ‘common 
schools,’ not the same instruction in all such schools” (Id., p. 355). 
Virginia’s case of Scott v. Commonwealth (Va., 1994) also acknowledges the 
disparities in resources available to different school districts, but like Gould the plaintiffs 
did “not allege that the present system has failed to reach the Standards of Quality” 
(Scott, pp. 140-141).  Like Sundlun below, the Virginia court respected the primary role 
of the legislature in education policy, saying “the General Assembly is empowered to 
make the final decision about both standards of quality and funding” for education.  
Although they acknowledged the importance of education and equity, they explained 
while the elimination of substantial disparity between school divisions 
may be a worthy goal, it is simply not required by the Constitution.  
Consequently, any relief to which the Students may be entitled must come 
from the General Assembly. (Scott, p. 142-143) 
 
In the case of Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar (Ill., 1996) the high 
court in Illinois benefited from both a relatively new constitution (1970) and a relatively 
recent case law (1976) in determining the education financing system was constitutional, 
and the quality of the education system was not subject to judicial analysis.  Because the 
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constitution was only 26 years old, the court in Edgar knew the delegates were aware of 
discrepancies in education funding but did not act to eliminate it (Edgar, p. 1186), so the 
discrepancies could not be considered unimaginable as the Texas court maintained in 
Edgewood I.  Similarly, the court relied on the record of the constitutional convention, 
court cases, and the Baker doctrine of nonjusticiable political questions to decide that   
what constitutes “high quality” education, and how it may best be 
provided, cannot be ascertained by any judicially discoverable standards.  
The constitution provides no principled basis for a judicial definition of 
high quality.  It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever 
standards of quality courts might develop would actually be derived from 
the constitution in any meaningful sense.  Nor is education a subject 
within the judiciary’s field of expertise, such that a judicial role in giving 
content to the education guarantee might be warranted.  Rather, the 
question of educational quality is inherently one of policy involving 
philosophical and practical considerations that call for the exercise of 
legislative and administrative discretion.  To hold that the question of 
education quality is subject to judicial determination would largely 
deprive the members of the general public a voice in a matter which is 
close to the hearts of all individuals in Illinois.  Judicial determination of 
the type of education children should receive and how it can best be 
provided would depend on the opinions of whatever expert witnesses the 
litigants might chose to present.  Members of the general public, however, 
would be obliged to listen in respectful silence. (Id., p. 1191) 
 
As a result, Edgar presents a lucent case for judicial restraint; but it offers no explicit 
judicial values or adequacy model for analysis in this study. 
In his dissent from Edgar, Justice Freeman presents an argument similar to that 
used in Lake View.  That is, the constitutional wording changed so that the “State” rather 
than the “general assembly” was responsible for education, and so “the education system 
provision is a constitutional directive to the three branches of state government” (Edgar, 
p. 1200).  He then goes on to explain “‘The State,’ plainly refers to the preceding ‘People 
of the State,’ which, as I explained, refers to the entire state government” (Id., p. 1200).  
How the state government came to replace the people of the state is unclear in Justice 
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Freeman’s comments, much as how the state and its populace were at odds in 
Sweetland’s observations above.  Justice Freeman maintained also that the “references to 
the constitutional convention record do not constitute such a clear expression of an 
obvious intent of the framers as to allow this court to ignore the unambiguous 
constitutional language,” and he would reverse the 1976 court ruling holding education as 
a political question (Id., p. 1202).  In conclusion Justice Freeman asserts the connection 
between education resources and opportunity, and he declares that the court should issue 
a call for “the legislative and executive departments of state government to recreate and 
reestablish a public school funding scheme” (Id., p. 1206).  It is not clear if there were 
significant differences in values between Justice Freeman and the majority in Edgar 
besides on the proper role of the courts in education policymaking.  
In City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun (R. I., 1995) the high court in Rhode Island 
overturned a lower court decision similar to the adequacy decisions modeled above.  
Compared to other states, Rhode Island had a very well funded education system, very 
small discrepancies between districts, constitutional language less than ten years old 
supporting local funding, and a government tradition in which the General Assembly was 
indisputably first among equals.  While the trial judge combined the word “promote” 
from the constitution with an education department report and the Rose standards for 
adequacy, the high court showed the trial judge misrepresented the history of Rhode 
Island’s constitution, ignored evidence from the recent constitutional convention, 
misrepresented the meaning of words and their context in history, and overstepped the 
court’s role by intruding into the legislature’s domain.  Moreover, the court rejected the 
definition of equity “that requires ‘a sufficient’ amount of money allocated to enable all 
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students to achieve learner outcomes” (Id., p. 61) because the relationship between 
money spent and learner outcomes is so tenuous.  Sundlun is primarily an eloquent 
example of judicial restraint, and the hints of beliefs shown in the opinion are too 
ephemeral to justify scaling. 
 
Summary of cases not modeled 
Of the cases not modeled, Edgewood provides the most interesting link to the 
modeled cases because of the similar creeping of the definition of the constitutional 
education provision in sync with judicial beliefs.  Skeen and Chiles show that differences 
in beliefs can account for the position of judges in the majority or dissent.  Brigham 
compares with Rose in the effectiveness and simplicity of judicial intervention in the 
political process.  In both states the judicial branch was effective because of the 
precarious balance of political forces in the other branches.  Edgar illustrates the 
importance of judicial restraint as well as the willingness of some judges to use the 
constitution to justify avoiding separation of powers.  The power of the lower court in 
Missouri to force the legislature to change funding for education is somewhat parallel to 
that of Judge DeGrasse in CFE II.  That a single judge should force the legislature to do 
things contrary to the previously expressed will of the entire population is noteworthy.  
Sheff seemed to be a singular case; however, the CFE cases also called for the legislature 
to address racial imbalance in the schools.  Some of the forces shaping decisions in the 
cases that did not result in adequacy models seem to be similar to those which shaped 
decisions in the cases modeled above.  
 
219 
CHAPTER V 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Summary 
At worst this analysis consists of little more than “parsing sentences in a two-foot 
stack” of opinions (Roosevelt, 1994, p. 823).  Nevertheless given a model of adequacy, 
measures of beliefs about education and careful reading of high court opinions, there was 
a consistent relationship between the education beliefs judges evinced in their opinions 
and the size and shape of the adequacy remedies they ordered.  Even in cases that did not 
result in an adequacy remedy, judicial beliefs seemed to play some role, if only to 
separate the majority from the dissent. 
The original question asked how judges leap from cryptic constitutional phrases 
to full blown adequacy remedies.  For example, how could a word like “efficient” in 
Kentucky’s constitution come to equal the 141 words of the seven “sufficients” so widely 
quoted from Rose (1990, p. 212) or the 147 words describing the “essential, and minimal, 
characteristics of an ‘efficient’ system of common schools” (Id.)?  While the lengthy 
opinions offered explanations from the plain meaning of the language, precedent and 
history, the beliefs of the individual judges also played a role.  Rose is a good example.  
Given similar status and training plus identical documents and testimony, the seven 
judges in Rose disagreed about what “efficient” meant.  The result reflected a genuine 
consensus of four judges in the majority of five.  One concurring and one dissenting 
judge would have reduced the seven sufficients significantly, and one believed the 
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question was not the court’s to answer.  At least part of the reason for the difference 
could be attributed to their differing beliefs about resources for education, children’s 
entitlement to education, and the role of education in society.  The majority held higher 
beliefs and they ordered a larger remedy.  The concurring and dissenting judges held 
lower beliefs and would have ordered a smaller remedy.  Other cases showed similar 
relationships between judicial beliefs and the results of the cases. 
 
Conclusions 
In light of the preceding, there may be room for modifying Tyack’s comments: 
Legal principles have increasingly been evoked as a source of authority in 
education and other traditional forms of authority, such as professional 
expertise and local majority rule, have been questioned. 
 
Some observers have seen activist judges as heroes of social justice, while 
others have condemned an “imperial judiciary” for exceeding its proper 
scope. (Tyack, 1982, p. 49) 
 
The following paragraphs will use Tyack’s comments as an outline to discuss the 
influence of constitutions, legal precedent and history in shaping decisions.  Next it will 
consider the change of authority for bureaucracies and citizens, and finally it will discuss 
the implications of judges setting educational policy for a representative democracy. 
The law traditionally has been based upon the words in key documents, especially 
constitutions.  Thro said the language of state education clauses  
could be, and probably should be, the determining factor during a third 
wave [of education finance cases].  For example, to somehow hold that a 
Category I clause calling for a system of free public schools of unspecified 
quality is the basis for reform would be ridiculous (1990). 
 
Thro believed that “since the language of the education clauses defines the duty of the 
state legislature, there is a plausible argument that the language of the education clause 
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should be a major, if not decisive, factor in the litigation” (1993, p. 23).  In simplest 
terms, by “looking at the language and comparing the text to provisions in other states, 
one can determine the level of duty, relative to other States, imposed on a particular state 
legislature” (Banks, 1991; Thro, 1993, p, 23).  This analysis of the cases above shows 
that constitutional words are less important than the beliefs of the person saying what 
they mean.  In the serial litigation in Texas, Ohio, Wisconsin, New Hampshire and New 
York the meaning of the state education clause changed measurably over a relatively 
short period of time.  Nothing really changed but the people on the bench and the beliefs 
they brought with them.  In New York and New Jersey the courts seemed to celebrate the 
ongoing redefinition of the meaning of the education clause as a positive thing.  
Specifically, New York’s Category I constitution called for an education system of no 
specific level of quality, yet in CFE II the court demanded a system of very high quality.  
Previous research showed the education clause, at least as read by scholars and laymen, 
was no indication of how a court would rule in an adequacy case (Banks, 1991; Dayton et 
al., 2004; Lundberg, 2000; Swenson, 2000).  Thro suspected that judicial beliefs might be 
the real reason for decisions going one way or another based on his observations of 
Montana and Washington (Thro, 1989, 1990, 1993).  This research confirms Thro’s 
suspicions.  Judicial beliefs are correlated to the outcomes in education finance cases.  
Referring back to Tyack’s comments above, it is not the legal principle, not the plain 
meaning, but the jurist that is key to the outcome of the case.  Rather than being a sea 
anchor preventing the ship of state from being blown too far or too fast by the winds of 
change, some jurists used the constitution as a springboard for shaping state policy 
according to their intuition (Notes, 1977). 
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Precedent and stare decisis were no more dependable reference points than 
constitutional language.  In some of the serial cases just reviewed the position of the 
dissent, rejected in an earlier case, became the majority position and the new law in a 
later case.  The Texas court could not agree on what its last opinion really meant even 
while many of the same judges occupied their seats on the bench.  The New York and 
New Jersey courts wrote their opinions with anticipation clauses, inviting more 
information to change their view of what the constitution meant.  They referred to 
previous cases as only partial answers to what the constitution really meant, and they 
pointed to future cases where that meaning would change again.  Judges using precedent 
seem more akin to theologians using scripture than engineers using formulas and tables. 
The courts’ use of history as an indicator of legal principle is also suspect, 
although not always so.  The McDuffy and Edgewood I decisions delved extensively into 
history and did not stray far from its implications in their decisions.  On the other hand, 
some found a speech by a politician clear evidence that everyone who framed the 
constitution felt a certain way, but then they ignored large swaths of consistent behavior 
that supported a conclusion different from the one they preferred.  For example, in 
Claremont I (1993) the New Hampshire court cited a 1719 law that fined “the selectmen 
of Sundry Towns within this Province” for failing to provide grammar schools (Id., p. 
1380).  This was clearly a penalty for the failure of local financing to provide for schools.  
Additionally the court declared, “we are unpersuaded by the State’s argument that the 
fact that no State funding was provided at all for education in the first fifty years after 
ratification of the constitution demonstrates that the framers did not believe part II, article 
83 to impose any obligation on the State to provide funding” (Id., p. 1381, emphasis 
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added).  Both examples support the primacy of local financing over state financing, yet 
the court reached the opposite conclusion.  In Robinson (1973), too, the contrast between 
the cited history and the outcome was striking.  
Tyack refers to the apparent loss of power of traditional authorities as the courts 
exerted more influence in education.  Professional expertise might not have lost its 
power, but it might be exercised now in a different venue and for a different master.  The 
DeRolph and Hunt cases seem to show some bureaucrats can use the courts to enhance 
their power, forcing legislatures to provide more funding for their departments (Sandler 
& Schoenbrod, 2003).  Local school districts, unions, advocacy groups, and sometimes 
even legislators are turning to the courts to obtain the resources they could not obtain 
from the legislatures.  If the iron triangle relationship hypothesized in DeRolph and Hunt 
is real, then the bureaucrats have freed themselves from accountability to the public and 
have found a powerful new ally in the courts.  Adequacy litigation in Kentucky has been 
renewed partly because the education portion of the state budget fell from approximately 
46.6 to 41 percent (Day, 2003, p. 25).  Educators want a higher percentage of the state’s 
tax revenues, and they are going to the courts to try to get what they want.  Courts force 
the legislatures to provide for things bureaucrats might not have obtained in the past.  A 
new symbiosis has emerged.  The courts have augmented their power with that of the 
bureaucratic experts, whose ideas exert influence in courtrooms, and the bureaucrats who 
share the courts’ objectives have augmented their power through the courts.  
Referring again to Tyack’s 1982 analysis, the power that seems most diminished 
is majority rule, either local or statewide.  By directing educational spending courts have 
assumed power that used to reside in the people and the legislature.  Ladd and Hansen 
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explained that “adequacy is exclusively focused on schoolchildren and does not embrace 
taxpayers as objects of concern” (1999, p. 102, Berne & Stiefel, 1979).  In CFE II the 
court effectively levied a tax upon the entire state to provide enhanced education to an 
already well-funded district without the consent of the legislature or the public.   
Decisions about education are necessarily value laden, and the power of values to 
shape outcomes is apparent in this research.  On September 29, 2004 Antonin Scalia said 
what I am questioning is the propriety, indeed the sanity, of having value-
laden decisions…made for the entire society by judges” (Gavel, 2004). 
 
In reducing the influence of majority rule, judges in adequacy cases assert the primacy of 
their values in education policy making.   
The bottom line in education finance cases is the amount of money dedicated to 
education.  Assuming the state treats all students about equally, the fundamental question 
then becomes whether funding at the level designated by the legislature meets the 
constitutional standard, or if it requires a bit more than what the legislature provided.  
Can a constitutional standard like “efficient” be reasonably read to determine that it 
requires some percentage higher than the current level, or does a reasonable reading of 
the constitution preclude such fine tuning?  According to Judge L. Ralph Smith 
to decide such an abstract question of “adequate” funding, the courts 
would necessarily be required to subjectively evaluate the Legislature’s 
value judgments as to the spending priorities to be assigned to the state’s 
many needs, education being one among them.  In short, the Court would 
have to usurp and oversee the appropriations power, either directly or 
indirectly, in order to grant the relief sought by Plaintiffs. (Chiles, 1996, 
emphasis added) 
 
John Rose, nominal defendant in the Rose (1989) case made the following observation 
about Judge Corn’s lower court ruling: 
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What Judge Corns wanted to do was appoint a committee.  And initially 
[he] wanted myself and Speaker Blandford and other people in the 
legislature [to] serve on that committee, to develop a plan for education 
and then to bring that plan back to him.  And he would decide if that’s 
what needed to be done. (Interview by William McCann, Jr., 10 October 
1990, cited in Day, 2003, p. 171) 
 
By actively interpreting constitutional phrases according to their beliefs about resources, 
school’s role in society and student entitlements, judges appear to be raising legislative 
questions into constitutional questions in order to enact their policy preferences.   
Illinois Constitutional Delegate Fogal envisioned a dialogue between the 
legislature and the people in setting education policy.   
Quality “means different things to different people.  We had in mind the 
highest, the most excellent educational system possible; leave this up to 
the determination of the legislature and your local districts, and let the 
citizens keep pushing for higher-quality education. (Proceedings of the 
Illinois Constitutional Convention, 767, quoted in Edgar, (1996). 
 
On the other hand, court management takes education policy out of popular and 
legislative control because 
so long as the majority reserves ultimate veto power over any new funding 
system, its protest that it is not retaining control over educational policy in 
Ohio should convince no one. (DeRolph II, 2000, p. 1035) 
 
Whether heroes or villains, judges have become significantly more involved in making 
education policy since Tyack wrote in 1982.  The reduction in majority rule inherent in 
adequacy rulings deserves considered attention. 
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Recommendations 
Recommendations for further study 
The elite values identified by Wirt et al. and the questions they generated provide 
an important basis for further study.  While the answers to questions such as “who has the 
right and responsibility to initiate policy?” (Handler, 1978, p. 31), “what policy ideas are 
deemed unacceptable?,” “what policy-mobilizing activities are deemed appropriate?,” 
and “what are the special conditions of the state that actors believe shape their policy 
making?” (1986, p. 17) have clearly changed as a result of litigation, no comprehensive 
analysis of the shift of power and elites was found for this paper.  If Sandler and 
Schoenbrod (2003) are right in believing that Michael Rebell and his fellow litigators are 
the elites guiding special education policy in New York, and education policy making has 
shifted to other elites across the nation, then this sea change should be documented and 
analyzed (van Geel, 1982, p. 76).  In this same context, if there is a new ruling 
triumvirate of elites, the iron triangle (Adams, 1982) discussed above in relation to 
DeRolph and Hunt, then that too should be examined and documented.   
This study was an overview of cases from several states, and thus it missed the 
entire story of any one case.  The history of education finance cases in the states might be 
the history of a shift in power between the branches of government.  A shift of this 
magnitude deserves intense public and scholarly attention to the dynamics of power in 
the various states and the personalities that manipulate that power.  Who brings the suits?  
Who supports the suits?  Who are the defendants, and to what extent do they support or 
oppose the objectives of the plaintiffs?  Who are the lower court judges who produce the 
initial judgments?  What risks do the various players face, and are they proportional?  If 
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governors and legislators are subject to swift loss of office when facing voter ire, while 
judges are immune from those pressures, is it a fair battle?  How does the Fourth Estate 
factor into the equation?  What are the incentives and risks for lower-level officials?  
Who are the mercenaries in this battle?  How much are they paid?  Who pays them?  
How much power do they wield?  To what extent does their longevity give them power 
over government officials?  Has adequacy litigation resulted in raising achievement as 
well as increasing spending? 
A weakness of this study is its primary focus on court documents.  Future 
research should examine other writings and public pronouncements of influential jurists 
in these cases to determine if the values this study found accurately reflect their 
convictions.  Segal and Cover as well as Danelski recommended different types of 
document analyses to help better understand judicial predispositions.  That technique 
could be useful in future analyses of these cases.  
In sum, education finance litigation, and especially adequacy litigation, has 
profoundly changed the way education is financed and conducted in many states.  Thro 
was disturbed by the thought that different courts “interpret identically worded or nearly 
identically worded provisions but … reach radically different results,” because it might 
“undermine the legitimacy of the state courts in the minds of the lay public” (Thro, 1989, 
p. 1660).  This study demonstrates that judicial beliefs are an indicator of how courts will 
rule.  This too should give the lay public cause for reflection.   
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Appendix B 
 
Operative State Constitutional Phrases 
State Category Operative phrase in the state constitution 
AK 1 “establish and maintain a system of public schools” 
AL I “foster and promote the education of its citizens in a manner consistent with its 
available resources” but “nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as creating 
or recognizing any right to education or training at public expense” 
AZ I “establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system” 
AR II Purposive preamble.  “maintain a general, suitable, and efficient system of free 
public schools” (Grubb Category III) 
CA III Purposive preamble.  “encourage by all suitable means” 
CO II “establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public 
schools” 
CT I “shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state.” 
DE II “establishment and maintenance of a general and efficient system of free public 
schools” 
FL IV “The education of children is a fundamental value”  “It is, therefore, a paramount 
duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing 
within its borders” for a “uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of 
free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education” 
GA IV “The provision of an adequate public education for the citizens shall be a primary 
obligation” 
HI I “establishment, support and control of a statewide system of public schools free from 
sectarian control” 
ID II “establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free 
common schools” 
IL IV “A fundamental goal” “is the educational development of all persons to the limits of 
their capacities” “efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and 
services” 
IN III Purposive preamble.  “encourage by all suitable means” 
IA III “by all suitable means” 
KS I “establishing and maintaining public schools” 
KY II “provide for an efficient system of common schools” 
LA I “establish and maintain a public educational system” 
ME IV Purposive preamble.  “it shall be [the legislature’s] duty to require, the several towns 
to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of 
public schools” 
 
Appendix B (continued) 
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Operative State Constitutional Phrases 
State Category Operative phrase in the state constitution 
MD II “a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools” 
MA I Purposive preamble.  “it shall be the duty of the legislatures and magistrates” “to 
cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them;” 
MI I “maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools” 
MN II Purposive preamble.  “establish a general and uniform system of public schools” 
MS I “provide for the establishment, maintenance and support of free public schools” 
MO I Purposive preamble.  “establish and maintain free schools” 
MT II “develop the full educational potential of each person” “provide a basic system of 
free quality public elementary and secondary schools” 
NE I “provide for the free instruction in the common schools” 
NV III “uniform system of common schools 
NH I Purposive preamble. “it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates” “to 
cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public 
schools” 
NJ II “maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools” 
NM II “uniform system of free public schools sufficient for the education of, and open to, 
all the children of school age in the state” 
NY I “maintenance and support of a system of free common schools” 
NC II Purposive preamble.  “means of education shall forever be encouraged” 
ND II “uniform system of free public schools” 
OH II “secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools” 
OK I “establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools” 
OR II “establishment of a uniform, and general system of Common schools.” 
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Operative State Constitutional Phrases 
State Category Operative phrase in the state constitution 
PA II “maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education” 
RI III Purposive preamble.  “promote public schools and public libraries, and to adopt all 
means which it may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the 
advantages and opportunities of education and public library services” 
SC I “maintenance and support of a system of free public schools” 
SD III “establish and maintain a general and uniform system of public schools” 
TN I “provide for the maintenance, support and eligibility standards of a system of free 
public schools” 
TX II Purposive preamble.  “establish and make suitable provision for the support and 
maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools” 
UT II “establishment and maintenance of the state’s education systems” 
VT I “competent number of schools ought to be maintained in each town” 
VA II “provide for a system of free public elementary and secondary schools” and “ensure 
that an educational program of high quality be established and continually 
maintained” 
WA IV “It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all 
children residing within its borders” 
WV II “thorough and efficient system of free schools.” 
WI II “establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable” 
WY II “The right of the citizens to opportunities for education should have practical 
recognition.  The legislature shall suitably encourage means and agencies calculated 
to advances the sciences and liberal arts.  Purposive preamble.  “establishment and 
maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction” 
Extracted from Mills & McClendon, 2000, Appendix I 
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Appendix C 
 
Validity 
The study used the following procedures to check the validity of the belief scores. 
1.  Four peers familiar with the project were asked to evaluate two cases.  Three agreed to 
read the cases, but only two read the cases and returned their scores. 
2.  The volunteers were given copies of the Rose and Campbell cases, a current copy of 
the methodology, a score sheet, and the author’s analysis of the Hunt case as an example.  
They were asked to read the methodology and the cases, to note quotes which indicated 
judicial beliefs, and to score the judges’ beliefs on the scoresheet. 
3.  The initial round of evaluations is displayed below.  The first letter in the column head 
represents the case or judge: Rose, Wintersheimer, Vance and Campbell.  The second 
letter represents Resources, Entitlement or School’s role in society. 
Appendix C Table 1 
First round validity check 
 RR RE RS WR WE WS VR VE VS CR CE CS 
E 1 4 1.5 1 4 2 5 4 2 4 4 1.5 1 
E 2 2 2 1 4 2 5 4 5 2 2 2 1 
(E1 + E2)/2 3.00 1.75 1.00 4.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 3.50 3.00 3.00 1.75 1.00 
Author 3 2 2 3 2 2 4 4.5 4.5 3 2 2 
Difference 0.00 0.25 1.00 -1.00 0.00 -3.00 0.00 1.00 1.50 0.00 0.25 1.00 
Although the differences ranged from -3.0 to 1.5, the average difference across all 12 
belief scores was 0.08.  Considering the maximum average score was 4.333 ((5+5+4)/3), 
this difference was only 1.79% of the potential score. 
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4.  After the initial round of evaluation, the author sent a copy of his scores to the 
evaluators to explain his scoring.  After reading the author’s rationale, the evaluators 
rescored the cases as shown in Appendix C Table 2. 
Appendix C Table 2 
Second round validity check 
 RR RE RS WR WE WS VR VE VS CR CE CS 
E 1 3 2 2 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 2 2 
E 2 3 2 1 3 2 2 4 5 5 3 2 1 
(E1 + E2)/2 3 2 1.5 3.5 2 2.5 4 4 4.5 3 2 1.5 
Author 3 2 2 3 2 2 4 4.5 4.5 3 2 2 
Difference 0 0 0.5 -0.5 0 -0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 
Although there were still differences between the evaluators and the author, the net 
difference in the second round was zero.   
5.  Delimitations 
Clearly this validity check would have been better with more evaluators; however, asking 
someone to do something as time consuming as reading, evaluating and scoring two court 
cases requires a substantial sacrifice from the evaluators.  Nevertheless, the evaluators’ 
raw impressions during the first round revealed the author’s scoring was reasonably close 
to the mark.  The second round might have been better following a conversation rather 
than simply sharing the author’s scores; however, neither evaluator completely agreed 
with the author even after reading his rationale, but the average of opinions was still 
remarkably close to the author’s evaluation.  
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